Sechitah on Shabbos: Wet Wipes, Bedikah Cloths, and Sponges With Handles

Topics

• Sechitah on Shabbos: Wet Wipes, Bedikah Cloths, and Sponges With Handles
• Continuing the Question of Wet Paper
• Washing Before a Hefsek Taharah
• Does Every Use of a Wet Cloth Express Water?
• Drying the Body and Hair
• A Beged Used as a Sponge
• Can Cleaning Water Be Called Holech Le’ibud?
• Two Separate Considerations in the Proposed Heter
• A Question About Rachel and the Terafim
• The Question of Geneivah Remains
• “Im Lavan Garti” and the Ramban
• Returning to Wet Paper
• Water First, Then the Paper
• The Letter Attributed to Rav Shlomo Zalman
• Reading Reb Moshe’s Teshuvah Carefully
• The Proposed Limits on the Paper-Towel Heter
• A Report in the Name of Reb Reuven
• Wetting an Eid Bedikah
• Clarifying the Uncertain Attribution
• A Sponge With a Beis Achizah
• How Much Pressure Is Being Applied?
• The Linen Plug of a Barrel
• The Aruch HaShulchan’s Explanation
• The Chazon Ish: Liquid Held in a Keli
• What If He Does Not Use the Handle?
• Does a Scrubbing Layer Count as a Beis Achizah?
• Bottle Brushes and Mops
• To Be Continued

Transcript

# Sechitah on Shabbos: Wet Wipes, Bedikah Cloths, and Sponges With Handles

## Continuing the Question of Wet Paper

Yesterday we began taking apart Reb Moshe’s teshuvah in Igros Moshe, Orach Chaim II, siman 70. As we understood his discussion, he permits wetting a paper towel to clean a table because the concern of libun does not apply to the paper in the same way that it applies to a beged.

But I asked a kashya: what happened to the other side of sechitah, the issue of dash? We are using the water to clean. If I press water out of the paper because I want that water on the table, why should the absence of libun answer the entire question?

We suggested a chiddush: perhaps water used to remove dirt is itself considered holech le’ibud. I do not want a usable quantity of water afterward. Its purpose is to clean, and in doing so it becomes dirty and is discarded. That is the sevara we were trying to understand.

We also saw a related discussion attributed to Rav Shlomo Zalman in the corrections and additions to Shemiras Shabbos Kehilchasah. It raised the possibility of treating the liquid in a baby wipe as holech le’ibud. Nevertheless, the passage, as we read it, included a reservation about permitting the case. I want to keep both parts of that discussion: the sevara is there, but it does not automatically become a final heter.

## Washing Before a Hefsek Taharah

Let us take an interesting halachah lemaaseh question. An ishah needs to clean herself before making her bedikah, before the hefsek taharah. Look at Mishnah Berurah, siman 326, se’if katan 6. He discusses an ishah who is preparing to begin wearing levanim on Shabbos or Yom Tov.

He permits washing the soiled areas with water heated before Shabbos or Yom Tov, but he adds a condition: she should wash with her hands rather than with a beged, so that she will not come to sechitah. He also mentions a practice of not beginning the levanim on Shabbos or Yom Tov, and says that where there is no established minhag, it may be permitted. Mishnah Berurah 326:6 says, “רק שתזהר לרחוץ בידים ולא בבגד כדי שלא תבא לידי סחיטה”—she should wash with her hands rather than a cloth, so that she will not come to squeezing.

We clarified that the discussion is about beginning the process associated with the hefsek taharah, rather than simply identifying any day of the shivah nekiyim.

Now let us understand the words “velo bebeged.” Does that mean that any use of a towel or cloth is prohibited? Why? Suppose there is only a little water. How much water is needed for this cleaning? If the cloth is used gently, without an action that expresses water, what exactly is the concern?

One suggestion was that the water will come out when the cloth is applied. But then we need to examine the manner of use. Saying “use it gently” is not an answer if that use nevertheless produces sechitah; conversely, we cannot simply assume that every contact with a wet cloth is sechitah.

Recall the cases we learned yesterday. There is a concern of shema yavo lidei sechitah when a person wants the wetness out of his cloth. There is also the case of tightening muchin in the opening of a vessel containing liquid. There the tightening itself brings about sechitah; that is not merely a possibility that he may later wring out the cloth. Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 320:15–16.

We must distinguish those two kinds of concern before we explain this Mishnah Berurah. Is he warning against a later act of squeezing, or does this particular way of cleaning necessarily express water? That is the question I want to work through.

## Does Every Use of a Wet Cloth Express Water?

Someone argued: “Whenever you wipe with a wet cloth, it comes to sechitah.”

Why must it? If you are merely dabbing the cloth, what makes that squeezing?

The response was that applying the wet cloth itself brings water out. Another participant distinguished between actual squeezing and contact that does not squeeze. That is precisely the point we need to clarify. Sechitah does not require the familiar motion of twisting a towel; pressure that expresses liquid can also be relevant. But we still have to establish what happens in the case before us.

The discussion of baby wipes raises the same question. Common practice alone will not explain the sevara. We have to see what the source says and what manner of use it addresses.

Notice the language of the Mishnah Berurah: “kedei shelo tavo lidei sechitah.” He does not simply write that every such act is already sechitah. Perhaps he is describing washing by using a wet beged as the means of bringing the water to the body. We should not assume that he means ordinary drying afterward.

If you first wet the towel and then use that towel to wash, I understand why expressing water may enter the discussion. On the other hand, the objection remains: if it is used without expressing water, why should it be prohibited merely because the towel is wet?

Someone brought the example of cleaning eyeglasses. A small amount of spray is applied, and then the glasses are wiped with a cloth. The point of the comparison was that a small quantity of moisture need not make the wiping an act of sechitah. That comparison must still be tested against the amount of liquid and manner of use in our case; it does not settle the question by itself.

## Drying the Body and Hair

Let us look at the discussion in Shemiras Shabbos Kehilchasah about drying the body, including the hair, with a towel. The text being read distinguishes ordinary drying from squeezing hair outside the manner of drying.

In the accompanying note attributed to Rav Shlomo Zalman, the suggested leniency is explained through several considerations: the expressed water goes to waste; squeezing hair is not the usual Torah prohibition of squeezing; and, in the case under discussion, the water is immediately absorbed into the towel rather than appearing as a separate, visible quantity.

The comparison made there is to squeezing kevashim and shelakos legufan, where the purpose is the food rather than obtaining the liquid. That is the sevara we are trying to understand.

The discussion then points back to washing one’s face even when one has a beard, and to the ishah preparing levanim who washes the relevant areas. The issue of drying the towel is also addressed through derech lichluch: ordinary drying can soil the towel rather than launder it. We referred to siman 302 and its Biur Halachah in that connection. Shulchan Aruch and Rema 302:10 and Biur Halachah there, s.v. דלא אמרינן, discuss this as derech lichluch, “דהוי דרך לכלוך”—a manner of soiling.

So I want to understand the cheshbon. We wash our hands on Shabbos and dry them with a towel. We wash our faces. Why should this Mishnah Berurah be read as a sweeping prohibition against ordinary drying?

The question is clear: if ordinary drying is permitted, perhaps “velo bebeged” refers to a different operation—wetting the beged first and using it to wash.

## A Beged Used as a Sponge

Perhaps that is the pshat: you make the beged wet first, and then use it to wash. In effect, you are using the cloth as a sponge. Drying the body afterward is a different operation; there you are taking water off the body rather than supplying water from the cloth.

Another suggestion was to compare the area being cleaned to the narrow vessel we discussed previously. In a kos tzar, the cloth is pressed into a confined space, and squeezing can be unavoidable. Perhaps that helps explain this particular case. But someone immediately objected that this is not what the Mishnah Berurah’s language says, and it would not necessarily explain the other cases being discussed. We should leave that comparison as a suggestion, not turn it into the established meaning of the source. Mishnah Berurah 302:60 and Biur Halachah 302:12, s.v. משום.

I still find the broad reading difficult. People wash their hands on Shabbos, including where there is hair, and dry them. We need to identify what changes in the present case.

My proposed explanation is that the Mishnah Berurah is discussing the beged as a means of washing—as a sponge. I am not changing his word “beged” to the word “sponge”; I am explaining the use to which the beged is being put. If it is used only for ordinary drying, perhaps that is outside this particular warning.

One of the chevrah was not comfortable with that reading. He felt that it was dangerous to infer such a distinction from the language. I hear the objection. We are learning the Mishnah Berurah and trying to understand his case, and the explanation must fit his words.

Still, my question remains: do we wipe our hands with a towel on Shabbos? Yes. Then what is the distinction? I have raised this question before, and the discussion attributed to Rav Shlomo Zalman made me want to examine it again. We should press the sevara until we understand it.

## Can Cleaning Water Be Called Holech Le’ibud?

There are really two nekudos I wanted to bring out.

First, perhaps the beged here is being used as a sponge rather than as an ordinary drying towel.

Second, what does this case show about holech le’ibud? Water used for this cleaning surely does not remain as a useful quantity of liquid. If that is the very definition of holech le’ibud, why is there a concern of sechitah? Perhaps using liquid to clean is itself a use of the liquid, even though the dirty water is later discarded.

At that point someone challenged the inference: perhaps the Mishnah Berurah is concerned with libun, not dash. Holech le’ibud belongs to the discussion of extracting liquid. It does not by itself remove a concern of laundering the beged.

That is an important objection. We have to answer both sides of sechitah, each on its own terms. A proof about libun does not necessarily resolve dash, and a sevara about wasted liquid does not necessarily resolve libun.

The note we were reading attributed to Rav Shlomo Zalman also worked with more than one consideration: what happens to the liquid, and the particular nature of the material or act involved. We cannot simply take one line and apply it without its qualifications.

Therefore, the inference I first suggested is not muchrach. The discussion raises a question about the definition of holech le’ibud, but this Mishnah Berurah alone has not established that the sevara is rejected. We still need to identify the source of the prohibition in the case and what exactly is being done.

## Two Separate Considerations in the Proposed Heter

I hear the objection: perhaps the Mishnah Berurah is addressing libun rather than dash. If we want to permit a case, however, we need a cheshbon that addresses both. We cannot leave one of the two concerns unanswered.

Let me state what I am suggesting. The restriction on using a beged to prepare for a bedikah is commonly understood very broadly. My proposed reading is narrower: the cloth is being used as a sponge to wash, in contrast to washing with the hand. I am not convinced that the passage is prohibiting ordinary drying with a towel.

For a proposed heter we would still need two nekudos: no relevant libun, and an answer to the extracting of liquid. We have been exploring whether the second answer can be holech le’ibud. A participant referred to a Yoreh De’ah source that calls a sevara weak, but I do not have its exact location in front of me.

Applying these ideas to baby wipes, one would argue that a paper wipe is not a cloth, and therefore the libun discussion changes. Then one would address dash through the claim that the liquid goes to waste. That is the proposed cheshbon; the dispute over its application is still with us.

People discuss wetter and less-wet wipes, checking the particular product, and squeezing a wipe before Shabbos so that it will not be very wet when used. I have heard these distinctions. But listing what people do is not yet an explanation of the sugya. We must understand why a particular difference matters.

A participant mentioned an oral instruction in this connection. We will discuss that procedure further.

## A Question About Rachel and the Terafim

Let me interrupt with a kashya that has bothered me today. What was wrong with Rachel taking the terafim?

Someone offered the familiar explanation that she incurred liability for geneivah as a bas Noach.

But I do not understand the proposed explanation. These were terafim associated with avodah zarah. What is the relationship between removing that avodah zarah and the claim that this was punishable theft? Simply saying “geneivah of a ben Noach” does not explain all the details of this case.

The discussion then turned to the suggestion that Rachel should have asked before acting. We mentioned similar comments people make about Dinah going out and Reuven’s changing the beds: even where an action seems to make sense, should one first ask? In Rachel’s case, someone suggested that she should have consulted her husband.

My question about the terafim remains. Their nature and use matter to the argument. We cannot conclude that an explanation has answered the case merely by attaching the word “geneivah” to it.

## The Question of Geneivah Remains

Let us understand what is being claimed. The explanation being offered is that Rachel had the din of a bas Noach and that taking the terafim was geneivah. I am asking how that explanation fits the removal of objects of avodah zarah. The exchange did not produce a clear answer.

The Torah records Rachel’s taking the terafim in Bereishis 31:19. Rashi there says, “להפריש את אביה מעבודה זרה נתכוונה”—she intended to separate her father from avodah zarah. Rashi on Bereishis 31:32 relates her death on the journey to Yaakov’s declaration, “lo yichyeh”: “ומאותה קללה מתה רחל בדרך.”

## “Im Lavan Garti” and the Ramban

Something else has bothered me today. How do we understand “im Lavan garti” together with “vetaryag mitzvos shamarti”? How does that fit the Ramban’s explanation that the Avos observed the Torah in Eretz Yisrael, while Yaakov married two sisters in chutz la’aretz?

The wording we are discussing is in Rashi on Bereishis 32:5. The Ramban’s discussion is on Bereishis 26:5. Rashi on Bereishis 32:5 says, “עם לבן הרשע גרתי, ותרי״ג מצות שמרתי, ולא למדתי ממעשיו הרעים”—I lived with the wicked Lavan, kept the 613 mitzvos, and did not learn from his evil deeds. The Ramban on Bereishis 26:5 says, “ושמירתו אותה היה בארץ בלבד, ויעקב בחוצה לארץ נשא האחיות”—his observance was in the Land alone, and Yaakov married the sisters outside the Land.

One answer suggested distinguishing shamarti from kiyamti. Another response was that Yaakov was not yet commanded in the Torah in the way that Klal Yisrael would be after Matan Torah.

I hear that. But my question is not merely whether he was legally over an issur. I am asking how the statement “taryag mitzvos shamarti” is understood alongside the Ramban’s particular explanation. If one says that he did not observe this practice in chutz la’aretz, what precisely does “shamarti” mean here?

There are different terutzim. We mentioned the Nefesh HaChaim’s distinction concerning the Avos before Matan Torah. There, their conduct is discussed in terms of their spiritual understanding, rather than obedience to the later binding command. That helps identify a different approach, but I still want to understand the Ramban on his own terms. Nefesh HaChaim I:21 says, “לא שהיו מצווים ועושים כך מצד הדין”—it was not that they were commanded and acted thus as a matter of binding law.

I may have missed something in the discussion; I am not claiming that there is no answer. I am saying that the kashya needs a clear formulation and a teretz that addresses it.

We also returned briefly to Rachel: if Yaakov’s words brought about the klalah, why did she not die immediately? Someone brought in Yosef’s name in connection with a suggested explanation. That question was raised as well.

## Returning to Wet Paper

Let us get back to our sugya. As we were reading Reb Moshe’s teshuvah, paper may be wetted and used to clean a table. We asked whether that reasoning would extend to cleaning a baby.

I was told a different procedure in an oral discussion attributed in the transcript to Rav Belsky: first apply water to the baby, and then wipe with a paper tissue. The order is the point—water first, paper afterward.

Why should that order matter? The explanation being offered was a form of ke’achar yad. Let us look at the Mishnah Berurah cited in connection with that claim.

A baby wipe combines moisture with the wiping material. The suggested procedure supplies the water separately. We now need to see which melachah is under discussion and whether the comparison actually supports the proposed distinction.

## Water First, Then the Paper

The oral report was that this order had been used when cleaning a baby in connection with a bris: first the water, then the wiping material. Again, the report specifically concerned paper tissues. It was not a statement that every wet cloth may be used in every way.

The citation brought was Mishnah Berurah 326:28. That passage discusses washing with bran: instead of first mixing bran with water, one takes it in already-wet hands. It describes gibul ke’achar yad. Mishnah Berurah 326:28 calls this “דגיבול כלאחר יד הוא”—kneading in an unusual manner.

If the baby wipe itself were permitted, why would a different procedure be needed? That is the question being asked. People are very anxious about these wipes, and there are also practical difficulties with materials that tear or fall apart. But anxiety, familiarity, and convenience do not determine the halachic cheshbon. We have to learn the source.

## The Letter Attributed to Rav Shlomo Zalman

I saw a discussion brought by Rav Yadler in a sefer we referred to as Pninim Or.

The writer reports hearing a lenient view attributed to Rav Shlomo Zalman concerning moist, disposable paper tissues. He asks whether this includes material wet enough to be tofe’ach al menas lehatpi’ach.

The discussion refers to Shemiras Shabbos Kehilchasah, chapter 14, se’if 33 in the edition being used, concerning a tissue containing perfumed moisture—the kind provided on an airplane—to wipe the face or hands. The writer considers whether that case is limited to moisture that is not expressed during use.

That takes us back to the same distinction: applying a damp material is not necessarily the same as squeezing liquid out of it. How wet is it, and what happens when it is used?

As the letter was read in the shiur, Rav Shlomo Zalman’s response began with uncertainty about wet paper. It raised the possibility that when wiping a soiled baby, both the paper and all the liquid are destined for disposal, including the moisture that remains absorbed in the paper.

That is the sevara I have been emphasizing. We are not collecting useful water afterward. The material and its liquid are thrown away. But he says that he is mesupak. We have to hear that as well.

## Reading Reb Moshe’s Teshuvah Carefully

The writer then discusses Reb Moshe’s teshuvah and suggests that its permission may be limited by factors that do not apply to the case being debated.

Before we examine those limitations, let me make something clear. I may speak sharply when learning an argument. I am not being mevatel a talmid chacham. I am trying to understand what the argument means and whether it follows from the teshuvah.

The first distinction being introduced concerns the kind of paper and the way the water is held: is the paper thick, is liquid absorbed into it, or is the wetness of a different kind? Let us continue those distinctions.

My objection throughout is that one must identify the actual libun or dash in the case. Calling something sechitah does not replace the cheshbon. At the same time, calling the paper disposable does not answer every possible objection. We have to read the reasoning with all its qualifications.

## The Proposed Limits on the Paper-Towel Heter

The first limitation being suggested is thick paper rather than thin tissue paper. But we have to ask whether that distinction actually describes the products under discussion. Some wipes are themselves quite substantial. It is not enough to say “paper” in one case and “tissue” in another; the physical distinction needs to be clear.

The second limitation concerns intention. The writer understands Reb Moshe’s case as one in which there is enough water already present that the person need not wipe forcefully to obtain more. On that reading, the person is not intending to express liquid. With a moist wipe, the argument goes, he may specifically want liquid to come out to help with the cleaning.

I am trying to understand that difference. Is the water only making the paper easier to use, or is the water itself the cleaning agent that I want to express? That is a real distinction to examine, but I did not understand the teshuvah as having been limited in this particular way.

A third point concerns derech sechitah. Perhaps squeezing paper was not the normal manner of doing this, but if using moist wipes becomes a widespread, ordinary practice, can we still call it unusual? That is not a bad sevara. Whether an action is the derech can depend on how people normally perform it.

Finally, the writer questions the use of holech le’ibud: if I need the liquid for cleaning, perhaps its eventual disposal is not enough to remove the concern. We are back to the central question.

## A Report in the Name of Reb Reuven

The discussion cites a sefer called Chinuch BaHalachah. Who is its author? I am not sure. It reports an explanation in Reb Reuven’s name: the wet paper in Igros Moshe is used gently to gather crumbs, with the moisture softening the paper, rather than to obtain water for cleaning.

We also mentioned articles quoting The Shabbos Kitchen, called “Shabbos Bamitbach” in the Hebrew discussion. I offered the material to someone who wanted to examine the points inside.

The two principal claims being made are that Reb Moshe did not mean to permit baby wipes, and that even his wet-paper case permits gathering crumbs rather than using the water to clean. I had not learned the teshuvah that way. These claims need to be checked inside before they can be treated as its definitive meaning.

We again mentioned the practice of squeezing wipes before Shabbos. That is one procedure people use, but it does not resolve how to read the responsum.

## Wetting an Eid Bedikah

Now let us discuss an eid bedikah. Sometimes the cloth is difficult or uncomfortable to use. May it be wetted on Shabbos?

Reb Azriel told me in Rav Shlomo Zalman’s name that it could be wetted, with the explanation of derech lichluch.

There is also a restrictive view attributed here to Rav Elyashiv. But I must be honest: I have notes in front of me, and I do not remember where I obtained this particular attribution. One version distinguishes between wetting the cloth itself and first applying water to the body. Another appears to prohibit even the latter procedure.

Those are three different possibilities: wetting the eid directly, applying water first and then using the eid, or permitting neither. We cannot merge them into one ruling when I myself do not remember the source.

Perhaps the restrictive reasoning is connected to our earlier case of a confined place in which the cloth will be pressed and liquid expressed. That is a suggested comparison to the discussion of a narrow vessel in Shulchan Aruch 302:12 and its Mishnah Berurah and Biur Halachah. It is not a verified explanation of Rav Elyashiv’s view.

## Clarifying the Uncertain Attribution

I wrote Rav Elyashiv’s name here, but I do not remember where the ruling comes from. I will have to look for it; presumably I have the source recorded elsewhere.

Again, the distinction is between wetting the bedikah cloth itself and putting water on the body first. Reb Azriel reported that Rav Shlomo Zalman permitted the former. Someone suggested that the latter should be a better heter. Perhaps—but if the subsequent use takes place in a confined area and necessarily presses out liquid, the same sechitah question may arise. I am not resolving the three alternatives from these incomplete notes.

We then briefly discussed washing with water for personal cleanliness. I related an account of a bachur who did not want to continue learning with his chavrusa because of a disagreement about that practice, and the upset it caused. I do not want to develop that tangent further; let us return to the sugya.

Someone then asked about material used to ease a bedikah. We distinguished clear jelly from an opaque or Vaseline-type material that could interfere with seeing a red mark. I said that lechatchilah it is better to avoid it, while distinguishing the clear material from the type that can obscure a mark.

## A Sponge With a Beis Achizah

Let us move to se’if 17 in siman 320. A sefog is a sponge. The Shulchan Aruch says that it is not used for wiping unless it has a beis achizah, a place by which to hold it. The concern is sechitah.

Now pay attention to the Mishnah Berurah, se’if katan 47. He presents two explanations. According to the explanation he attributes to Rashi and the Rambam, a handle makes it possible to wipe without squeezing. According to the Raavad’s explanation, even where liquid is expressed, the handled sponge is compared to a vessel of water from which one pours.

The Mishnah Berurah uses the word or—leather—in discussing the grip. Keep that in mind. Modern sponges may have a vinyl or plastic layer. Does that count as a beis achizah? We are going to have to examine the function of that layer rather than simply call every additional surface a handle.

Mishnah Berurah 320:47 expresses the Raavad’s comparison as “הוי כצלוחית מלא מים שמריק ממנו מים”—like a vessel full of water from which he pours water. The Raavad’s comparison is striking. Pouring water out of a cup is not mefarek. His explanation compares the water leaving this sponge, with its beis achizah, to that act.

I want to suggest a major nafka minah between these two explanations. If the Rambam’s reason is that the handle allows use without squeezing, the permission depends on how it is used. But if the Raavad’s reason changes the way the act itself is classified, perhaps the result will differ even when pressure expresses liquid. Let us develop that carefully.

## How Much Pressure Is Being Applied?

How hard is the person wiping?

According to the Rambam’s explanation as presented in Mishnah Berurah 320:47, the beis achizah allows wiping without sechitah. If he presses so hard that he actually expresses liquid, what has the handle accomplished? The reason for the heter would no longer fit that action.

According to the Raavad’s explanation, however, perhaps even that expression of liquid is understood as emptying water from a vessel. That suggests a substantial nafka minah. I am proposing an implication of the two explanations; we still need to see how the halachah is understood.

## The Linen Plug of a Barrel

Look at Shulchan Aruch 320:18 and Mishnah Berurah, se’if katan 55.

The case is a barrel plugged with linen. The Shulchan Aruch records opposing views about an act that inevitably expresses liquid where the person does not benefit from it. He then discusses the common practice and the argument that a long spigot extends beyond the fibers, so that the hand does not directly touch them. That is compared to a sponge with a beis achizah.

Nevertheless, the Shulchan Aruch says that this argument is not strong and that there is room to question it. He therefore advises arranging matters so that no vessel stands beneath the barrel when the opening is plugged.

What does that hesitation mean? We just learned that a sponge with a handle is permitted. Is the entire principle of beis achizah now doubtful?

The Mishnah Berurah explains the difference: the sponge is used for ordinary wiping—“דאין שם אלא קינוח בעלמא”—whereas here the spigot is pushed forcefully into the opening and squeezing certainly occurs.

That seems to support the reading we proposed in the Rambam: the handle helps where the manner of use avoids squeezing. It does not permit every forceful act merely because the hand is separated from the absorbent material.

I want to suggest that this points to the Mishnah Berurah applying the Rambam’s explanation in this discussion. According to the broader implication we proposed in the Raavad, we would have expected a different result. This is my inference from the comparison, and it needs to be assessed as such.

## The Aruch HaShulchan’s Explanation

The Aruch HaShulchan, siman 320, se’if 31, brings the Raavad’s comparison to pouring from a vessel and explains it as “כלומר שאינה דרך סחיטה”—that is to say, it is not the manner of squeezing. I am explaining that through shinui.

But now we have to ask: why should a change in manner suffice here? Can someone simply squeeze an apple with a shinui and thereby permit it? One cannot assume that every rabbinic concern disappears whenever an action is unusual.

That question is part of understanding the explanation. We have not yet shown how far it extends or which feature of the handled sponge makes the difference.

Before I press that further, let us look at a different mahalach attributed to the Chazon Ish. It focuses on the relationship between the liquid and the material that holds it.

## The Chazon Ish: Liquid Held in a Keli

The Chazon Ish, siman 56, se’if katan 5, has a lomdishe explanation of the handled sponge. Let us look at the sevara.

In ordinary squeezing, the mashkeh is absorbed into the material, and bringing it out is mefarek. In the explanation we are considering, the beis achizah gives the sponge a different character: it is a keli holding liquid. Its water is not treated in the same way as liquid absorbed and subordinate to an ordinary material.

Someone pressed the question: what does it mean to call the water batel? A sponge is used precisely to take in water and then release it. Why should that water be considered absorbed in a way that makes its release mefarek?

That is the point we were trying to formulate. Lefi this mahalach, the formal character of the object as a keli changes the way its liquid is regarded. The comparison is not simply that one performs the act differently. It is that emptying the keli is not the same act as extracting absorbed liquid from an ordinary substance.

The contrast being discussed is clear: the Aruch HaShulchan’s explanation of she’einah derech sechitah is being considered through the manner of use, while the interpretation attributed to the Chazon Ish focuses on the status of the sponge as a keli.

## What If He Does Not Use the Handle?

Now I want to suggest a nafka minah. Suppose the sponge has a handle, but the person does not hold the handle. He takes hold of the sponge itself and wipes. The handle is present, but he is not using it.

If the heter depends on actually performing the act with a shinui, perhaps he has lost that feature. He is using the sponge in the ordinary way.

But if the handle gives the object the status of a keli, perhaps its status remains even when he holds the absorbent part. The handle does not disappear merely because he is not gripping it.

That is the suggested difference. We have to read the Chazon Ish inside and see whether that consequence follows. We did not have the Aruch HaShulchan immediately available during this exchange,

Now the Raavad’s language is striking: like pouring from a vessel of water. We commonly explain that by saying that the water is not absorbed into the cup. The mahalach being proposed asks us to focus on the fact that it is a cup—a keli—and that releasing its water is its function.

I am repeating the point because it changes the question. Is the heter tied to the manner in which the person holds and uses the object, or to the object’s status? The example of gripping the sponge rather than the handle is meant to test that distinction. It remains a proposed nafka minah, not a concluded psak.

## Does a Scrubbing Layer Count as a Beis Achizah?

Let us clarify the practical question we mentioned. Have you seen a sponge with a thin vinyl or plastic layer, a scrubbing surface attached to the sponge? Does that layer count as a beis achizah?

It would seem to depend on what the beis achizah accomplishes. If its function is to allow wiping without squeezing, we must ask whether holding this particular surface actually does that. Merely pointing to a piece of vinyl is not an answer.

If the explanation is a different manner of performing the act, we must ask whether that manner is a shinui. Perhaps everybody ordinarily uses that sponge in precisely this way. And if the explanation turns on the status of the object as a keli, we need to see whether this sort of attached surface gives it that status.

I do not know the answer from what we have established so far. That is the she’eilah.

## Bottle Brushes and Mops

Here is another question I have never understood fully. Why is a bottle brush prohibited in the discussions people commonly quote? Some brushes are plastic. It depends on the bristles and on how the brush works. We had once brought examples to examine.

People bring a restrictive view in Rav Moshe’s name.

My question is that the brush has a handle. If a beis achizah explains the heter of the sponge, why does that not settle the bottle-brush case? Of course, that question itself requires us to understand whether its bristles hold and express liquid in the relevant manner, and which explanation of beis achizah we are applying.

Similarly, what about a mop? It has a handle. Yet people bring a prohibition on using it. Why is the presence of a handle not sufficient?

These are questions we have opened, not permissions we have established. The different materials, manner of use, and explanations of the sponge may matter. We have not completed that analysis.

## To Be Continued

We will continue tomorrow. This sugya is complicated, and we have not finished it.

I also want to show you the later Mishnah Berurah relevant to how we pasken. We will have to continue this inside.

We are waiting for the minyan. Is the recording on?