Hilchos Tochen: Cutting and Crushing Vegetables, Shinui, and the Heter of Le’alter
Original title: 091230_000.mp3
An intensive Hilchos Shabbos shiur on melachas Tochen, comparing fine chopping to crushing or pounding, the Chazon Ish's interpretation of a Tosefta concerning elderly eaters, the role of...
- Category
- Halacha
- Subcategory
- Orach Chaim
- Sub-subcategory
- Shabbos Halacha
- Duration
- 0:30:24
- Recording year
- 2009
Topics
- Hilchos Shabbos: Tochen, Chituch, Ketishah, and Shinui
- Returning to Yesterday's Sugya
- The Chazon Ish's Reading of the Tosefta
- The Difference Between Cutting and Crushing
- "Chayav" or Merely "Asur"?
- A Butter Knife as a Shinui
- Mishnah Berurah: Vegetables That Can Be Eaten Raw
- The Problem of "Ein Techinah B'Ochlin"
- The Tur, the Rishonim, and the Meaning of Chiyuv Chatas
- The Rambam: "Kedei Levashelo"
- Reading the Mishnah Berurah Again
- Onions, Karpas, and What It Means to Be Edible Raw
- Let's Make a Chazarah
- The Chazon Ish and the Rema Again
- Potatoes, Cucumbers, and the Ordinary Derech of Preparation
- Returning to the Dull Knife
- A Close Reading of Mishnah Berurah 321:38
- What About the Rambam's Purpose of Cooking?
- The Unfinished Question: Does Tochen Require a New Tikkun?
Transcript
# Hilchos Shabbos: Tochen, Chituch, Ketishah, and Shinui
## Returning to Yesterday's Sugya
Rabosai, before we begin, take the sefarim or recordings that you need. There are two parts; make sure you have part one and part two. Don't be frightened if the beginning is a little difficult. We have to work through the lomdus properly before we can appreciate the practical halachah.
Now, yesterday we began clarifying **melachas Tochen**, and particularly **mechatech**, cutting food into very small pieces. We asked a practical question. Suppose a person has vegetables that people normally **chop**. What if, instead of slicing them finely, he uses the **back of a fork to crush them**?
Take a cucumber as our example. Ordinarily you cut a cucumber into small pieces. Perhaps it is a *shinui* if you press it with the back of a fork and mash it instead. If fine chopping is the problematic act, maybe crushing it in such an unusual way should be permitted.
But now I want to bring the **Chazon Ish**, because his explanation may seem to point exactly in the opposite direction.
## The Chazon Ish's Reading of the Tosefta
We were bothered by a **Tosefta** concerning cutting or crushing dried fruits and foods for **zekeinim**, elderly people who cannot eat them in their ordinary form. [The precise Tosefta reference and exact text need verification against the original; the transcription is unclear.]
What is the Tosefta teaching? If a person prepares the food **le'alter**, immediately before eating, we have learned that certain forms of fine chopping may be permitted. If he prepares it for later, then the problem is obvious. So why does the Tosefta mention elderly people who cannot eat the food?
What special role does their inability to eat play in the halachah? That was the kashya.
The **Pri Megadim**, as we discussed yesterday, can be understood to say that a food which cannot be eaten in its present form presents a greater problem of **tikkun ha'ochel**. Even if the person prepares it close to the time of eating, the act makes an otherwise unsuitable food edible. **Rav Moshe Feinstein** is cited in the shiur as developing a similar explanation of the Rema. [The exact texts of those attributions remain to be checked.]
But the **Chazon Ish, Orach Chaim 57**, takes a different approach.
He distinguishes between **chituch**, cutting food into small pieces, and **ketishah**, crushing or pounding. The leniency for chopping food *le'alter* does not necessarily extend to actual pounding, because **ketishah resembles the principal melachah of grinding much more closely**.
In other words, where the Rema or Tosefta appears to speak about cutting, the Chazon Ish understands the particular case as **ketishah**. He says the act is a true form of *techinah*, not merely cutting food for immediate eating.
Now that's a major chiddush.
We had said that using the back of a fork to **crush a cucumber** might be easier than chopping it finely. The Chazon Ish seems to say the opposite: **crushing can be worse than chopping!**
But perhaps we must distinguish the kinds of food. The dried figs and carobs in the Tosefta are foods which people might naturally **crush** to make them edible. Their usual preparation may be by pounding. A cucumber, on the other hand, is not normally crushed that way; people ordinarily slice it.
So perhaps even according to the Chazon Ish, the cucumber could still be different because the **derech** of preparation is different.
This is exactly what I want the olam to appreciate. Don't reduce the sugya to "cutting is asur, crushing is mutar." There are multiple considerations: **what food is it, what is its normal way of preparation, what action is being performed, and when will it be eaten?**
We are beginning to see that the shape of a **shinui** may depend on what would normally be done to this specific food.
## The Difference Between Cutting and Crushing
Let's continue with that Chazon Ish. The more you think about it, the more surprising it becomes. We were suggesting that **crushing a cucumber with a fork** might constitute a shinui and therefore be easier than cutting the cucumber very finely.
But **ketishah** can be the very form of *techinah* that the Chazon Ish considers **more serious** than *chituch*. Why? Because pounding is closer to true grinding. Cutting is an offshoot, a *toldah*, that resembles grinding in the sense that one object becomes many smaller pieces, but crushing can be almost the same as grinding itself.
Now you have to ask: **is the nature of the action determined by what people normally do to that food?**
Nobody ordinarily crushes a cucumber into a paste. A tomato might be crushed in certain salads or dips. A potato is very commonly mashed—after it has been cooked. A person must understand whether the act is an ordinary form of preparing the food or a genuine shinui.
I am not saying that every unusual method is automatically mutar. We have to compare what the Chazon Ish says with the other Acharonim and ask which types of change actually help.
We were discussing a *sevara* that a food **not ordinarily cut finely** might be different from foods regularly chopped into fine pieces. Maybe the din of *mechatech yerek dak dak* applies in the clearest form when that is its usual method of preparation.
But there is also the **nature of the melachah**. The Chazon Ish's argument is that **ketishah itself is so similar to techinah** that the mere fact it is done *le'alter* may not provide the same heter as immediate chopping.
You see now why a person's initial guess—"I'll crush instead of chop, so it must be easier"—does not settle the shailah.
## "Chayav" or Merely "Asur"?
Now look at the language of the **Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 321:12**: **"המחתך הירק דק דק חייב משום טוחן"**—one who cuts a vegetable into very fine pieces is liable under *Tochen*.
But the **Tur** and some Rishonim discuss the case using the expression **"אסור"**, forbidden. We asked whether their choice of language points to a distinction between **an actual Torah liability** and a rabbinic prohibition in certain forms of chopping.
Some Rishonim consider fine chopping less directly related to grinding than pounding. If so, perhaps this supports the possibility of a lesser issur in some circumstances, and therefore different rules about **shinui** or **le'alter**.
But listen, rabosai. We cannot say that because an authority uses the word **asur**, the case is necessarily only derabbanan. Sometimes asur is simply a general expression. We have to see the context and the author's actual position.
And the **Mishnah Berurah** discusses the possibility of **chiyuv chatas** in the case of very fine chopping, which certainly suggests that he is not automatically regarding every form of *mechatech yerek* as a merely rabbinic concern.
I want you to see why the language matters. If something is genuinely a *melachah de'oraisa*, a person who commits it unintentionally may have liability for a chatas in the proper circumstances. If a case is only *derabbanan*, it would be inaccurate to speak of that same liability.
So which is it? How do we reconcile the apparently different formulations? That is the kashya the olam is struggling with tonight.
### A Butter Knife as a Shinui
We also spoke yesterday about another possible **shinui**.
Suppose instead of using a sharp kitchen knife designed for fine chopping, the person takes a **dull, blunt butter knife**, the kind used to spread butter or cut something soft. It is difficult and inconvenient to chop vegetables very finely with that knife.
Perhaps that itself is a **shinui in the manner of cutting**, and perhaps for certain foods the change is sufficient without the two changes sometimes required in other cases.
I connected this to discussions in the **Rav Pe'alim**, which address the number and character of shinuyim involved in preparing foods. The exact responsum requires verification before treating my suggestion as a psak.
Don't walk away and announce, "The Rabbi said you can cut any vegetable into tiny pieces with a butter knife." I'm proposing a possible *sevara*: that using an instrument not normally suited to that precise action may count as a change.
But what if the change is merely inconvenient? What if it produces exactly the ordinary result using a slightly less efficient tool? How different must the action be to have a meaningful halachic shinui?
Those are the questions.
And our earlier example of **pepper** is helpful. If people ordinarily **crush peppercorns**, then cutting them into tiny pieces with a knife might be the unusual method. We learned about the halachos of *ketishas pilpelin* and whether changing the method makes a difference.
This is why I keep bringing the olam back to the facts. For each food we need to ask: **what is the normal derech of its preparation?**
We have not yet resolved the cucumber, the banana, or the potato. We're building the distinctions that will let us analyze them.
## Mishnah Berurah: Vegetables That Can Be Eaten Raw
Let's take a look at the **Mishnah Berurah**, **Orach Chaim 321, se'if katan 38**, where he discusses the law of cutting detached vegetables. He writes, in substance, that from the language of the Shulchan Aruch it appears that the prohibition concerns **even vegetables fit to be eaten raw**.
Now I want to ask you: **what does the fact that the vegetable can be eaten raw have to do with the melachah of Tochen?**
If we were discussing **Bishul**, I could understand it. Perhaps a food already fit to be eaten raw stands differently in relation to cooking. But why should that decide whether **cutting it into small pieces** is called grinding?
Someone suggests that "fit to be eaten raw" means **fit to be eaten without this particular cutting**. If I can take a cucumber and bite into it as it is, then the vegetable is already a finished food. The chopping simply makes it more convenient. Maybe that means the act is not an essential *tikkun*.
That's a beautiful idea. We developed it yesterday, and some of the olam liked it very much.
But I want to test it. Suppose the vegetable is an **onion**. Most people don't take a whole onion and eat it like an apple. They chop it into small pieces and mix it into another food. The chopping contributes significantly to making it suitable for the way it will be eaten.
Could it be that an onion is the classic case of **mechatech yerek dak dak**, while a cucumber is not?
If so, that might explain why some authorities speak very severely about finely cutting onions or radishes in advance, perhaps even discussing whether the resulting food may be eaten.
But is that really what the Mishnah Berurah means? We have to be careful. A vegetable can be **edible raw** and still be normally eaten only after cutting or mixing. And not every kind of chopping that makes food convenient becomes a de'oraisa act.
### The Problem of "Ein Techinah B'Ochlin"
Now here's another famous expression: **"אין טחינה באוכלין"**, that there is no grinding in food in certain circumstances or according to certain opinions.
But what does that mean in our sugya? Do we accept it as a general rule? What kinds of foods are included? And what about vegetables that grow from the ground?
We discussed the similar expression about **ibud b'ochlin**, the laws of processing foods, and I think I may have confused the two discussions in the middle of the shiur. Give me a minute. I'm tired tonight, rabosai. I had a very difficult day, and I need the olam to help me keep the sources straight.
Somebody finds the Mishnah Berurah. We read it together. Ah, that text was about **ibud**, not necessarily about **Tochen**. Fine, then I retract that particular comparison.
But the question remains: How can we discuss **chiyuv chatas** in the same sugya where there are positions that limit the prohibition of grinding already prepared foods?
Remember, the laws concerning food which has **already been ground or cooked** may differ from those concerning cutting a newly harvested vegetable into tiny pieces. And the rule of *ein techinah achar techinah* also needs to be understood in its particular cases.
I am not telling you that there is no Torah prohibition in chopping food. Quite the opposite: the **Shulchan Aruch** uses the word **chayav**, and the **Mishnah Berurah** takes the matter seriously.
I am asking how **the Rishonim and Acharonim** define the action. Is it a full *toldah* of Tochen, or does its classification depend on the kind of food, the purpose of cutting, and how it is ordinarily prepared?
That's a strong kashya.
And our discussion keeps returning to the difference between **chituch** and **ketishah**. If crushing is more directly comparable to grinding, perhaps the rules of immediate preparation and shinui are more restrictive there. But then how do we understand the different language in the poskim regarding fine chopping?
I want us to work it through, not rush to a conclusion.
## The Tur, the Rishonim, and the Meaning of Chiyuv Chatas
Now let's return to our kashya. The **Tur** speaks about cutting vegetables very finely using the language of **asur**, whereas the **Shulchan Aruch** uses **chayav**. The **Mishnah Berurah** appears to take that liability seriously.
So if you tell me that *mechatech yerek dak dak* is a lesser form of Tochen, and perhaps not a full Torah prohibition according to some Rishonim, **how can there be chiyuv chatas**?
You can't have it both ways without explaining the distinction.
Somebody says that the melachah of Tochen is only when a person reduces grain to flour, and after a food has become edible perhaps there is no further grinding. But that isn't a complete definition either. The Shulchan Aruch plainly speaks about vegetables, which are **gidulei karka**, things growing from the ground.
And remember, we have to distinguish **the classic av melachah of grinding grain**, a *toldah* which resembles grinding, and cases in which the act is only *michzi k'tochein*, resembling grinding and perhaps prohibited at a lower level.
The question is whether finely slicing a vegetable is truly comparable to grinding it into small particles or whether its connection to Tochen is more remote.
Why, then, do some Rishonim treat **chituch** differently from **ketishah** when considering a shinui or immediate preparation? Perhaps because pounding actually reduces a solid into fragments in the ordinary way of grinding, while cutting may be less directly comparable.
But now take out the Mishnah Berurah. It speaks of being **close to chiyuv chatas** in certain chopping cases. That's strong language. If the act were uniformly derabbanan, the expression would be difficult.
One student thinks the answer lies in the distinction between **different foods**. Another suggests that it depends on **how finely** the food is cut. A third brings up **ein techinah b'ochlin**. Each suggestion needs to be matched to the exact lashon of a source.
Please, rabosai, don't simply throw sevaros at me. Take out the **Tur** and show me what he says. If we have a real machlokes, that's fine, but let's establish **where** it is and **what** the Rishonim are arguing about.
I don't have to give a teretz to every source right this minute. Sometimes the best way to learn a sugya is to identify the contradiction clearly enough that we can go back and examine the texts.
## The Rambam: "Kedei Levashelo"
Now here is something very interesting. The **Rambam** writes about *mechatech yerek* in **two places**, and the language is strikingly similar.
In **Hilchos Shabbos 7:5**, he says: **"המחתך את הירק מעט מעט לבשלו הרי זה חייב, שזו המלאכה תולדת טחינה"**—one who cuts a vegetable into very small pieces **to cook it** is liable, because the act is a toldah of grinding.
And in **Hilchos Shabbos 21:18**, he writes: **"המחתך את הירק דק דק כדי לבשלו הרי זה תולדת טוחן וחייב"**—cutting a vegetable finely **in order to cook it** is a toldah of Tochen and carries liability.
Do you see the words **"לבשלו"** and **"כדי לבשלו"**?
The Rambam didn't merely say, "Anyone who cuts vegetables finely is liable." He mentions a specific purpose: **preparing the pieces for cooking**.
Now we have to ask: Is the cooking purpose an **essential condition of the prohibition** according to the Rambam, or is he describing the normal reason people cut a certain kind of vegetable so finely?
That's a major question. Perhaps fine cutting is considered genuine *techinah* when it prepares the food for cooking; perhaps the same act done simply to make a salad is different. But don't assume that one word creates an unrestricted heter without checking how the Rishonim and later poskim understand it.
And here's another important detail: the Shulchan Aruch uses language very close to the Rambam's words but **does not explicitly repeat the phrase "kedei levashelo"** in the same way. Does that show that the Mechaber intentionally ruled more broadly?
We must look at the Beis Yosef and the other authorities to know.
## Reading the Mishnah Berurah Again
Now return to the expression **"ראויים לאכלן חיים"**, vegetables fit to be eaten raw.
Maybe, the Mishnah Berurah is saying **even where there is no need to cook**, fine cutting can still be a form of Tochen.
Or perhaps, as we suggested yesterday, "fit to be eaten raw" is being contrasted with food that cannot conveniently be eaten without being **processed**. Those could be related ideas, but they are not identical.
If the Rambam specifically mentions preparing for cooking, perhaps the Mishnah Berurah's formulation is intended to show that the halachah does not depend on that particular purpose.
And if that is the correct explanation, it might reverse our earlier understanding of the difference between an onion and a cucumber.
Do you hear what I'm saying? The same few words can lead to very different practical possibilities. That's why I don't want to rush to a conclusion.
We have to keep the original texts in front of us and see what each one actually says.
## Onions, Karpas, and What It Means to Be Edible Raw
Now let's take the case of **onions**. A person doesn't usually pick up a whole raw onion and eat it like an apple. He cuts it and puts it into other foods. Perhaps he mixes it with salt or another ingredient. Could that affect whether the act of cutting is called a real **tikkun of the food**?
I want to mention a psak cited in the name of **Rav Moshe Feinstein** concerning **the brachah on onions**. The thought, as I am bringing it, is that because people commonly eat onions cooked or in combination with other foods rather than as a stand-alone raw vegetable, the status of a raw onion for a brachah may be different.
Some families used onions for **Karpas** on the night of the Seder. There are old minhagim and remazim associated with the tears an onion brings to the eyes. But for Karpas we have to pay attention to the required **borei pri ha'adamah** and its role in the seder, including the relationship to Maror.
Can a raw onion serve that purpose according to the brachah being assumed? That's an interesting separate halachic question. [The exact Igros Moshe source for the quoted position about onions, and its application to Karpas, were not independently verified. The shiur's explanation should not be used as an unconditional practical ruling about the brachah.]
Somebody jokes that the children come home from school with pictures of the onion and the tears. Fine. But we're trying to understand the underlying halachic idea, not merely the remez.
You could ask: **what if the onion is mixed with other food?** The fact that it isn't normally eaten alone does not necessarily mean it is unfit to be eaten raw. There are distinctions between *ne'echal chai*, generally fit for raw consumption, and the ordinary way that a particular food is served.
So the onion example complicates the argument.
If **eating it raw** means eating it straight from the ground, perhaps many vegetables would not qualify. But if it means that they don't require **cooking**, an onion may qualify in some circumstances even if people generally chop it.
And if the issue in Tochen is whether the act of chopping is itself the decisive tikkun, we need to know which sense of *ra'uy le'echol chai* the Mishnah Berurah has in mind.
## Let's Make a Chazarah
All right, somebody came late. Who wants to review what we've learned so far? Come on. Don't be frightened. We're going to give the olam a quick chazarah.
First, we began with the practical question of **crushing a cucumber with the back of a fork**, rather than chopping it finely. Perhaps that is an unusual way to prepare the cucumber and could count as a **shinui**.
Second, we brought the **Chazon Ish**. He explains that **ketishah**, pounding or crushing, may be more closely related to actual grinding than ordinary fine cutting. Therefore he understands a difficult Tosefta and Rema in terms of pounding, for which the ordinary heter of *le'alter* may not apply in the same way.
Third, we asked whether the case of **dried figs and carobs** is different from a cucumber. If these are foods ordinarily pounded to make them usable, then pounding them may be the very *derech techinah*. But perhaps pounding a cucumber is more unusual.
Fourth, we discussed the **dull butter knife**. Could using an instrument not suited to fine cutting count as a shinui sufficient to change the halachah? That was a *sevara*, and we have to compare it with the poskim who require more than one shinui in some grinding cases.
And fifth, we began the big question: **what does the Mishnah Berurah mean by vegetables that are fit to be eaten raw?**
Do those words mean that the vegetable could have been eaten **without chopping it**? Or does the author contrast it with the Rambam's case of cutting **for cooking**?
That is a major distinction. If we interpret the text one way, perhaps a cucumber is a less serious case than an onion. If we interpret it another way, a vegetable that is eaten raw is actually the very case in which the Mishnah Berurah is telling us that the prohibition remains.
So we're learning, we're comparing, and we are not yet at a final psak.
### The Chazon Ish and the Rema Again
Now return to the Chazon Ish's explanation of the Rema and the **Tosefta about elderly people**. You have to appreciate why he found the traditional explanation difficult.
If the whole question were just preparing food **later rather than immediately**, that would seem to explain the prohibition without mentioning the old people. And if the case were immediate preparation, perhaps the usual heter of *le'alter* would already apply.
The Chazon Ish says that the Tosefta may concern **ketishah**, which is a more direct form of grinding. Then we understand why the action is forbidden even under circumstances in which chopping might be permitted.
But the **Biur Halachah** and other Acharonim may not read the Tosefta exactly like that. Some understand the action and the immediate-food leniency differently. We have to examine their words.
I am very impressed by the kashya the Chazon Ish raises. I'm not sure the entire resolution sits perfectly with every other source, but his challenge is powerful.
That's the way we learn. We don't have to cover up a disagreement. We should identify it, learn it inside, and see what each posek is saying.
And now let's continue the discussion with **potatoes** and other foods that are normally mashed, because those examples may help clarify the distinction.
## Potatoes, Cucumbers, and the Ordinary Derech of Preparation
Now let's take **potatoes**. Everyone knows that potatoes are commonly **mashed** after they are cooked. So if a person wants to mash a potato on Shabbos, the act may be very different from using the back of a fork to crush a **cucumber**, something we do not ordinarily prepare that way.
The Chazon Ish's distinction between **chituch** and **ketishah** might be particularly important with a food whose normal preparation is by crushing.
Someone asks about mashing a potato for a person who is ill. Rabosai, I am not going to issue a practical psak about *Tochen* for a choleh without examining the relevant circumstances and the separate laws of illness on Shabbos. The point here is how the method of preparing the food fits the **definition of the melachah**.
And we have another whole issue about **cooked vegetables**. Some poskim permit forms of mashing a food which has already been fully cooked and has softened so thoroughly that it falls apart, while others distinguish the extent of cooking and the manner of mashing.
We spoke yesterday about the views of the **Chazon Ish** and **Rav Moshe** on mashing cooked foods, including a banana and a potato. How soft must the food be? Does it have to be so thoroughly cooked that it practically falls apart on its own? Does using a fork make a difference? Those are individual halachic questions.
Now, if you tell me a **cucumber** is not normally mashed, perhaps the act of crushing it constitutes a clear **shinui**. But we have to see whether that is a shinui which the halachah recognizes for this case and whether the act is still considered an actual form of grinding.
That's why I am comparing **the derech of the food** with **the type of action**. You cannot just say "mashing" is always easier than chopping, or always more severe. The combination matters.
### Returning to the Dull Knife
And then we have the other possible shinui: a **blunt knife**, a butter knife, that is not normally used to slice vegetables into tiny pieces. Suppose a man insists on cutting vegetables very finely with such a knife. It is difficult, slow and inconvenient.
Maybe that itself constitutes a change from the ordinary method. I have been trying to build that sevara from the rules of **shinuyim** that we learned earlier, and from the distinction between chopping and crushing.
But please, don't say that I have now given everyone permission to prepare a finely chopped salad hours before the meal with a butter knife. I am proposing an analysis, and we must see if it is accepted by the relevant poskim.
## A Close Reading of Mishnah Berurah 321:38
Now let's return again to the expression in the **Mishnah Berurah**:
**"ומדסתם משמע דאפילו בירקות שראויין לאכלן חיין ... "**
From the fact that the ruling was stated generally, it appears that even vegetables **fit to be eaten raw** are included.
What does the Mishnah Berurah mean by emphasizing that fact? That's our question. If chopping the food finely is *Tochen*, perhaps it doesn't matter whether the vegetable could be eaten raw. But the author seems to regard it as worth mentioning.
One proposed explanation was that a vegetable **ready to be eaten without any chopping** is already a finished food. Its preparation is not the same kind of *tikkun* as taking something unfit to eat and making it edible by processing.
But another explanation is that the Mishnah Berurah is **departing from the Rambam's restriction** to chopping vegetables for cooking. He is telling us that even in a case where the food is intended to be eaten raw—where the action is not preparation for bishul—the issur can still apply.
Those two understandings may produce opposite results in the very practical cases we have been discussing.
For example, take **radishes** or other vegetables commonly eaten raw but usually chopped and mixed into a salad. If we focus on the fact that the food is already edible, perhaps the chopping is less transformative. But if we focus on the fact that the **Rambam says kedei levashelo**, perhaps the Mishnah Berurah is coming to include precisely those cases of **raw salad** that are not intended for cooking.
Do you understand why I am struggling with this language?
If the word *chai* refers only to the food's state before chopping, you have one analysis. If it is contrasted with the Rambam's *bishul* condition, you have another.
And when the Mishnah Berurah speaks elsewhere of **chiyuv chatas** and even a possible prohibition against eating food that was chopped impermissibly, we must be especially careful not to infer broad permissions based on one speculative reading.
### What About the Rambam's Purpose of Cooking?
So let's say it clearly one more time. According to the text of the **Rambam**, in **Hilchos Shabbos 7:5** and **21:18**, the act he describes is **finely chopping vegetables in order to cook them**.
The question is whether the **purpose of cooking** is essential to his halachic definition of Tochen, or simply the ordinary case he uses to illustrate it.
Some of the Rishonim and Acharonim understand the limitation more narrowly, and others infer a broader issur for fine chopping. The **Kesef Mishneh** itself examines those possibilities, including a vegetable normally eaten raw that is chopped with a cooking purpose.
So it is not enough to point to the Rambam and announce "only for cooking" without understanding how the other poskim interpret his words.
The same applies to the Shulchan Aruch: he writes **"המחתך הירק דק דק חייב משום טוחן"**, which is broader in wording. Did he deliberately omit *kedei levashelo*? Was he following another Rishon? Was the omission meant to include the ordinary raw salad case?
Rabosai, those are real *chakirois*. And they are worth learning slowly.
The important thing at this point is that **we have not resolved the kashya yet**. I want you to see the opposing possibilities, because understanding them is more valuable than memorizing an attractive but unfounded heter.
Now let's hear the question from the olam and see where the sugya leads.
## The Unfinished Question: Does Tochen Require a New Tikkun?
A talmid suggests that perhaps the Rambam is emphasizing **the purpose of the cutting**. If the food is already a finished, prepared food, why should it matter how many more times a person cuts it up? What has he really accomplished?
I understand the suggestion. Even if one holds that **yesh techinah b'ochlin** in some circumstances, perhaps the action still has to be a meaningful **tikkun** of the food.
But we have to distinguish a food which has already been reduced to small pieces from a vegetable which has not yet undergone the normal preparation that people call grinding or very fine chopping.
And perhaps that is the underlying point of the Rambam's words **"כדי לבשלו"**: he is speaking about cutting that actually serves a purpose in preparing the food.
But is that a necessary condition of Tochen according to the Rambam? Or only the particular example he gives? That is precisely the argument we're trying to clarify.
[The original transcription stops here, mid-sentence: “So, meileh the...” No final answer, practical psak, or continuation is recoverable from this recording's supplied chunks. The audio needs review or re-transcription.]