Shabbos 123a–b: Muktzeh, Shem Kli, and Tikkun Gavra

Topics

• Shabbos 123a–b: Muktzeh, Shem Kli, and Tikkun Gavra
• Golemei Machatin: When an Unfinished Needle Is Already Usable
• What Does “Mimalech” Accomplish?
• Shem Kli or Shimush Kli?
• The Broken Needle: “Batel Shem Kli”
• Why Does the Gemara Need “Geruta’os”?
• How Complete Must the New Needle Be?
• The Biur Halachah’s Safek and the Role of Present Use
• From Tumah and Muktzeh to Tikkun Gavra
• Afiktoizin: Tikkun Gavra Without Refuah
• What Makes an Act “Refuah”?
• Shechikas Samemanim and a Separate Issur of Tikkun
• “Harei Hu K’mi Shema’achilo U’mashkeihu”
• Why Is “Orchei” Not Enough?
• The Heter of Ordinary Sustenance
• Tikkun Gavra May Remain—Even When the Act Is Normal
• Rav Sheshet’s Proof from Removing a Thorn
• Why Does Rashi Add “Dami L’Melachah”?
• The Structure of the Machlokes: Sustenance Versus Melachah

Transcript

# Shabbos 123a–b: Muktzeh, Shem Kli, and Tikkun Gavra

## Golemei Machatin: When an Unfinished Needle Is Already Usable

The Gemara is dealing with a *golem*—an unfinished object. Think of something that has already taken its basic form, but still stands to be completed. In our case, the metal has been prepared as a needle, but the eye has not yet been made.

The Gemara says that this unfinished needle is different from a needle that was already completed and then broke. A *golem* was never finished in the first place. Ordinarily, it is עומד לינקב—it stands to have the eye pierced. Once the eye is made, the מלאכה is completed. Before that point, regarding *tumah*, it is not yet considered a finished *kli*.

Rashi explains: **“בגולמי — גולמי מחטין העומדות לינקב”**. A pierced needle has reached גמר מלאכה; one that has not yet been pierced has not. Therefore, לענין טומאה it is not yet a *kli*. Nevertheless, לענין שבת it may be moved because it is already fit for a use: **דחזי לקוץ**—it can be used to remove a thorn. (Rashi, Shabbos 123a)

The Gemara then adds an important point: **זימנין דמימליך עלייהו ומשוי להו מנא**. Sometimes a person changes his mind and decides not to pierce the eye at all. He is satisfied to leave the needle exactly as it is and use it in that form.

What is the *mimalech*? It does not necessarily mean that from the outset he fashioned this piece of metal specifically for extracting a thorn. Rather, he had intended to complete the needle, and then he changed his mind: “I am not making the hole. I am leaving it as it is.” Once he decides that this is its finished form, it can function as a *mana*—a usable implement—as it stands.

That is a significant point in Rashi. The permissibility on Shabbos is rooted in the fact that the object is presently fit for use, even though its formal manufacturing process has not been completed for purposes of *tumah*. (Shabbos 123a)

## What Does “Mimalech” Accomplish?

We have to read Rashi carefully. When the Gemara says **זימנין דמימליך עלייהו ומשוי להו מנא**, the point is not necessarily that the owner consciously designates the unfinished needle for a new purpose. Rashi says: **דמימליך — ולא נקיב לה; ומשוי לה מנא — כמות שהיא ולנטילת קוץ**. He changes his mind and does not pierce it; he leaves it as it is, and in that state it can serve for removing a thorn. (Rashi, Shabbos 123a)

Suppose a craftsman prepared one hundred pieces. He intended to pierce all of them, but now he needs only five. Regarding the rest he says, “Forget it. I am not making the hole.” That decision itself changes the status of the object. It is no longer standing toward an unfinished act that must still be done. He is satisfied with it *kemo shehi*—as it presently is.

That is a greater *chiddush* than saying that he explicitly thought, “I hereby designate this as a thorn-removing instrument.” Rashi is teaching that it is enough that he abandons the plan to complete the eye and accepts the object in its present form. Its existing utility can then give it the status necessary for Shabbos.

Now look at Rabbeinu Chananel. He describes the manufacturing process: metal wire is cut into needle-sized pieces; one end is sharpened and the other end is pierced. Before those steps are completed, it is a *golem*. Rabbeinu Chananel writes that sometimes the owner changes his mind and makes the unfinished piece a *mana* as it is. (Rabbeinu Chananel, Shabbos 123a)

This raises the central *yesod* we have to clarify: what exactly is required לענין שבת? Is actual *shem kli* necessary, or is it enough that the object has a practical *shimush*? Rashi’s language pushes us toward the significance of present usability. Rabbeinu Chananel’s formulation gives more room to understand that the unfinished object is already connected to the world of *keilim* because it stands to become a finished implement.

## Shem Kli or Shimush Kli?

Rabbeinu Chananel explains the *golem* very concretely. These are pieces of iron prepared for needle production: the craftsman cuts the metal to size, sharpens one end, and pierces the other. Before that process is complete, the piece is still called a *golem*. (Rabbeinu Chananel, Shabbos 123a)

The Gemara teaches that such an object is not treated the same way for *tumah* and for Shabbos. Regarding *tumah*, the fact that the intended manufacturing process is not complete prevents it from having the status of a finished *kli*. Regarding Shabbos, however, the Gemara can permit its movement because it is already fit for a practical use.

According to Rashi, this point is especially striking. Rashi says that לענין טומאה it is not a *kli*, but לענין טלטול it is permitted **דחזי לקוץ**—because it is fit to remove a thorn. The emphasis appears to be on *shimush*: it can do something useful now. (Rashi, Shabbos 123a)

Rabbeinu Chananel’s language can be read with a somewhat different emphasis. The piece stands within the process of becoming a *kli*. It is an unfinished needle, not an arbitrary piece of metal. That gives us room to ask whether its connection to a future *shem kli* is itself part of why it is significant on Shabbos.

So we have to separate two concepts. One is *shem kli*: does this object formally have the name and status of a utensil? The other is *shimush kli*: does it presently perform a useful function?

The Gemara’s distinction between *tumah* and Shabbos forces us to examine which of those elements matters in each area of halachah. Tumah clearly demands more. An unfinished object may be practically useful and still lack גמר מלאכה. But for Shabbos, perhaps the practical usability itself is enough.

That is the question we have to carry into the next Rashi: when a completed needle later breaks, why does the Gemara treat it differently from a needle that was never finished?

## The Broken Needle: “Batel Shem Kli”

Now the Gemara turns from an unfinished needle to a needle that was once complete and then broke. This is an entirely different case.

The Gemara says: **אבל היכא דניטל חררה או עוקצה — אדם זורקה לבין גרוטאות**. If the eye or the point of a finished needle is removed, a person throws it among the scrap metal. (Shabbos 123a)

Rashi explains the decisive phrase: **גרוטאות — שברי מתכות; אדם זורקה לבין גרוטאות ובטל שם כלי מינה**. Its *shem kli* is gone. (Rashi, Shabbos 123a)

This is important. Why does the Gemara have to tell us that people throw it among the *geruta’os*? Why not simply say that the needle can no longer serve its original function? Once it was designated for sewing and now it cannot sew, let us say that its original *tzorech* is gone.

Apparently, the Gemara is telling us something more. A new, unfinished needle still has a future. It is in the middle of becoming a utensil, and a person may decide to leave it as it is and use it. A broken needle is different because normal human conduct is to discard it. The fact that **אדם זורקה לבין גרוטאות** demonstrates that its identity as a *kli* has collapsed.

That is why Rashi does not merely say that it lacks its old function. He says **בטל שם כלי מינה**.

This sharpens our earlier question. An unfinished object may not yet have גמר מלאכה for *tumah*, yet it can still be relevant on Shabbos because it is usable and stands within the world of *keilim*. But when an existing utensil breaks in a way that causes people to discard it, the *shem kli* itself is lost.

The practical consequence is not simply whether I personally can imagine another use for the broken piece. The Gemara is looking at the object’s ordinary status: is this still treated as an implement, or is it now scrap? That language of *geruta’os* is therefore essential to understanding the *maskanah* of the sugya. (Shabbos 123a)

## Why Does the Gemara Need “Geruta’os”?

Let us press the point further. Suppose a tape recorder breaks. One could always say, “Perhaps I can use part of it for something else.” But that is not enough. The question is not whether a creative person can invent some secondary use. The question is what this object is normally regarded as after it breaks.

That is why the Gemara’s phrase **אדם זורקה לבין גרוטאות** is doing real work. If the only issue were that the original sewing function is gone, the Gemara could have stopped there. Instead, it tells us that this is the sort of broken object people discard. Rashi translates that into a halachic concept: **בטל שם כלי מינה**. (Shabbos 123a; Rashi ad loc.)

Now we can understand the ruling of the *Mechaber*: **“מחט שלימה מותר לטלטלה ליטול בה את הקוץ; ניטל חודה או חור שלה אסור; וחדשה שלא נקבה עדיין מותר.”** A complete needle may be moved to remove a thorn. If either its point or its eye was removed, it is forbidden to move. But a new needle that has not yet been pierced is permitted. (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 308:11)

The distinction follows the conclusion of our Gemara. A broken needle is not treated like the earlier approach that focused only on whether it remains technically usable for a thorn. The *maskanah* is that once the completed needle breaks in the manner described, it is ordinarily thrown away and its *shem kli* is lost.

But a *chadashah shelo nikvah*—a new needle not yet pierced—is different. It was never a finished needle that broke. It is a *golem*. That returns us to the earlier rule: sometimes a person changes his mind and leaves it in its present state, **זימנין דמימליך עלייהו ומשוי להו מנא**.

Notice also what the *Mechaber* does not say. He does not require that the owner explicitly announce a new designation for removing thorns. He simply rules that a new, unpierced needle is permitted. That fits very well with the way we learned Rashi: the object’s present usable status matters, even before the manufacturing process intended for a sewing needle is complete.

## How Complete Must the New Needle Be?

The *Mechaber* rules: **“וחדשה שלא נקבה עדיין, מותר”**—a new needle that has not yet been pierced is permitted to move. (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 308:11)

The *Biur Halachah* asks an important question on those words. What if the new needle not only lacks an eye, but also has no sharp point yet? Is that also permitted, or do we require that it at least be presently fit to remove a thorn?

His language is: **“נסתפקתי אם הוא הדין באין לה חוד בעת חידושה... או אפשר דעדיין לא חזיא אפילו לנטילת קוץ... וצ״ע.”** He remains uncertain and notes that the sugya on Shabbos 123a gives some indication toward requiring present usability. (Biur Halachah 308:11, s.v. *vechadashah shelo nikvah*)

This goes directly to the heart of our discussion. When the Gemara permits *golemei machatin*, what is carrying the heter? Is it enough that this piece is in the process of becoming a needle—*omed la’asos kli*? Or must it already have a usable feature, such as the sharp point, so that it is fit for **נטילת קוץ**?

The Gemara itself distinguishes sharply between the unfinished object and the broken object. In a *golem*, we can say **זימנין דמימליך**: sometimes the owner stops the manufacturing process and accepts the object as it is. But that only helps if “as it is” has some meaningful use.

That is why the *Biur Halachah’s* question is so powerful. A new needle without an eye but with a point is already usable for a thorn. A new piece that has neither eye nor point may still stand to become a needle, but perhaps at this stage it is not yet *chazi* for anything.

So we have two possible elements before us: the object’s relationship to a future *shem kli*, and its present *shimush*. The sugya is forcing us to define how much of each is needed for Hilchos Shabbos. The *Biur Halachah* leaves the precise boundary as a *tzarich iyun*.

## The Biur Halachah’s Safek and the Role of Present Use

The *Biur Halachah* leaves us with a very precise *safek*. The *Mechaber* says that a new needle, **שלא נקבה עדיין**, may be moved. But the Gemara never explicitly says what happens if, at that stage, the needle also lacks its sharp point. Perhaps it is enough that this is an unfinished needle standing to be completed; perhaps not, because at present it is not even fit for **נטילת קוץ**. (Biur Halachah 308:11, s.v. *vechadashah shelo nikvah*)

That question tells us that we cannot simply say, “Once something stands to become a *kli*, it already has everything we need for Shabbos.” If that were obvious, there would be no *safek*. The issue is whether there must also be a present *shimush*.

And this is why the words of our sugya matter so much. The Gemara does not build the heter around an abstract label of *kli*. It keeps returning to whether the object is actually fit for use. Abaye says, **לענין שבת מידי דחזי בעינן — והא נמי חזיא למשקל בה קוץ**: for Shabbos we require something fit for use, and this needle can be used to remove a thorn. (Shabbos 123a)

At the same time, Rava’s conclusion teaches that usefulness alone cannot always be enough. A broken needle may still be physically capable of some secondary use, but if normal people throw it among the scrap metal, **בטל שם כלי מינה**.

So the sugya contains both sides. *Shimush* matters, but status matters as well. A new unfinished needle is not equivalent to a broken discarded one.

This is also why the wording of the *Mechaber* is so exact. He says a new needle that has not yet been pierced is permitted; he does not say that every raw piece destined eventually to become a needle is automatically permitted. The *Biur Halachah* therefore asks how far the halachah extends when the object is still missing the very feature that makes it presently usable.

That boundary remains unresolved. But the question itself helps define the sugya: Hilchos Shabbos is not merely asking, “Is this technically a completed *kli*?” It is asking how the object stands in real life—what it is, what it is fit to do, and whether people still treat it as an implement.

## From Tumah and Muktzeh to Tikkun Gavra

We have been trying to define what *shem kli* means in this sugya. For *tumah*, the Torah requires a finished utensil—*kli ma’aseh*, an object whose workmanship has been completed. A *golem* can therefore be pure even though it already has a practical use. For Shabbos, the threshold is different.

That distinction is the background to the next sugya. The Gemara moves from the needle itself to a different question: **אסובי ינוקא**—aligning or setting the limbs of an infant. Rav Nachman prohibits it; Rav Sheshes permits it. (Shabbos 123a–b)

Rashi explains the case as arranging the infant’s limbs after birth, when the limbs require setting. On Rav Nachman’s prohibition Rashi writes: **דדמי למתקן**—it resembles an act of repair. (Rashi, Shabbos 123a)

Immediately, we have to define what kind of “repair” is at issue. This is not literally repairing a vessel. The question is whether arranging the human body can take on the character of *tikkun*—a constructive correction analogous to *metaken mana*.

That itself is a striking continuation of our discussion. We began with the status of a *kli*: when is an object sufficiently formed to be treated as a utensil on Shabbos? Now the Gemara asks the parallel question in a human context: when an act restores or arranges the body, can it be viewed as a forbidden *tikkun*?

The language of the Gemara is therefore important: **Rav Nachman asar; Rav Sheshet shari**. One side sees the act as sufficiently similar to repair to prohibit it; the other sees a basis to permit.

The rest of the sugya is not merely going to tell us who is lenient and who is stringent. It is going to define what counts as *tikkun gavra*, why certain bodily acts are permitted on Shabbos, and whether the heter comes from the fact that the act is normal—*orchei*—or from a more specific category.

That distinction will become the center of the next several lines of Rashi.

## Afiktoizin: Tikkun Gavra Without Refuah

Rav Nachman brings a proof for his prohibition from the Mishnah: **אין עושין אפיקטויזין בשבת**—one may not induce vomiting on Shabbos. (Shabbos 123a–b)

Rashi explains *afiktoizin*: a person drinks something that causes him to vomit, not for medical treatment, but to empty his stomach so that he can eat and drink more. Then Rashi adds the crucial line: although the usual gezeirah of **שחיקת סממנין** does not apply, because this is not being done as *refuah*, it is nevertheless forbidden **משום דמתקן גברא**—because he is improving or “repairing” the person. (Rashi, Shabbos 123b)

That creates an important category. Something can be **not refuah** and still be **tikkun gavra**.

We therefore have to read Rashi very carefully. Why does he emphasize that the purpose is not medical treatment? Is the entire point simply that the man is healthy, and therefore this is outside the ordinary laws of *refuah*? Or is Rashi emphasizing the person’s intent—he is emptying his stomach specifically in order to make room for more eating?

There is a difference. If the issue is only that he is not ill, then emptying the stomach for comfort is still fundamentally a non-medical act. But if the decisive point is the purpose—*kedei le’echol velishtos harbeh*—perhaps an identical physical act performed simply to feel better could be viewed differently.

Rashi’s formulation forces the question because he gives both elements: **לא לרפואה**, and then **אלא להריק את מעיו שיוכל לאכול ולשתות הרבה**.

The practical discussion of medicine on Shabbos ordinarily revolves around the gezeirah of *shechikas samemanim*. But here the Gemara has deliberately brought us to a different problem. Even after we remove the concern of *refuah*, Rav Nachman can still say that there is an issur because the act is a *tikkun* of the body.

That becomes the foundation for understanding the machlokes with Rav Sheshet. Is every such bodily improvement prohibited, or are there ordinary human acts that remain permitted even though they improve the body?

## What Makes an Act “Refuah”?

Let us sharpen the two readings in Rashi.

Rashi says that *afiktoizin* is **לא לרפואה**, but rather **להריק את מעיו שיוכל לאכול ולשתות היום הרבה**. (Rashi, Shabbos 123b)

One way to understand him is that there is simply no illness here. The person is healthy; he is full. Emptying the stomach is not treatment of a *choli*. Therefore, the usual gezeirah of *shechikas samemanim* is not the reason for the prohibition. The problem is instead *tikkun gavra*.

But perhaps there is another way. Maybe the act is defined by its goal. He is not emptying his stomach because the emptying itself is desirable as a bodily treatment; he is doing it in order to eat more. His *kavanah* is directed toward eating, not toward healing.

Why does that matter? Because if a person were to empty his stomach simply to relieve discomfort—to feel physically better—we would have to ask whether that begins to look more like *refuah*, even if he is not a classic *choleh*.

This is why Rashi’s final phrase cannot be brushed aside. If all Rashi wanted to tell us was that the man is healthy, he could have stopped at **לא לרפואה**. Instead he explains what he wants to accomplish: to make room to eat and drink more.

At this point we have two overlapping halachic categories. One is *refuah*, with its concern of *shechikas samemanim*. The other is *tikkun gavra*, an act that repairs or improves the body even when it is not defined as medical treatment.

That distinction is precisely what makes this sugya valuable. It prevents us from assuming that every bodily benefit on Shabbos is simply a question of medicine. The Gemara has a separate concept of *tikkun*.

The next question is whether ordinary bodily conduct—acts that people normally do as part of life—escapes that definition of *tikkun gavra*. Rav Sheshet’s answer, **התם לאו אורחיה, הכא אורחיה**, will force us to determine exactly what *orchei* accomplishes.

## Shechikas Samemanim and a Separate Issur of Tikkun

The general halachah of medicine on Shabbos is built around the gezeirah of **שחיקת סממנין**: Chazal were concerned that a person engaged in preparing medicine might come to grind ingredients. The later *poskim* discuss how that gezeirah applies in a world in which ordinary medicines are manufactured commercially rather than prepared by each individual.

That broader discussion is important, but our Rashi shows that it does not resolve this sugya. Even when *shechikas samemanim* is not the issue, an act may still be prohibited as *tikkun gavra*.

Rashi says explicitly regarding *afiktoizin*: **ואף על גב דלא גזור בה משום שחיקת סממנין, דהא לאו לרפואה היא — אסור משום דמתקן גברא**. (Rashi, Shabbos 123b)

So we have to keep the categories separate. “Not *refuah*” does not automatically mean “permitted.” An act can fall outside the medicinal gezeirah and nevertheless be viewed as an abnormal bodily correction.

That gives us a useful framework for practical examples. There are things a person does simply to live normally and comfortably—eating, drinking, resting, cooling down, cleaning ordinary perspiration. Those activities certainly improve how the body feels. Yet we do not instinctively call every ordinary act of comfort *tikkun gavra* in the prohibited sense.

On the other hand, *afiktoizin* is an unusual intervention. The person manipulates his body by inducing vomiting so that the body will be in a different condition afterward. Rav Nachman sees in that an act of *tikkun*, despite the absence of medical treatment.

This is where Rav Sheshet’s response becomes decisive. He answers: **התם לאו אורחיה, הכא אורחיה**. There, inducing vomiting in this way is not the normal course of conduct. Here, aligning the infant’s limbs is normal conduct. (Shabbos 123b)

But what does that mean? Does “normal” itself remove the label of *tikkun*? Or does normality place the act into another permitted category?

Rashi’s next words suggest that the second possibility is the one we have to investigate.

## “Harei Hu K’mi Shema’achilo U’mashkeihu”

Rav Sheshet answers Rav Nachman: **התם לאו אורחיה, הכא אורחיה**—there, by *afiktoizin*, it is not normal conduct; here, by arranging the infant’s limbs, it is normal conduct. (Shabbos 123b)

If Rashi had stopped there, we might have understood the *svara* very simply: an ordinary act is not viewed as a forbidden *tikkun*. People lie down when they are tired, cool themselves when they are hot, wash off discomfort, and otherwise care for the body in the normal course of life.

But Rashi does not stop there. On **הכא אורחיה** he writes: **והרי הוא כמי שמאכילו ומשקהו**—it is as though one is feeding and giving the child to drink. (Rashi, Shabbos 123b)

Why does Rashi need that comparison?

That is the question. If *orchei* itself means “this is normal and therefore not *tikkun*,” then the comparison to eating and drinking seems unnecessary. Just say that arranging the infant’s limbs is the ordinary way of caring for a newborn.

Perhaps Rashi is telling us something deeper. Maybe the act remains a real *tikkun gavra*, but it is permitted because this particular type of bodily care belongs to the same category as sustaining the child through food and drink. In other words, *orchei* does not merely mean “common.” It identifies this as ordinary maintenance of the body itself.

That distinction would be significant. There are many things that are common and make a person feel better. Not all of them are necessarily comparable to **מאכילו ומשקהו**. Feeding and drinking are not external repairs; they are basic acts by which the body is maintained.

So when Rashi says **הרי הוא כמי שמאכילו ומשקהו**, he may be defining the heter, not merely offering an example.

This reading will have to be tested against the next proof Rav Sheshet brings—the Mishnah permitting a needle to remove a thorn—and against Rav Nachman’s answer, **התם פקיד, הכא לא פקיד**.

## Why Is “Orchei” Not Enough?

The difficulty can now be stated very sharply.

Rav Sheshet says: **התם לאו אורחיה, הכא אורחיה**. If the entire point is simply that normal conduct is not called *tikkun gavra*, then why does Rashi add **והרי הוא כמי שמאכילו ומשקהו**? (Shabbos 123b; Rashi ad loc.)

We do many ordinary things on Shabbos that improve the body. A person lies down and his back feels better. He puts on a shoe. He eats because his body needs nourishment. No one has to say that lying down is permitted because it is “like eating.” It is simply normal human conduct.

So what is Rashi adding?

It seems that Rashi is not merely defining *orchei* as “common.” He is identifying the particular type of normal conduct involved here. Arranging the infant’s limbs is part of maintaining and sustaining the child. In that sense, it is **כמי שמאכילו ומשקהו**.

This distinction becomes clearer if we think about the laws of *refuah*. Food can have a health benefit, but because it is ordinary eating, it remains eating. A person may eat normal food even when the food also strengthens him. The ordinary act of nourishment does not become reclassified simply because it benefits the body.

The same conceptual question arises with things such as vitamins or other items taken routinely. The relevant issue is not merely whether they are beneficial, but whether the act belongs to the ordinary category of eating and maintaining oneself or whether it is distinctly an act of treatment. The practical halachah in any particular case requires its own analysis; our point here is the structure of Rashi.

That is why **הרי הוא כמי שמאכילו ומשקהו** is so important. Rashi appears to be saying that the heter is not merely “people commonly do this.” Rather, this normal care of the infant is included in the ordinary sustaining functions of the body.

If so, *orchei* is not the end of the explanation. *Orchei* tells us why this act is comparable to feeding and giving drink. And once it enters that category, the fact that it improves the body does not make it a prohibited *tikkun*.

That reading will explain why the next stage of the Gemara—the case of removing a thorn—requires a new argument.

## The Heter of Ordinary Sustenance

There is a special force to the category of *ma’achal u’mashkeh*. Eating and drinking sustain the body. They certainly “improve” a person in the broad sense, but that improvement is not treated as a forbidden act of bodily repair.

This helps explain the examples we discussed. If a person eats a salad for its nutrients, it remains ordinary eating. The fact that the food is healthy does not strip it of its identity as *ochel*. By contrast, swallowing something that people do not normally consume as food can enter a different halachic discussion, especially when the entire act is directed toward treatment.

That is why routine pills and vitamins were raised as an example in the shiur. The question is not simply, “Does this benefit the body?” Almost everything a person eats benefits the body. The question is whether this act can genuinely be placed under the heading of ordinary consumption or whether it remains an act of *refuah* or bodily correction.

Now bring that back to the infant. If Rashi were merely giving us an example of *orchei*, his wording would be strange. Why choose specifically **מאכילו ומשקהו**? Feeding is not simply one common behavior among many. It is the paradigm of sustaining the body.

Therefore I want to say that Rashi is defining the heter. Arranging the infant’s limbs is permitted because, in the normal care of a newborn, it is treated like feeding and giving drink. It belongs to the ordinary maintenance of the child.

This is why the language **הרי הוא כמי** matters. Rashi is not saying, “Here is another ordinary act.” He is saying, “Halachically, this is comparable to that category.”

If so, the Gemara is not necessarily abandoning the concept of *tikkun gavra*. The act can still be a bodily improvement. The point is that this type of improvement is permitted because it falls within a category that Shabbos allows as part of normal bodily sustenance.

That is a much stronger reading than saying simply that anything common is automatically permitted. And it gives us a real *nafka minah*: an act may be common and still not be comparable to feeding and drinking.

We therefore have to look at the next proof—removing a thorn—to see whether every non-medical *tikkun gavra* is permitted, or whether Rav Nachman can distinguish between types of bodily change.

## Tikkun Gavra May Remain—Even When the Act Is Normal

This gives us a different way to read the sugya.

The Gemara may not be retracting the whole concept of *tikkun gavra* when Rav Sheshet says **הכא אורחיה**. The act of arranging the infant can still be a real *tikkun* of the body. What makes it permissible is that this particular *tikkun* can be classified as **כמי שמאכילו ומשקהו**.

That is a major difference.

If *orchei* itself erased the category of *tikkun*, then any ordinary bodily improvement would be permitted simply because it is common. But according to this reading of Rashi, we must ask a second question: is the act part of the ordinary sustaining care of the body, comparable to feeding and giving drink?

Consider a splinter. Removing a splinter certainly makes a person feel better. It may even be something people commonly do. But is taking out a foreign object really comparable to feeding the body? Not obviously.

The same question can be raised with other acts of comfort. Applying powder to reduce discomfort, exercising, or making some external correction to the body may be normal behavior, but they are not automatically **מאכילו ומשקהו**. The conceptual category is narrower than “anything people commonly do.”

This is why I think Rashi is teaching us something very precise. The heter of *orchei* in this sugya works because the ordinary care of the infant is a form of maintaining the child itself. If those limbs are not arranged in the normal way, the child has not received the basic bodily care that is ordinarily given to him.

Therefore the phrase **כמי שמאכילו ומשקהו** is not decorative. It tells us the mechanism of the heter.

And now Rav Sheshet brings a proof that seems, at first glance, to broaden the rule: the Mishnah permits using a hand needle **ליטול בה את הקוץ**. If taking out a thorn is permitted, perhaps we see that *tikkunei gavra* is generally permitted when there is no issue of *refuah* and *shechikas samemanim*.

Rav Nachman’s answer—**התם פקיד, הכא לא פקיד**—will show why that proof is not so simple. (Shabbos 123b)

## Rav Sheshet’s Proof from Removing a Thorn

Rav Sheshet now brings a proof from our Mishnah: **מחט של יד — ליטול בה את הקוץ**. A hand needle may be moved in order to remove a thorn. (Shabbos 123b)

Rashi explains Rav Sheshet’s proof in very clear terms: **אלמא תקוני גברא במידי דלאו לרפואה, דליכא משום שחיקת סממנין, שרי**. We see that an act of improving the person, when it is not an act of medical treatment and there is no gezeirah of *shechikas samemanim*, is permitted. (Rashi, Shabbos 123b)

At first glance, this sounds broader than what we just developed. A thorn is not food. Removing it is not obviously an act of sustaining the body in the way feeding an infant is. Yet Rav Sheshet sees it as proof that this kind of *tikkun gavra* can be permitted.

Rav Nachman therefore answers: **התם פקיד, הכא לא פקיד**.

Rashi explains **פקיד**: the thorn is not part of the body; it is merely deposited there—**אינו מחובר בו אלא מופקד ונתון שם**. Therefore removing it is not considered a *tikkun* of the person himself. (Rashi, Shabbos 123b)

That is a very sharp distinction. Washing dirt off one’s hand is not the same as repairing the hand. The dirt is on the person; it is not the person. So too the thorn, even though it is lodged in the skin, remains a foreign object. Taking it out removes something that does not belong there; it does not reconstruct the body.

By contrast, **הכא לא פקיד**—in the case of the infant’s limbs, we are dealing with the body itself. The limbs are not a foreign object placed in the child. Arranging them is an act performed on the structure of the body.

So Rav Nachman rejects Rav Sheshet’s proof at its root. The Mishnah of the thorn does not prove that true *tikkun gavra* is permitted. According to Rav Nachman, removing the thorn is not *tikkun gavra* in the first place.

But Rashi adds one more phrase on **הכא לא פקיד**, and that phrase requires explanation.

## Why Does Rashi Add “Dami L’Melachah”?

Rashi explains **הכא לא פקיד** with the words: **ודמי למלאכה, שמסדרן ומכניסן למקום חיבור**—it resembles a *melachah*, because he arranges the limbs and places them into their proper connected position. (Rashi, Shabbos 123b)

Why does Rashi need to say this?

The Gemara’s immediate distinction seems straightforward. By the thorn, **פקיד**: it is a foreign object lodged in the person, and removing it is not a repair of the person. By the infant, **לא פקיד**: we are dealing with the body itself. If so, Rashi could simply say that here it is *tikkun gavra* and there it is not.

Instead, Rashi returns to the language of *melachah*: **ודמי למלאכה**.

That is not a casual addition. It suggests that Rav Nachman’s point is not exhausted by identifying the object being changed. There is something about the manner of the act—**שמסדרן ומכניסן למקום חיבור**—that gives it the character of constructive work.

This is exactly the language we would have expected earlier, when Rashi first explained Rav Nachman’s prohibition as **דדמי למתקן**. There the question was: why does arranging the infant’s limbs resemble repair? Rashi could have explained: because one is organizing and restoring connected parts to their proper position.

Yet Rashi saves that description for the end of the discussion, after Rav Sheshet has brought the proof from the thorn.

That means the phrase is answering more than the local question, “Is the thorn part of the body?” It is returning to the underlying machlokes. Rav Sheshet wants to treat ordinary bodily correction as something comparable to feeding and drinking. Rav Nachman must explain why this case is different.

His answer is that here the action has the form of *melachah*. One is not merely sustaining the body or removing something foreign. One is actively arranging the body’s own connected structure.

That is why Rashi adds **ודמי למלאכה**. It tells us what makes **לא פקיד** halachically significant.

## The Structure of the Machlokes: Sustenance Versus Melachah

Now the entire sugya fits together.

Rav Sheshet says **הכא אורחיה**, and Rashi explains: **הרי הוא כמי שמאכילו ומשקהו**. The heter is not merely that the act is common. The act belongs to the ordinary sustaining care of the infant, comparable to feeding and giving drink. (Shabbos 123b; Rashi ad loc.)

Rav Sheshet then brings the Mishnah of the thorn. Rashi reads his proof as follows: if one may remove a thorn, we see that *tikkunei gavra* which is not *refuah* and has no concern of *shechikas samemanim* can be permitted.

Rav Nachman answers **התם פקיד, הכא לא פקיד**. The thorn is foreign to the body. Removing it is not a true reconstruction of the person. But arranging the infant’s limbs is different: **ודמי למלאכה, שמסדרן ומכניסן למקום חיבור**. It resembles constructive work because one is arranging connected bodily parts into their proper position. (Rashi, Shabbos 123b)

Why was that final phrase necessary? Because Rav Nachman has to answer Rav Sheshet’s category of **מאכילו ומשקהו**. He cannot simply say, “This is *tikkun gavra*.” Rav Sheshet already agrees that the act improves the body and nevertheless sees ordinary sustaining care as permitted.

Rav Nachman therefore identifies a qualitative difference. Feeding and drinking sustain the body without having the form of a constructive *melachah*. Here, by contrast, one performs an act of arranging and restoring connected parts. The action itself has a *d’mus* of *melachah*.

That is the lomdus of the Rashi.

If Rashi had understood **אורחיה** to mean simply that normal conduct is permitted, the end of the sugya could have remained a simple distinction between *tikkun gavra* and something that is not *tikkun gavra*. But once Rashi defines Rav Sheshet’s heter through **מאכילו ומשקהו**, Rav Nachman must explain why this bodily care cannot enter that same category.

His answer is: because this is not merely sustaining the body. **ודמי למלאכה.**

That is the thread running through the sugya—from the definition of a usable *kli*, through *tikkun gavra*, to the difference between ordinary sustenance and an act that bears the character of constructive work.