Hilchos Rechitzah on Shabbos and Hilchos Krias HaMegillah

Topics

• Rechitzah on Shabbos: Is the Issur the Act of Bathing?
• What Is a Mitzta'er?
• BeKli O BeKarka: What Did the Chachamim Prohibit?
• Tevilah, Mitzvah, and the Chacham Tzvi
• What Is the Shiur of Hot Water?
• Bathing in Cold Water on Shabbos
• Cold Water: The Difference Between a River, Mikveh, and Home
• Turning to Hilchos Krias HaMegillah
• If You Can Read the Megillah Only Once, Which Reading Comes First?
• Berov Am Hadras Melech: Must It Be Read with a Large Group?
• Why Must We Stop Learning Torah for Megillah?
• The Litvishe Derech of Learning
• Memories of the Old Beis HaTalmud
• Women and the Public Reading of Megillah
• Is Berov Am More Important by Day Than by Night?
• The Time of the Daytime Megillah Reading
• Alos Hashachar, Netz, and the End of the Night
• Eating Before Megillah, and the Zman of Nightfall
• Why Megillah Is More Than an Ordinary Derabbanan
• A Purim Memory
• Closing Conversation

Transcript

## Rechitzah on Shabbos: Is the Issur the Act of Bathing?

Before we go further, I want to return to the *sugya* we were discussing yesterday and the day before: *rechitzah* on Shabbos. There is a *yesod* I have been thinking about. Perhaps the *gezeirah* of *rechitzah* applies particularly when an action is done **derech rechitzah**, in the ordinary manner of bathing, rather than to every act of cleaning a part of one's body with water.

Let us make the distinction clear. Suppose a person takes a cloth and wants to wipe or clean his forehead or face. Is that necessarily the same thing as going to bathe? We must also distinguish between water heated before Shabbos and water heated on Shabbos itself; those involve additional *halachic* considerations. I am trying to isolate the precise boundaries of the *gezeiras rechitzah*, not give a practical *heter* for any source of hot water.

The familiar expression in the *poskim* is **פניו ידיו ורגליו**, his face, hands, and feet. But when the Shulchan Aruch discusses *rechitzah*, what action does the language refer to? Is it possible that the distinction is between bathing those parts in the manner of a bath and using water simply to clean one's face?

Some of you are pointing out *raayos* against my suggestion. The Mishnah Berurah discusses an *ishah sheloveshes levanim*, and that passage may be difficult for my reading. I agree it requires explanation. I am not pretending the *sugya* is finished.

## What Is a Mitzta'er?

The first point I want to discuss is the allowance sometimes associated with a **mitzta'er**, a person who is experiencing discomfort. I showed you a passage in *Shemiras Shabbos Kehilchasah* referring to the Biur Halachah. The case described, as I understand it, is a person accustomed to showering every day who feels uncomfortable when he cannot shower.

Why is that called a *mitzta'er*? Is he an **istenis**, an unusually delicate person? I don't think that is necessarily what the author means. *Istenis* is a distinct term. A person can be genuinely uncomfortable simply because he has become accustomed to a particular standard of cleanliness. In our times many people shower daily. What used to be unusual has become ordinary.

So perhaps the point is that the threshold of discomfort being discussed is not an extraordinary degree of suffering. A person can feel genuinely distressed by being dirty or sweaty. What does the *Biur Halachah* mean in the particular case? That is the question.

I am not satisfied with automatically equating every ordinary daily shower with an *istenis*. Let's read the *poskim* and see how they describe the *mitzta'er*. It matters whether we are talking about ordinary inconvenience, real discomfort, or someone with a special sensitivity.

But now I want to bring out another *nekudah*: does the law of **פניו ידיו ורגליו** necessarily apply to washing one of those parts individually? It may be that those words refer to a particular manner of washing in a bath. Take out the Mechaber and read his language carefully. He speaks of bathing **בכלי או בקרקע**—in a vessel or in the ground. What do those details teach us? Why specify the setting at all?

I am raising a *lomdishe shaylah* about the wording of the *gezeirah*. We need to see whether it survives the sources.

## BeKli O BeKarka: What Did the Chachamim Prohibit?

When the Mechaber says **בין בכלי בין בקרקע**, whether the water is in a vessel or gathered in the ground, perhaps he is describing the kind of situation in which people ordinarily bathed. There is a bath, a *mikveh*, a receptacle in which a person washes himself. That is the **derech rechitzah** I am investigating.

But if he takes a cloth and cleans his face, is that included? My suggestion is that it may not be. Again, it is a *chiddush* that we have to test. You cannot simply announce a *heter* because you like a *sevara*. Look at the words of the Shulchan Aruch. What exactly is prohibited, and what exactly is permitted?

I showed some *talmidei chachamim* this *mahalach*. They did not immediately accept it. That's all right. I want to understand what the Shulchan Aruch actually says. If the prohibition were against any contact between warm water and a person's face, why spend time telling us whether the water is in a vessel or in the ground? Isn't that detail an indication that the Chachamim were speaking about a recognizable **manner of bathing**?

There is a discussion in the *Aruch HaShulchan* concerning *poshrim*, lukewarm water, and the relation between the temperature and the normal *derech rechitzah*. I understand that passage as pointing toward a distinction between water used in the usual manner of bathing and water used for a different purpose. We need the precise *lashon* inside to know how far that proof goes.

There is another possible way to explain the issue. The original *gezeirah* was made because of the bathhouse attendants who heated water improperly on Shabbos. The Chachamim prohibited forms of bathing that resembled that practice. If you take a little water just to clean something from your face, should that be compared to entering a bathhouse? Maybe not. But I know there are difficulties, and we have to learn them.

You are raising a question about washing a child. Perhaps the case there also means bathing the child in a small tub, as opposed to simply cleaning an area with a cloth. If you use a cloth, of course there may be a separate problem of **sechitah**, squeezing out liquid. You cannot solve one *sugya* by forgetting another. Even if my distinction in *rechitzah* is sound, the cloth has to be used in a permitted manner.

And the discussions of a woman preparing for *tevilah* have their own *pratim*. We shouldn't jumble together the distinct issues of *rechitzah*, *tevilah*, and *sechitah*. I want to understand each one on its own terms.

I like the *sevara*. Maybe in the end the *poskim* will accept it, maybe not. I am learning this with you, and it is still open to a *kashya*. That is how you learn a *sugya*.

## Tevilah, Mitzvah, and the Chacham Tzvi

Somebody brought me a *teshuvah* of the **Chacham Tzvi**. I read it carefully this morning; it is a beautiful *teshuvah*. The *gedolei haAcharonim* looked at every angle. The question concerns a woman who needs *tevilah* and the precise time when it may take place, including a possible *heter* during **bein hashmashos**. We have to understand whether a permission for *tevilas mitzvah* can be applied more widely, or whether it was limited to that particular case.

That also affects how we read a certain Mishnah Berurah. When he speaks about *tevilah*, does he mean *tevilas mitzvah* specifically? Could a person use it as a *raya* for an ordinary immersion? I don't think the wording is clear enough to assume that. First read the *teshuvah* inside, then decide what it proves.

## What Is the Shiur of Hot Water?

Now another major *shaylah*: what is **chamin**, hot water, and what is **poshrim**, lukewarm water, for these *halachos*?

One approach is that if a person considers the water hot, it is called hot. But does that mean any warmth at all? Is the distinction based on temperature alone, or on the way people ordinarily use the water? You need to know exactly what the *posek* meant.

There is a discussion attributed to **Igros Moshe, Orach Chaim, chelek daled**, concerning the temperature normally used for bathing during the week. The *sevara* is that the Chachamim's *gezeirah* was directed at ordinary hot-water bathing. Water cooler than the normal bathhouse water might be regarded differently. That reading needs to be checked against the actual *teshuvah* and the other *poskim* before giving any practical ruling.

In the *Aruch HaShulchan* we also find discussion of what people ordinarily call *cham* and *posher*. Maybe the categories are defined by normal human usage. Others may understand them more rigidly as temperature classifications. That is part of the *machlokes*.

Then there is a *chiddush* associated with Rav Shlomo Zalman: if you take a large quantity of cold water and add a small amount of hot water only to remove the sharp coldness, that may be treated differently from making hot bathwater. The water is no longer hot; you are just making cold water more comfortable.

But I want to ask a *kashya*. Suppose you reverse the process: you begin with hot water and add a great deal of cold water until it cools. Is that the same? Is the law defined by the result, by the starting water, or by the person's intent? And we cannot ignore **Hilchos Bishul**. The permissibility of mixing hot and cold water depends on the circumstances of the heating and pouring, quite apart from *rechitzah*.

There is a lot to learn. I don't want to decide a question from the sound of a nice *sevara*. We have to examine the actual *psak* and the circumstances to which it applies.

## Bathing in Cold Water on Shabbos

The final question in this discussion concerns **mayim tzonen**, cold water. At the level of the original *gezeiras rechitzah*, cold water is different from hot water. Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 326:1, expressly distinguishes them. But that doesn't finish the *halachah*, because other concerns can arise.

*Shemiras Shabbos Kehilchasah* discusses the concerns of **sechitah** and **hotzaah**, especially where one bathes and must dry oneself, or might carry water. It also discusses the differing customs and practical restrictions of bathing in cold water. Rav Moshe Feinstein's *teshuvos* are brought into this discussion as well.

What if the person is at home and there is no concern of carrying outside? Does that remove the *hotzaah* concern? Yes, potentially, but what about squeezing water out of hair or cloth? Is one still worried about *sechitah*? And does the customary restriction apply to an ordinary shower in one's home in the same way that it applies to a river or *mikveh*?

I am asking questions here, not issuing a simple blanket *heter*. The various *minhagim* and rulings differ, and the conditions matter. Some Sephardic authorities have a different practical approach to cold-water showers on Shabbos, but we have to read their own *psakim* rather than assume all communities follow one rule.

## Cold Water: The Difference Between a River, Mikveh, and Home

Let's finish the discussion of cold water. In the *teshuvos* of **Igros Moshe** there is a distinction involving situations where there is no concern of **hotzaah**. If a person immerses in a river or a *mikveh*, the normal conditions may give rise to concern about carrying water or squeezing water out. At home some of those practical circumstances may be different.

But here's my *kashya*: even if you remove *hotzaah*, what happens to **sechitah**? We might be concerned that the person will squeeze his hair or a towel. Is Rav Moshe's argument addressing only one concern, or does he understand the whole *gezeirah* differently? I want to look into the precise wording. We cannot draw a conclusion without reading it carefully.

And I know that there are communities, especially among *Sephardim*, where the rulings regarding bathing with cold water on Shabbos differ. You have to examine the reasoning and conditions of those *poskim*. It is not enough to say, "Somebody takes a cold shower, so it must be permitted." There is a *sugya* behind it.

*Rabosai*, after all this discussion, don't come out of the room saying that I told you to take showers on Shabbos! I want to understand the **sugya**, the *yesodos*, and the *chiddushim*. For *halachah l'maaseh* we must be careful and follow the applicable *psak*. Enough about *rechitzah* for now.

## Turning to Hilchos Krias HaMegillah

Now we are going to learn **Hilchos Krias HaMegillah**. Purim is coming, and I prepared a *kuntres* of *halachic* questions and *chiddushim* that we will try to work through. Ideally we would have begun learning the *halachos* well before Purim, but let's use the time we have.

Take out your Mishnah Berurah. I want you to be able to follow the *mekoros*, not just listen to me talking. We will learn together.

The first point everyone knows: we read Megillas Esther **twice**—once at night and again during the day. The Shulchan Aruch writes: **"חייב אדם לקרות המגילה בלילה ולחזור ולשנותה ביום"** (Orach Chaim 687:1). The Gemara discusses the obligation in Megillah 4a.

But here is an important question: **which reading is the ikar mitzvah?** Is the daytime reading primary, and the nighttime reading an additional obligation? There is a *machlokes Rishonim*, with Tosafos, the Rosh, Ran, Rashba, and Ritva discussed in connection with the issue.

There is also a discussion about the *brachah* of **Shehecheyanu**: when is it recited, and what might that show about the character of the two readings? I see a printing mistake in the notes—don't let that throw you off. We have to compare the texts carefully, especially the discussion of the Rambam and the Gra, rather than build a *raya* out of a typographical error.

Now, suppose the daytime reading is indeed the primary one. Does that have any **nafka minah l'halachah**? What if a person could only fulfill one of the two? We will have to examine that next.

## If You Can Read the Megillah Only Once, Which Reading Comes First?

I want you to pay attention to how the *poskim* discuss this. We said that Megillah is read at night and during the day. Many understand that the **ikar** is the daytime reading. But you might ask: what difference does that make in practice? A person is obligated in both!

Let's imagine an unusual case where someone can arrange only one reading. Should he read at night when the opportunity is in front of him, or should he wait for the daytime reading because it is primary?

There are two kinds of *sevara* here. On the one hand, we have **אין מעבירין על המצוות**, the idea that one should not pass over an available mitzvah. We also have the general concern that if you delay, you may lose the opportunity altogether. On the other hand, if the daytime reading is the central obligation and you are genuinely forced to choose only one, perhaps you should preserve your opportunity for the more important reading.

I brought a discussion associated with the **Aruch HaShulchan** that emphasizes taking the mitzvah now, at night, rather than gambling on tomorrow. Other *Acharonim* discuss the primacy of the day reading and reach a different conclusion in the unusual one-reading case. We have to see who says which *sevara* and under precisely what circumstances.

These cases are not common. But they could happen—for example, if someone in a hospital can receive a Megillah reader only once. So there is a practical dimension, even if most of the time we can easily arrange both readings.

## Berov Am Hadras Melech: Must It Be Read with a Large Group?

Now here is a much more common question. How important is it to hear the Megillah in a larger gathering?

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 690:18) tells us to seek ten people for the reading. Even where an individual can fulfill the mitzvah alone, we also have the principle **"ברב עם הדרת מלך"**—"In a multitude of people is the King's glory" (Mishlei 14:28).

Suppose I can hear Megillah in a small *minyan*, but there is a much larger gathering in the beis medrash. Is it worthwhile—or even required—to go to the larger gathering? And how much effort does one have to make for that purpose?

I am bringing the Mishnah Berurah and Magen Avraham into the discussion because the mere fact that a reading is valid with ten does not necessarily answer the *hiddur* of a larger gathering. If you can hear with one hundred people here and with two hundred people there, is there a significant *berov am* advantage? And what if going to the larger group causes you to miss learning time?

That leads to the well-known statement that **מבטלין תלמוד תורה לשמוע מקרא מגילה**—we interrupt Torah learning to hear the Megillah (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 687:2).

But what exactly does that statement mean? Is it obvious that we stop learning to fulfill the mitzvah? Or does it teach something more subtle about the value of gathering a large public for *pirsumei nisa*?

That question brings us to an important *chakirah*, and to a *vort* of Reb Chaim.

## Why Must We Stop Learning Torah for Megillah?

We have the halachah: **"מבטלין תלמוד תורה לשמוע מקרא מגילה"**—we interrupt Torah learning to hear the reading of Megillah (Orach Chaim 687:2, following the Gemara in Megillah 3a).

There is a well-known *kashya* discussed in the name of **Reb Chaim**. What is so unusual about saying that one stops learning to do a mitzvah? We stop to fulfill many mitzvos! And if Megillah itself is **Divrei Kabbalah**, the writings of the Nevi'im and Kesuvim, doesn't reading it have a character of Torah? Why should the Gemara describe it in terms of *bittul Torah*?

The *Aruch HaShulchan* offers an interesting way to look at this: perhaps the *chiddush* is not simply that a person leaves his Gemara to hear the Megillah, but that he should go where there is **berov am hadras melech**, even if that takes additional time. He can fulfill the basic obligation in a smaller place, but the *publicity of the miracle*, **pirsumei nisa**, is enhanced by a greater gathering.

If so, the halachah may be teaching that a person should interrupt his learning even to join the public reading in a more fitting way. We have to examine the language inside to see exactly how far this interpretation goes. It gives a very different emphasis to **מבטלין תלמוד תורה**.

## The Litvishe Derech of Learning

You know, this discussion reminds me of the *chinuch* of the old Lithuanian yeshivos. In that world there was a tremendous feeling for what it means to learn Torah in depth. I remember the attitude toward merely saying words or reading easy *vertlach* instead of engaging in a genuine *sugya*. There was a certain seriousness, a demand for *ameilus*.

Let me tell you a *maaseh* that my father told me many times.

When my father was a *bachur* in Beis HaTalmud, he was a tremendous *masmid*. He told me that during breakfast he sometimes liked to take out the *Mayanos Shel Torah* and read from it. One day he became aware of a tall figure standing over him: **Reb Leib Malin**. Reb Leib saw what he was reading and made a sharp remark about spending his precious time on that kind of easy reading.

My father described the *pachad* that Reb Leib's words left in him. He said that from that day onward he could barely bring himself to touch that book. It wasn't that he was a narrow-minded person or followed every stringency of Reb Leib. On the contrary, my father was open and easygoing. Yet the impression of Reb Leib's seriousness about Torah learning remained with him for years.

Why am I telling you the *maaseh*? Because it helps you understand the world in which the famous *chakirah* of Reb Chaim was heard. You didn't simply pass over a line of Gemara. You asked: **What exactly is the halachah teaching? What is its *chiddush*?** That atmosphere, the demand that the *sevara* be clear, is part of what we are trying to preserve in our own learning.

Now let me tell you one more memory of that world, and then we have to return to the Megillah.

## Memories of the Old Beis HaTalmud

My father told me another incident involving Reb Leib. A relative in the family asked him to bring something for Shabbos—a woman's dress—and he had it hanging where it could be seen in the yeshivah. Reb Leib noticed and sharply questioned him about it. The point, as my father remembered it, was the extraordinarily serious atmosphere in the beis medrash: the *bachurim* felt that everything they did reflected the standards of Torah.

He also described an incident concerning a water fountain installed in Beis HaTalmud. Reb Leib objected that **a beis medrash is not a park**. I heard that a very strong *talmid*, Reb Leizer, removed the fountain. There were colorful stories about the strength and intensity of certain *talmidei chachamim* in those days.

In the conversation, someone related an especially startling story concerning a suspected thief and a violent confrontation. I cannot establish those details from the recording, and I would not repeat such a severe allegation as a confirmed historical fact. It was part of the animated recollection and the discussion among the *oilam*, not a source from which we can establish what occurred.

All right, *rabosai*. Back to the *sugya*. We have so much in the *kuntres* that we won't finish if we spend the whole night on stories.

## Women and the Public Reading of Megillah

Let's return to **berov am**. What is the obligation of women in this regard?

Women are obligated in Megillah, but the *Rishonim* and *poskim* discuss whether to describe their obligation as reading or hearing. Then there is the separate question of joining a *minyan* for *pirsumei nisa*. The Rema writes in Orach Chaim 690:18: **"ויש להסתפק אם נשים מצטרפות לעשרה"**—there is doubt whether women can be counted among the ten for the purposes under discussion.

So there are two questions. First, can women be counted toward the required public gathering? Second, **does the preference for berov am apply to women in exactly the same way as to men?** Those are not necessarily the same *shaylah*.

You might say: what difference does it make that her *chiyuv* is described as *shemiah*? Listening is also a mitzvah. By shofar we speak about hearing the sound. But one cannot simply assume that every individual obligation has the same public-gathering requirements. What does **berov am** add? Is it part of the *pirsumei nisa* of Megillah, or is it an independent *hiddur* of having many people perform a mitzvah together?

Suppose ten people independently say Kiddush in a room. Is that a fulfillment of **berov am** in the same sense as one person reading Megillah for all ten? There are differences between a group performing a collective public act and many individuals each fulfilling their own obligation.

The *poskim* discuss women's Megillah readings and whether they should be arranged in shul or may be conducted at home. That brings us to a practical question. If a woman can hear the Megillah from a reader at home, does she have to go to a large public reading? And if we think the daytime reading is the *ikar*, might the answer be different at night and in the day?

We have to be careful in what we tell people. I am raising the *shalos*, not telling you to impose new obligations on women without a clear *psak*. Let's look at the sources first.

## Is Berov Am More Important by Day Than by Night?

Many women who attend a large Megillah reading in shul come at night, while during the day they may hear it at home from a husband or another reader. But suppose **the primary mitzvah of Megillah is during the day**, as we discussed. If **berov am** is a meaningful requirement for women, wouldn't there be a stronger reason to arrange the public gathering for the daytime reading?

That is a real *nafka minah*. It is not merely an abstract discussion of which reading is primary.

On the other hand, I have seen a ruling attributed to **Rav Elyashiv** that women do not have the same obligation of *berov am* and can fulfill their obligation at home. If that is the *psak*, the whole calculation changes. We also have to distinguish the question of a woman joining ten listeners from the question whether she must seek the largest possible gathering. The Rema's *safek* does not automatically answer all of that.

What is the *maaseh*? Should we tell a woman that she must go to shul for a public Megillah reading even when it is difficult for her? I am not prepared to say that from our discussion. The *poskim* have to be weighed, and a family's circumstances matter.

I remember my *bubby*. There was a shul in the house, and yet her relationship with going to shul was very different from what we see today. Every Shabbos she would ask about the parashah and the haftarah. Those were different times, and the expectations surrounding home and shul were different. I don't want to take one custom from one place and automatically make it a universal *chiyuv*.

So, *rabosai*, hear the distinction. A woman is obligated in Megillah. But whether, how, and when she should seek a public reading is a further question. If she has a permitted way to fulfill the mitzvah at home, we cannot simply tell her that she has failed because she did not attend the largest gathering.

## The Time of the Daytime Megillah Reading

Now let's turn to the **zman**. Open Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 687:1:

**"ושל לילה זמנה כל הלילה ושל יום זמנה כל היום מהנץ החמה עד סוף היום ואם קראה משעלה עמוד השחר יצא."**

The nighttime reading can be done throughout the night. The daytime reading is normally from **netz hachamah**, sunrise, until the end of the day, but if it was read from **alos hashachar**, daybreak, the obligation is fulfilled after the fact.

So we have to distinguish **alos** from **netz**, and *lechatchilah* from *bedieved*. Don't mix them up. If somebody is in an unusual circumstance and needs to read during that early period, what does the halachah permit? We will look at the Mishnah Berurah and its qualifications.

## Alos Hashachar, Netz, and the End of the Night

Here is the *shaylah*: what happens if someone has not read the Megillah at night, and it is already close to dawn? **"של לילה זמנה כל הלילה"**—the time for the nighttime reading is the entire night. Ordinarily, that means until the end of the night. But there are discussions about the period between *alos hashachar* and *netz hachamah*, particularly for a person in a pressing situation.

One cannot simply take the *bedieved* provision for the daytime reading and apply it automatically to the nighttime reading. They are separate obligations, and different questions arise. The *Magen Avraham* and Mishnah Berurah discuss unusual circumstances. There may be an approach to reading without a *brachah* when the time is doubtful, but we need the exact ruling inside before relying on it.

Imagine a person who had a medical emergency and was unable to hear the nighttime reading. Or someone who fell asleep and woke very late. Does he still have a possibility of fulfilling the night obligation? What if the time is uncertain? Those are cases in which the *zmanim* really matter.

Now there is another question. Is there a reason to insist on reading Megillah early in the night, or can you arrange a reading at one in the morning? The Shulchan Aruch says that the *zman* is all night. But the general principle of **זריזין מקדימין למצוות** tells us to perform mitzvos promptly. How does that apply here? If someone could hear the Megillah alone immediately or wait for a *minyan* much later, which consideration is more important?

I saw a discussion attributed to Rav Shlomo Zalman and other *poskim* about the urgency of reading early and the importance of a public reading. I don't want to assert an answer without seeing the details inside. A person's situation, the likelihood of assembling ten, and whether he will still have time to read all matter.

The *oilam* is remembering stories about people who went to great lengths to assemble a *minyan* for the Megillah, including paying people to attend, and sometimes the gathering fell apart. Stories can illustrate the *shaylah*, but they do not by themselves decide the *halachah*.

What if a group is waiting for a Megillah scroll or a *baal korei*, and the hour grows later? Should everyone continue waiting? Could they eat? Should someone read individually? That is precisely why we need a proper order in the *sugya*: first the time of the *mitzvah*, then the preference for a *minyan*, and then the rules about eating before one fulfills the mitzvah.

We'll come to the eating question as well. For now, remember that having the whole night does not mean every other *halachic* consideration disappears.

## Eating Before Megillah, and the Zman of Nightfall

Someone raises the question about eating before the Megillah. It often comes up on Purim night after **Taanis Esther**. A person has been fasting; the fast is over, but he still has not heard the Megillah. How much is he allowed to eat?

I remember coming home from **Rav Moshe Feinstein's levayah**. We were traveling by bus from New York toward Baltimore, and the fast had ended. An announcement was made that some cake was available for those who needed to eat. Most of the *oilam* waited. I remember the discussion because it illustrates how a practical situation—people traveling, hungry, and waiting to fulfill Megillah—can bring the *halachos* into focus. There are distinctions involving a small amount of food, a proper meal, and arrangements such as appointing a *shomer*. We need to learn the exact rulings.

Now what is the time of the **nighttime reading** in America? That itself depends on how you calculate *tzeis hakochavim*. There is a discussion associated with **Igros Moshe, Orach Chaim IV, siman 62**, in which the timing of a rabbinic obligation is considered. I refer to a practice of about **fifty minutes after sunset** in that context. But there are different calculations, and different authorities and communities use different *zmanim*. We cannot take one number and announce it as universal for every date, place and *psak*.

Some were more stringent about waiting for a later *tzeis*; others used a shorter interval for a mitzvah of rabbinic status. I recall discussions among *poskim* and calendars concerning times such as forty-two, forty-five, fifty, and seventy-two minutes. Those numbers require proper interpretation according to location and the definition of nightfall.

And now I have a *kashya*. The Mishnah Berurah, Orach Chaim 692:16, discusses the seriousness of Megillah as **Divrei Kabbalah**. When a person is in doubt whether he read Megillah, the usual rule **ספק דרבנן לקולא** does not necessarily apply in the ordinary way. So if Megillah has that special status, how far can we use the statement that the nighttime reading is rabbinic in order to be lenient about its time?

Perhaps one has to distinguish the night's enactment from the main obligation during the day. Perhaps the *chumra* of Divrei Kabbalah applies differently in different parts of this *sugya*. That is exactly the point I want to investigate.

There are many more *ha'aros* in the *kuntres*. We have barely begun. Don't think these are trivial technical questions. They affect how and when a person performs the mitzvah, how we balance *zerizus* with **pirsumei nisa**, and what to do in unusual circumstances. We have to build the *psak* on clear *mekoros*.

## Why Megillah Is More Than an Ordinary Derabbanan

Let's understand the *kashya*. On the one hand, the nighttime reading is discussed as an obligation of *derabbanan*. On the other hand, Megillah is associated with **Divrei Kabbalah**, which can be treated with greater severity than an ordinary rabbinic law. The Mishnah Berurah discusses the issue of a person who is doubtful whether he fulfilled the mitzvah. So how should we calculate a doubtful time for the nighttime reading? Can you really say, "It's only *derabbanan*, so we will simply be lenient"?

I am not answering it from a slogan. We have to distinguish the source and level of each obligation. Is the same *chumra* attached to the daytime reading and the nighttime reading? How do the *poskim* formulate the difference? And if someone has a medical or other exceptional circumstance, what *brachah* does he make? I want a precise answer based on the Mishnah Berurah and the earlier sources.

There is a lot more in these *halachos*. I prepared many *ha'aros*, including modern questions about **hearing aids** and **microphones**. Those are not small questions. The mitzvah is to hear the Megillah in the proper way, and technologies that change or amplify sound raise their own *shalos*. We will have to learn those *sugyos* separately.

## A Purim Memory

You are reminding me of a Purim *maaseh* from my childhood. My eighth-grade *rebbe* lived in Williamsburg, and it was a very special thing for some of the *talmidim* to be invited to his home on Purim. We looked forward to it tremendously.

I remember a strange and very uncomfortable incident involving something we were given to drink. I was very young, and the experience burned my mouth terribly. The people around me found the whole thing amusing. I still remember the burning feeling, and I remember the laughter. There is more to the story, but I will leave the rest for another time.

It is interesting how a discussion of Purim and a *minyan* can bring back these memories. But we have to return to the *halachos*; I don't want to spend all the time on stories. We're going to have to cover a great deal in the *kuntres*.

The *oilam* is still discussing where a particular person lives and how to get there. We'll work out those practical arrangements outside the shiur. The important thing is that each person should have a properly arranged Megillah reading and know the relevant *zmanim*.

All right, let's go *weiter*.

## Closing Conversation

The formal *shiur* has concluded, and there is a brief informal exchange about people and locations. The surviving transcription is too fragmented to establish the precise details confidently.

A final question appears to touch on organizing a topic by the parashah, but there is not enough coherent text to reconstruct the question or its answer faithfully. No further *halachic* ruling can be attributed to the speaker from this passage.

*Amen.*