Ribbis Devarim, Hakaras Hatov, and the Flow of Money

Topics

• Ribbis Includes More Than Money
• The Chiddush of Ribbis Devarim
• The Apparent Conflict with Hakaras Hatov
• Money Is Entrusted for a Purpose
• A Shulchan Is a Mission
• Lashon HaKodesh Describes Form and Purpose
• The Table Belongs to a Shaliach
• But the Borrower Still Received a Favor
• Gratitude Must Not Become Repayment
• Normal Gratitude and Added Payment
• The Opposite Danger: Kefiyas Hatov
• Greeting a Lender
• May a Borrower Say Thank You?
• Custom Defines the Baseline
• Lo Sechanem and Customary Benefits
• Favors Can Also Be Ribbis
• Before the Loan and After the Loan
• Loans to Sefarim, Yeshivos, and Institutions
• When the Loan Reveals a Person’s Character
• The Torah’s Balance

Transcript

# Ribbis Includes More Than Money

We will discuss a practical and essential area of halachah: *ribbis devarim*, interest paid through words.

Everyone understands the basic prohibition of ribbis. If a person lends another Jew money, the borrower may not return more than he received. The Torah calls interest *neshech*—a bite—because the borrower is often under pressure. He urgently needs money and may therefore agree to terms that diminish him. The lender takes advantage of that vulnerable position and “bites” into what belongs to him (Shemos 22:24; Vayikra 25:36–37; Devarim 23:20–21).

Chazal speak with exceptional severity about lending with interest. This is not a minor monetary restriction. It touches the Torah’s understanding of how one Jew must respond when another is in distress.

# The Chiddush of Ribbis Devarim

The prohibition is not limited to money. The Gemara derives from the words *“neshech kol davar asher yishach”* that even an added word can constitute ribbis. If a borrower begins offering a lender special greetings, praise, gratitude, or honor because of the loan, that additional treatment may be prohibited (Bava Metzia 75b).

This requires explanation. When a person returns extra money, one can understand the “bite.” The borrower has surrendered something because he needed the loan. But what has been taken from him when he says an extra thank-you? How is a word a form of interest?

To answer that, we must understand that the prohibition of ribbis is not merely about the amount of money transferred. It is about the relationship created by a loan and about preventing that relationship from turning the borrower’s vulnerability into a source of benefit for the lender.

# The Apparent Conflict with Hakaras Hatov

Here is the difficulty. When someone does you a favor, the rule is generally the opposite: do not minimize your gratitude. Thank him again and again. A person must not be stingy with words of appreciation.

Why, then, does halachah restrict gratitude after a loan? Why should the borrower not express his appreciation as fully as possible?

# Money Is Entrusted for a Purpose

The answer begins with the Torah’s view of money and business. We often imagine business as an opportunity to take: I possess something that you need, and I will use that need for my own benefit. A believing Jew must view it differently. Proper business is also a form of giving. I have been placed in a position to provide what another person requires.

When Klal Yisrael told David HaMelech that they needed livelihood, he answered, *“Let them go and support one another”* (Berachos 3b). Money is called currency because it circulates. It is not meant merely to remain locked in one person’s account. Hashem places resources in one person’s hands so that they can reach another.

# A Shulchan Is a Mission

A teaching cited from *Me’am Loez* explains the word *shulchan*, a table, as related conceptually to *shlichus*. Hashem gives a person a table filled with food so that he can serve as a messenger and share that food with others. The table is not only a sign of ownership; it is an assignment.

This reflects a broader feature of Lashon HaKodesh: words are not arbitrary labels. They express the inner nature of the thing being named.

A rebbe once illustrated this with the word *sheleg*, snow. He noted the numerical progression in its letters—three hundred, thirty, and three—and cited a teaching connecting that pattern to the three components commonly used to describe water, two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom. A student immediately asked: if water has the same composition, why is water not also called *sheleg*? The answer to that question leads back to the deeper point that Lashon HaKodesh describes not only substance, but also form and function.

# Lashon HaKodesh Describes Form and Purpose

The answer offered to the question about *sheleg* was that snow and water may share the same underlying composition, yet appear in different forms. Snow expands outward; when it melts, it contracts into water. The descending numerical pattern in the letters—three hundred, thirty, and three—was presented as a hint to that movement from an expanded form back toward its root.

Whether or not one can establish every detail of that teaching, its purpose in the shiur was clear: in Lashon HaKodesh, a name reflects the character and function of the thing.

# The Table Belongs to a Shaliach

That brings us back to *shulchan*. A table is not merely the place where a person consumes what he owns. It represents a mission. Hashem has placed food and resources on your table so that you will distribute them properly.

The Ohr HaChaim HaKadosh explains the words, *“If you lend money to My people, to the poor person who is with you”* (Shemos 22:24), to mean that the poor person’s money is presently *with you*. Hashem entrusted it to your hands so that you could pass it to the one for whom it was intended (Ohr HaChaim to Shemos 22:24).

A lender must therefore avoid the feeling: “I gave him my money; he now owes me honor.” From the Torah’s perspective, Hashem gave you the ability to lend because He appointed you to help this borrower. You are a guardian and a messenger, not the ultimate source of the kindness.

# But the Borrower Still Received a Favor

This explains why the lender should not seek excessive thanks. Yet the borrower’s question remains. The lender could have refused. He chose to help. Should the borrower not possess genuine *hakaras hatov*?

Certainly he should. The prohibition is not a command to become ungrateful. The question is how gratitude should be expressed without being converted into an additional payment for the money that was lent.

# Gratitude Must Not Become Repayment

This distinction is crucial. Outside the laws of a loan, a person should never be stingy with appreciation—especially toward those closest to him. When your wife or another person helps you, say more, not less. Do not use this halachah as an excuse for *kefiyas hatov*.

A loan, however, creates a special psychological pressure. Shlomo HaMelech says, *“The borrower is a servant to the lender”* (Mishlei 22:7). The borrower feels indebted. He wants to escape that uncomfortable feeling and restore the balance between them.

A teaching related in the name of Rav Yerucham illustrates this. One person repeatedly tells his benefactor, “Thank you, thank you; I cannot thank you enough.” The benefactor keeps replying, “It was nothing.” What may be taking place beneath the surface? The recipient is trying to discharge the debt through his words: “I have thanked you sufficiently; now we are even.” The benefactor, consciously or unconsciously, may be answering: “Your words have not yet repaid what I did.”

That is precisely the danger. Gratitude has been transformed into compensation. The lender received money back, and now receives an additional emotional benefit—special honor, praise, or submission—because the borrower once needed him.

# Normal Gratitude and Added Payment

The Torah does not erase the borrower’s obligation to recognize the kindness. It establishes a boundary. Normal courtesy remains courtesy. Added treatment given specifically because of the loan becomes a possible form of ribbis.

This is why public honors can also raise a question. Suppose an institution received a loan and then placed the lender’s name everywhere, honored him publicly, or celebrated him because he supplied the money. Even if no additional cash changed hands, the loan may have produced a valuable benefit: kavod.

# The Opposite Danger: Kefiyas Hatov

At the same time, human nature easily moves in the opposite direction. A story was told about Rav Yitzchak Hutner, who saw someone avoiding him and remarked, “Why is he ignoring me? I never did him a favor.” The sharp humor exposes a familiar weakness: people sometimes avoid a benefactor because his presence reminds them of their obligation.

This weakness began with Adam HaRishon. When confronted after the sin, he said, *“The woman whom You gave to be with me—she gave me from the tree”* (Bereishis 3:12). Rashi notes that Adam denied the very good Hashem had given him, and Chazal identify this as *kefiyas hatov* (Rashi to Bereishis 3:12; Avodah Zarah 5b).

The balance is therefore delicate: do not repay a loan with honor, but do not erase the kindness from your heart.

# Greeting a Lender

The Gemara gives a concrete example of *ribbis devarim*. A person who was never accustomed to greet another may not suddenly begin offering him special greetings after receiving a loan from him. The new honor is being generated by the loan (Bava Metzia 75b; Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 160:11).

Suppose you passed this person in shul for years without acknowledging him. After he lends you money, you suddenly approach him warmly: “Shalom aleichem! How are you?” That change may look like friendship, but its cause is the loan. The greeting is an added benefit.

If he later becomes your neighbor or a genuine social relationship develops, normal interaction may be different. The determining question is not merely what words were spoken, but why the treatment changed. Is this now ordinary conduct between neighbors and friends, or are you honoring him because he lent you money?

The shiur treated this concern as relevant even after repayment when the new honor remains clearly connected to the loan. The practical parameters require careful halachic guidance.

# May a Borrower Say Thank You?

This leads to the most sensitive question. May the borrower simply say thank you?

The practical approach presented was that ordinary courtesy is permitted. In contemporary society, a basic “thank you” is the normal response to assistance; it is not necessarily understood as compensation. But the borrower may not turn that courtesy into an exaggerated tribute: repeated thanks, unusual praise, elaborate blessings, or declarations that he never would have made without the loan.

The exact wording depends partly on ordinary communal practice. If a person routinely says *chazak u’baruch*, *todah rabbah*, or a brief blessing to everyone who assists him, the phrase may be ordinary courtesy. If he never speaks that way and suddenly begins showering the lender with brachos, the words reveal their source.

The rule is therefore not that one particular phrase is always permitted or always prohibited. The question is whether the borrower is remaining within his established norm or delivering additional value because he received the loan.

# Custom Defines the Baseline

This principle appears in other areas of halachah as well. Something that would otherwise look like a gratuitous gift may be regarded differently when it is the accepted form of payment or courtesy. A customary tip, for example, is not necessarily the same as an unsolicited present. The halachic baseline is shaped by what people ordinarily give in that setting.

The same is true here: what is normal remains normal. What is extra because of the loan is the concern.

# Lo Sechanem and Customary Benefits

The shiur used tipping a non-Jew as an analogy. The Torah says, *“Lo sechanem”* (Devarim 7:2), and Chazal interpret this, among other ways, as a prohibition against giving a gratuitous gift (*matnas chinam*) to an idolater (Avodah Zarah 20a). Yet a normal business tip is generally not viewed as a purely gratuitous gift. It is part of the accepted commercial relationship and may benefit the giver through proper service and goodwill.

The point was not to resolve every detail of *lo sechanem*, but to illustrate the role of ordinary practice. A customary benefit is different from a special benefit created solely by the loan.

# Favors Can Also Be Ribbis

Ribbis devarim is not confined to speech. A borrower may not begin performing services for the lender that he did not previously perform.

If the lender never had his garbage taken out by this person, the borrower may not suddenly begin doing it because of the loan. If the borrower purchases an aliyah for the lender, arranges special synagogue honors, or performs another valuable favor because the lender helped him, the favor may constitute ribbis.

The same issue applies to a *Mi Shebeirach*. If the gabbai routinely makes the same blessing for everyone in that circumstance, it is ordinary procedure. If the borrower suddenly arranges unusual brachos and public recognition specifically because of the loan, the lender is receiving added honor.

A borrower who notices that the lender is receiving such praise may have to stop it. That must be done with sensitivity so as not to embarrass the lender or the person speaking, but one cannot knowingly accept prohibited benefit merely because refusing it feels awkward.

# Before the Loan and After the Loan

The students raised an additional question: what if a person begins doing favors before requesting the loan, hoping to influence the lender? That can raise the issue of *ribbis mukdem*—a benefit advanced because a loan is anticipated. Similarly, a benefit delivered afterward can be *ribbis me’ucheres* when it is repayment for the earlier loan (see Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 160:6).

These cases depend heavily on intention, timing, prior practice, and the nature of the relationship. They should not be decided by slogans. The practical question is always: would this word, favor, blessing, or honor have been given in the same way had there been no loan?

# Loans to Sefarim, Yeshivos, and Institutions

The same concern appears when money is lent for a sefer or to a public institution.

Suppose someone lends money so that a sefer can be printed. May the author place an elaborate acknowledgment in the front of the sefer because of that loan? Suppose a person lends a yeshiva a large sum to purchase a building, with repayment to take place whenever the institution is able. May the yeshiva then honor him at its dinner, place his picture on advertisements, or publicly praise him for providing the funds?

If the honor is given because of the loan, it may be a substantial form of ribbis. The lender has received not money, but kavod, publicity, and communal standing. The fact that the recipient is a yeshiva or a sefer project does not automatically remove the issue.

Donation and loan are not the same. A donor may be recognized according to accepted practice. A lender expects his principal to be returned. One must not casually add another form of compensation without clarifying the halachah.

# When the Loan Reveals a Person’s Character

A student raised a subtle case. Until now, he thought very little of a certain person. Then, during a difficult moment, that person lent him money generously. The loan revealed a quality he had never recognized, and he now genuinely respects him. May he begin greeting him warmly because a real relationship has developed?

The answer requires honesty. If the new conduct is merely a disguised thank-you—an added honor intended to repay the loan—it is prohibited. If the event truly created an ordinary friendship and the conduct is now normal for that relationship, it may be different. But a person must examine his motives carefully. Ribbis devarim often hides inside feelings that appear noble.

# The Torah’s Balance

The borrower must remain grateful. He may express normal courtesy and should never become a *kafui tov*. But gratitude may not be turned into payment through excessive thanks, blessings, favors, services, public recognition, or unusual respect.

The lender, in turn, must not expect emotional repayment. Hashem placed the money in his hands and gave him the privilege of serving as a shaliach. He should not feel that the borrower now belongs to him or owes him submission.

That is the Torah’s hashkafah of a loan. The lender helps without extracting benefit. The borrower recognizes the kindness without purchasing his freedom through honor. Because these distinctions are subtle and highly practical, specific cases should be brought to a competent posek.