Are We Doing What Hashem Wants—or What We Want? The Akeidah, Negius, and True Yiras Shamayim

Topics

• Are We Doing What Hashem Wants — or What We Want?
• The Akeidah: What Is the Real Ratzon Hashem?
• Where Was Avraham's Choice?
• Vayashkem Avraham Baboker — Zerizus
• Acting Immediately: Another Lesson in Zerizus
• "Atah Yadati Ki Yerei Elokim Atah"
• Why Does Rashi Bring This Discussion at the End?
• Malbim and Rav Chaim of Brisk: What Was Avraham Told?
• Another Approach: The Intended Shechitah and the Command to Stop
• Returning to Rashi's Midrash
• The Nisayon of Negius: Are You Hearing Hashem or Yourself?
• "Elokim Yir'eh Lo HaSeh L'Olah, Bni"
• The Korban of the Self
• Rav Shach, the Maharil Diskin, and the Interpretation of Nevuah
• Why the Contradiction Is Raised Only Afterward
• How Negius Can Change the Way We Understand a Din
• The Dayan and the Empty Envelope
• Yirmiyahu: "Asher Lo Tzivisi, V'Lo Dibarti, V'Lo Alsah Al Libi"
• Muktzeh and the Real Purpose of Shabbos
• "La'asos Es HaShabbos" — Not Merely to Avoid Melachah
• When We Weaponize Daas Torah
• "Al Tishlach" and "Al Ta'as Lo Meumah"
• "Lehavin U'Lehaskil ... Lishmor V'La'asos U'Lekayeim"
• Rav Dovid Feinstein: Do Not Use Shemiras HaLashon to Destroy People
• The Akeidah's Lasting Lesson

Transcript

# Are We Doing What Hashem Wants — or What We Want?

## The Akeidah: What Is the Real Ratzon Hashem?

Rabosai, at the end of Parashas Vayeira we come to the **Akeidas Yitzchak**, the final and greatest of Avraham Avinu's ten nisyonos.

I think the Akeidah teaches a lesson which touches every aspect of our lives: **How do I know that what I am doing is truly what the Ribbono Shel Olam wants—and not simply what I want to do?**

A person can go through his entire life convinced that he is doing the right thing. "This is what Hashem wants from me. This is a mitzvah. This is the ratzon Hashem."

But maybe he is mistaken. Maybe his own interests and preferences are shaping the way he understands the mitzvah. It takes genuine **yiras Shamayim** to ask, without negius: *What does the Eibishter really want from me?*

That, I believe, is a fundamental lesson of the Akeidah.

### Where Was Avraham's Choice?

The mefarshim ask a very simple question about the nisayon.

Hashem told Avraham to bring Yitzchak for the Akeidah. Once Avraham Avinu hears the Ribbono Shel Olam speaking to him, what choices does he have?

What does it mean, "You were tested"? The Eibishter said to do something. If Hashem commands it, Avraham will do it!

Now, for people on our madreigah, the Akeidah would certainly present a terrible nisayon. But we are talking about **Avraham Avinu**. He lived his whole life for the Ribbono Shel Olam. If Hashem wants something, he does it.

It isn't even that Hashem *could* accomplish whatever He wants. Whatever the Ribbono Shel Olam wills **will happen**. If He wished to take a life, He needs nobody's assistance.

So what was the nisayon in seeing whether Avraham would listen?

The **Ran, in his Derashos**, is cited as suggesting a beautiful approach. Hashem's words were not simply an absolute command in the ordinary sense, but a **request**:

**"קח נא את בנך את יחידך אשר אהבת את יצחק"** (Bereishis 22:2).

Take, **please**, your son, your only one, whom you love—Yitzchak.

What is the word **"נא"**? *Please.* It sounds like a bakashah, not simply a command from which there is no choice. According to the explanation we are developing from the Ran, the greatness lies in Avraham's willingness to fulfill even what Hashem asks of him.

[The exact Derashos HaRan derush and whether the original makes this precise distinction between request and binding command require verification; this is the interpretation presented in the shiur.]

Now, even apart from that approach, I want to point out something which the pasuk emphasizes.

### Vayashkem Avraham Baboker — Zerizus

It says:

**"וישכם אברהם בבקר ויחבש את חמרו"** (Bereishis 22:3).

Avraham rose **early in the morning** and saddled his donkey.

There is a tremendous lesson in those words.

A person could say, "Fine, Hashem wants me to do this, so I'll do it. But let me take some time. Let me sit with it. Let me gather my thoughts. Let me discuss it with people. Perhaps in a few days I'll be ready."

Avraham did not do that.

**Vayashkem Avraham baboker.**

He got up early. Without delay. Without dragging his feet. With **zerizus** and a clear commitment to the ratzon Hashem.

By other events in Avraham's life, the Midrash describes him consulting **Aner, Eshkol and Mamre**. Here, when the Akeidah arrives, the Torah describes him getting up to fulfill the word of Hashem.

So even if you tell me Avraham was certain to obey, the **way** he obeyed was a madreigah in itself.

Someone can fulfill a mitzvah with resentment, hesitation or the feeling that he has no choice. And someone else can run toward it with **zerizus**, because he wants to do the will of the Ribbono Shel Olam.

But I have another mahalach, and I think it may bring us to a deeper understanding of the Akeidah.

We have to examine what Hashem **really told Avraham**, what Avraham thought those words meant, and what the pasuk says **at the end** of the nisayon.

## Acting Immediately: Another Lesson in Zerizus

Now, rabosai, let's look more deeply at **"וישכם אברהם בבקר"**.

When Avraham hears that he is to bring Yitzchak for the Akeidah, he rises at the beginning of the next morning. There is no long deliberation described. He prepares the donkey, takes Yitzchak and goes.

The **Bnei Yissaschar**, as I recall his beautiful vort on Lech Lecha, draws a similar lesson from the earlier pasuk:

**"וילך אברם כאשר דבר אליו ה'"** (Bereishis 12:4).

Avraham went **ka'asher diber elav Hashem**.

We ordinarily read that as "in accordance with what Hashem told him." But perhaps *ka'asher* can be heard as **"as soon as"**: the moment Hashem told him, Avraham went.

That's the beautiful *remez* I saw brought. [The exact location and Hebrew wording in Bnei Yissaschar need verification before formal citation.]

Avraham didn't insist on arranging everything in his own way. He didn't first say, "Let me consider when and how I'd prefer to do it." The Ribbono Shel Olam told him to go, and he went.

And in our parashah, **"Vayashkem Avraham baboker."** He fulfills the ratzon Hashem with zerizus.

But that is only one dimension of the nisayon. I want to share another *mahalach*, which I think brings out the **yiras Shamayim** at the center of the Akeidah.

## "Atah Yadati Ki Yerei Elokim Atah"

Look at the end of the Akeidah:

**"ויאמר אל תשלח ידך אל הנער ואל תעש לו מאומה כי עתה ידעתי כי ירא אלקים אתה ולא חשכת את בנך את יחידך ממני"** (Bereishis 22:12).

The malach tells Avraham not to send his hand toward the boy and not to do anything to him, **"for now I know that you are a yerei Elokim."**

What does **"now I know"** mean? What was the test that demonstrated his yiras Shamayim?

Now, Rashi brings an extraordinary Midrash at this very place.

Avraham asks the Ribbono Shel Olam: Yesterday You told me:

**"כי ביצחק יקרא לך זרע"** (Bereishis 21:12)—through Yitzchak your descendants will be called.

Then You said:

**"קח נא את בנך"** (22:2)—take your son.

And now You say:

**"אל תשלח ידך אל הנער"** (22:12)—don't lay your hand on him.

How can these three things fit together?

Rashi brings Hashem's answer:

**"לא אמרתי לך שחטהו אלא העלהו; אסקתיה, אחתיה."**

I didn't tell you **to slaughter him**, only **to bring him up**. You brought him up; now bring him down.

That is a gevaldige Midrash.

But I have a question that bothered me deeply.

### Why Does Rashi Bring This Discussion at the End?

The apparent contradiction existed **from the beginning of the Akeidah**.

When Hashem first told Avraham **"veha'aleihu sham le'olah"**, Avraham already knew the earlier promise that the children of Israel would come through Yitzchak.

If that was a difficulty, why didn't the Midrash's conversation appear **before** Avraham took Yitzchak to the mountain?

Why wait until **"Ki atah yadati ki yerei Elokim atah"**?

What does Avraham's question about the wording have to do with Hashem declaring **"Now I know you fear G-d"**?

Surely the Torah's emphasis on yiras Shamayim is not accidental.

And there's another question. The Midrash says the command was really **"ha'aleihu"**, raise him up, not "shechteihu," slaughter him.

Did Avraham not know how to read a word? Did he not understand his own nevuah?

These questions led to an important discussion between the approach of **the Malbim** and teachings reported in the name of **Rav Chaim of Brisk**.

Let's see how the interpretations differ before returning to my own understanding.

## Malbim and Rav Chaim of Brisk: What Was Avraham Told?

Now I want to bring you the **Malbim's** approach to the Akeidah and the questions quoted in the shiur in the name of **Rav Chaim of Brisk**.

The Torah says:

**"והעלהו שם לעלה"** (Bereishis 22:2).

Bring him up there as an olah.

According to the way I am reading the **Malbim**, the literal words did not necessarily command Avraham to **slaughter** Yitzchak. The command was to **bring him up** onto the mizbeach.

That fits the Midrash quoted by Rashi: **"לא אמרתי לך שחטהו אלא העלהו."**

But now a question arises. Avraham acted as if the instruction could require actually bringing Yitzchak as a korban, with the full significance of a shechitah.

Could he simply have failed to understand what Hashem said?

The Malbim's discussion includes an expression that Avraham did not distinguish the precise wording properly, **"לא דקדק ... היטב"**, as quoted in the shiur. The entire context of that expression and the printed text need review before turning it into a claim that Avraham was an ordinary mistaken reader.

Now the Brisker school, in a teaching quoted here in the name of **Rav Chaim**, challenges that approach.

First, if the intention was simply for Avraham to raise Yitzchak onto the mizbeach and then bring him down, **where is the greatness of the nisayon** which Chazal describe as the Akeidah?

Second, how could **Avraham Avinu**, a navi of such an extraordinary madreigah, simply misunderstand what the Ribbono Shel Olam meant? It is a tremendous challenge to portray the nisayon as resulting from a failure to read or understand his own nevuah.

Third, there are technical questions concerning the very definition of **hakravah**. Can merely bringing someone up onto the mizbeach be understood as the intended korban? There is a whole Brisker analysis of **hakravah mechayim**, **zevachim**, and the different stages of a korban.

I am not going to give an entire shiur in Zevachim tonight, but those questions matter.

### Another Approach: The Intended Shechitah and the Command to Stop

The view attributed to **Rav Chaim** in this shiur places the emphasis on Avraham's absolute preparedness to bring Yitzchak as a korban. Hashem's later command **"אל תשלח ידך"** brought the test to its conclusion.

Avraham was ready, and at that point there was no longer a need for the deed itself.

There are beautiful teachings about the **ashes of Yitzchak** being considered as though they were upon the mizbeach, even though Yitzchak was not actually slaughtered. And at the end Avraham offers **the ram in his son's place**:

**"ויעלהו לעלה תחת בנו"** (Bereishis 22:13).

We can discuss the status of thought, of preparedness to sacrifice, and the offering of the ram instead. But the actual wording, authorship and details of each teaching need primary-source verification; one cannot merge every Brisker interpretation into one fully authenticated quotation.

### Returning to Rashi's Midrash

But I have the same question on both approaches.

If the Ribbono Shel Olam did not require the shechitah, why is the clarification expressed **at the end**, specifically next to **"Ki atah yadati ki yerei Elokim atah"**?

And if the command did involve the full possibility of shechitah before Hashem stopped it, how do we understand Rashi's words **"I never told you to slaughter him, only to bring him up"**?

I want to suggest a different way to read the issue—not as an argument about whether Avraham knew Hebrew, and not as an arbitrary mistake in his nevuah.

It may have to do with the most difficult thing a person can face: **interpreting the ratzon Hashem without allowing his own desire to interfere**.

Think of this. If Avraham wanted Yitzchak to remain alive—and of course he loved his son—he would have every reason to hear **"veha'aleihu"** in the narrowest possible way.

He could say, "Hashem didn't tell me to slaughter him. He only said to bring him up. Finished."

But was that reading an objective understanding of the instruction—or was it his **father's heart**, his **negius**, affecting what he heard?

That's the nekudah I want you to appreciate.

And if we understand it, perhaps it will answer both the Malbim's question and the position of the Midrash at the very end of the Akeidah.

## The Nisayon of Negius: Are You Hearing Hashem or Yourself?

Now, rabosai, I want to develop the mahalach I have in mind.

**Negius, negius, negius!**

When a person **wants** something, everything he hears seems to support what he wants. Every proof, every statement, every explanation suddenly fits his preferences.

And that may be the greatest danger when we're trying to understand the **ratzon Hashem**.

Imagine Avraham Avinu at the Akeidah. The Ribbono Shel Olam says:

**"והעלהו שם לעלה"**.

A father hears this instruction about **his only beloved son**.

What would the father inside him want to understand?

"Bring him up—that's all. Hashem never said to slaughter him. So I will take Yitzchak onto the mountain, bring him up on the mizbeach, and bring him down. I will have done exactly what Hashem said."

And perhaps that would be the correct literal interpretation! Indeed, Rashi records that Hashem finally explained: **"לא אמרתי לך שחטהו אלא העלהו."**

But Avraham doesn't permit himself to settle the question based merely on **what he wants the words to mean**.

He asks himself: "Am I explaining these words that way because that is truly the will of the Ribbono Shel Olam—or because **I**, as a father, cannot bear the other possibility?"

That's the tremendous nekudah.

Avraham knows that he has **negius**. He loves Yitzchak. He wants his son to live. But he will not allow that love to determine the interpretation of the nevuah.

So he prepares for the most difficult possibility, in case that is truly the ratzon Hashem.

I am not saying Avraham failed to understand his nevuah or that any person should independently interpret purported Divine messages. This is a *derush* about Avraham's unique nisayon, not a model for claiming new commands in ordinary life.

The point is that Avraham refuses to use his **own personal desire** as the yardstick of Hashem's will.

### "Elokim Yir'eh Lo HaSeh L'Olah, Bni"

Now listen to a pasuk that may fit this mahalach beautifully.

Yitzchak asks Avraham: Where is the lamb for the korban?

Avraham answers:

**"אלקים יראה לו השה לעלה בני"** (Bereishis 22:8).

Hashem will see to the lamb for the offering, my son.

Why doesn't Avraham simply explain everything?

Perhaps because he isn't certain **how the final outcome will unfold**. He knows he must act according to the ratzon Hashem, but he will not let his own preference decide what that will demand.

"Elokim yir'eh lo." The Ribbono Shel Olam will determine what the korban is to be.

And I am prepared for **whatever He wants**.

That is yiras Shamayim: not simply obeying a command when we clearly understand it, but being ready to **set aside our own interests** in discovering and fulfilling the truth.

Now I see a beautiful way to understand why Rashi brings the Midrash at **"Ki atah yadati ki yerei Elokim atah."**

Only when Avraham's commitment is established does the ultimate clarification arrive. The Midrash explains: Hashem never intended an actual slaughter.

But the nisayon was Avraham's willingness **not to let the convenient interpretation become his conclusion merely because it was convenient**.

### The Korban of the Self

There's a beautiful pasuk at the beginning of Sefer Vayikra:

**"אדם כי יקריב מכם קרבן לה'"** (Vayikra 1:2).

When a man among you brings a korban to Hashem.

I want to make a *remez* from the word **"מכם"**—from you.

The most profound korban is sometimes the person's willingness to be **makriv his own ratzon**, his own preferences, the need to have things turn out his way.

Avraham Avinu was prepared to sacrifice everything dear to him, but the deeper avodah was that there was no **"zich"**—no self-interest controlling his decision.

Whatever the Ribbono Shel Olam wants, that's what I want.

Now we have to ask: is this idea merely my own *svara*, or does it connect with what other gedolim have said about **nevuah** and Avraham's nisayon?

I saw another approach quoted in the name of **Rav Shach** and **the Maharil Diskin** which I think follows a similar direction.

## Rav Shach, the Maharil Diskin, and the Interpretation of Nevuah

I want to take our idea a little further.

I saw an explanation connected with **Rav Shach**, zichrono livrachah, and a teaching of the **Maharil Diskin** concerning the way a navi receives a nevuah.

The **Rambam, Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah, chapter 7**, explains the difference between **Moshe Rabbeinu's nevuah** and that of other nevi'im.

Moshe received nevuah with a unique clarity:

**"פה אל פה אדבר בו"** (Bamidbar 12:8).

Mouth to mouth I speak with him.

But other nevi'im received nevuah through a **mashal or chidah**, a vision or representation through which the message was communicated. The Rambam writes:

**"כל הנביאים על ידי מלאך לפיכך רואים מה שהם רואים במשל וחידה"** (Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah 7:6).

Other prophets see their prophecy through an angelic medium, in a parable or riddle.

He also explains (7:3) that the interpretation of the prophetic parable becomes clear to the navi through the prophetic experience. So it is not correct to portray all nevi'im as simply guessing wildly about what their visions mean.

Nevertheless, the difference between **an image conveyed in prophecy** and Moshe's unparalleled clarity is an important theme in the Rambam.

Now the Maharil Diskin is quoted as suggesting that the **navi's understanding of the vision** is a crucial part of the experience.

According to the teaching I heard in the name of **Rav Shach**, perhaps Avraham's nisayon included the way he **interpreted** the prophecy of the Akeidah.

[The exact Maharil Diskin and Rav Shach sources have not been located in the printed sefarim; this is preserved as the shiur's oral attribution, not as a verified verbatim quotation.]

Think what Avraham could have done.

His heart would certainly want **"veha'aleihu"** to mean only lifting Yitzchak onto the mizbeach. He could have interpreted the nevuah in the most comforting possible way.

But would that be an objective interpretation—or the influence of his **negius**?

The way Rav Shach's thought is given here, Avraham's extraordinary **yiras Shamayim** is that even at the level of how he understood the prophecy, he refused to allow his desires to control what he believed Hashem wanted.

Now the words at the end fit beautifully:

**"כי עתה ידעתי כי ירא אלקים אתה."**

Now I know that you fear Hashem.

Not merely that you went through with an extraordinarily difficult action. Even your way of **understanding and interpreting the command** was governed by yiras Shamayim rather than personal preference.

That's a tremendous madreigah.

### Why the Contradiction Is Raised Only Afterward

Now return to our original kashya.

Rashi quotes Avraham saying that the commands seemed contradictory: I was promised descendants through Yitzchak, then told to bring him as an olah, and now told not to touch him.

Why is that conversation at the **end**, not the beginning?

Perhaps because Avraham refused to **resolve the contradiction in the direction he personally preferred** before carrying out the nisayon.

A regular person who sees a seeming contradiction might immediately say, "Better not to do anything. Shev v'al taaseh—sit and do nothing."

But we cannot use a legitimate halachic principle like **shev v'al taaseh** as a cover for avoiding a clear obligation whenever we find an excuse.

Another person might say, "The first statement is easier for me, so I'll emphasize it and put aside the second."

Avraham did neither.

He kept the question before him, continued with zerizus, and made himself ready to follow whatever would prove to be the real ratzon Hashem.

And only at the culmination of the nisayon came the clarification **"לא אמרתי לך שחטהו אלא העלהו."**

This is the approach I want to bring out. It isn't a replacement for the plain reading or for the traditional Midrash. It is a *mahalach in understanding the nisayon*.

Now, rabosai, that's not only a lesson in Chumash.

Every day people speak about the **ratzon Hashem**. They use those words in business, in community disagreements, and most dangerously in **bein adam lachaveiro**.

But how often is the thing that we insist "Hashem wants" really the thing **we** want?

That is where **negius** can blind us completely.

## How Negius Can Change the Way We Understand a Din

Rabosai, I want to speak about something painful, because this is not merely a beautiful Chumash vort.

I would say that an enormous amount of the time, **negius**—self-interest—gets involved in what we call the ratzon Hashem.

I'm using a strong expression to wake us up, not giving you a statistical percentage. But we have to recognize how deeply our own preferences can influence our judgment.

We are convinced that we are doing everything **l'shem Shamayim**.

This is especially dangerous in **bein adam lachaveiro** and in **business**. A person wants to win a dispute, protect his own money, or establish that he is right—and suddenly every halachic argument seems to support his side.

He can quote sources. He can claim he knows exactly what the Ribbono Shel Olam wants.

But perhaps he is seeing through the eyes of his **negius**.

### The Dayan and the Empty Envelope

I once saw a wonderful mashal attributed to the **Ben Ish Chai**.

There was a dayan hearing a din Torah between two litigants. As the proceedings continued, it became apparent to one man that the judgment was likely to go against him.

What could he do?

He approached the dayan privately, and the dayan told him to bring an **envelope** on the day the ruling was announced. He was to stand in the back of the room and wave it where the dayan could see.

The fellow did as instructed.

On the day of the psak, he stood there holding the envelope. The dayan glanced toward it, and suddenly his decision went in favor of the man holding it.

Everybody was shocked! From the evidence, it had seemed that the other fellow would win.

Afterward, the litigant slipped the envelope to the dayan. The dayan hurried into his room to open it.

And what did he find?

**Nothing!**

Not one dollar! The envelope was empty!

A terrible ma'aseh. The dayan had changed his judgment because he imagined he was about to receive money. He allowed himself to be influenced by a bribe that didn't even exist.

[This is an illustrative story attributed orally to the Ben Ish Chai; the precise work and wording have not been independently verified.]

Do you see what negius does?

It doesn't merely tempt a person to do something he knows is wrong. It can make him **believe that the wrong answer is the correct answer**.

The dayan may even have felt he could justify his ruling. But his judgment had been affected by something entirely foreign to the Torah.

That's the danger I am speaking about.

We look in the mirror and say, "I'm doing this because it is right!" But is it really right, or is the empty envelope waving in front of our eyes?

## Yirmiyahu: "Asher Lo Tzivisi, V'Lo Dibarti, V'Lo Alsah Al Libi"

There is a pasuk in **Yirmiyahu 19:5** that I want you to hear.

The navi rebukes Klal Yisrael for building high places for Baal and committing the terrible act of sacrificing their children.

The verse says:

**"ובנו את במות הבעל לשרף את בניהם באש עלות לבעל, אשר לא צויתי ולא דברתי ולא עלתה על לבי."**

They built the high places of Baal to burn their children in the fire as offerings to Baal—**something I did not command, did not speak, and that did not enter My heart**.

What is the meaning of these three expressions?

**"Lo tzivisi"**—I did not command it.

**"V'lo dibarti"**—I never spoke of it as an instruction.

**"V'lo alsah al libi"**—it did not enter My will or intention.

Of course the simple pasuk is condemning a horrific idolatrous act. The spiritual explanation I want to draw must not obscure that plain meaning.

But perhaps the three expressions teach us something about the difference between **the written rule**, **what people claim that rule means**, and **the actual intention of the Ribbono Shel Olam**.

A person can find clever ways to argue that some technically permitted act is what Hashem wants.

But he may be missing the **taam** and **purpose** of the command altogether.

He follows what he claims is the letter of the law while destroying the very values the mitzvah was intended to express.

I want to give you a practical example from **the Rambam's explanation of muktzeh**.

### Muktzeh and the Real Purpose of Shabbos

In **Hilchos Shabbos 24:12–13**, the Rambam explains that Chazal established restrictions on handling certain items on Shabbos in order to preserve **menuchas Shabbos**.

A person could technically avoid the thirty-nine melachos but spend the entire day dragging furniture, carrying tools and reorganizing his home like on a weekday.

What happened to **"למען ינוח"**—that one should rest?

He may not have violated a biblical melachah in each individual motion, but he has defeated the purpose of Shabbos.

The Rambam makes clear that the halachic safeguards protect the character of the day.

Do you hear? It isn't enough to ask, "Can I find a technical way around the issur?"

You have to ask: **What does the Ribbono Shel Olam want this Shabbos to become?**

And that question leads directly into our next point.

## "La'asos Es HaShabbos" — Not Merely to Avoid Melachah

Now, rabosai, think about Shabbos.

A bachur can daven, eat, and then go to sleep for nearly the whole day. He has been careful not to do melachah. He didn't switch on a light or write or carry in a prohibited way.

Wonderful—he observed the restrictions of Shabbos.

But I want to ask him: **Did he really make a Shabbos?**

The Torah says:

**"ושמרו בני ישראל את השבת לעשות את השבת לדרתם ברית עולם"** (Shemos 31:16).

Klal Yisrael shall guard Shabbos **to make Shabbos** throughout their generations as an eternal covenant.

Do you hear the expression?

Not only **"lishmor es haShabbos"**, to guard Shabbos.

**"La'asos es haShabbos"**—to make Shabbos!

Of course, the straightforward halachic meanings of *shmirah* and *asiyah* have to be learned in their sources. I am bringing out a mussar lesson from the words.

It's not enough to get through the day without doing something prohibited. Hashem wants a Shabbos of **kedushah**, **Torah**, **tefillah**, **oneg** and **menuchah**.

Imagine a person spends Shabbos doing absolutely nothing spiritually, simply sleeping away the hours. Can he really say he made Shabbos into what the Ribbono Shel Olam wanted?

Sometimes we're so proud that we are **Shomer Shabbos**.

I see these bumper stickers and think, "Shomer Shabbos? That's all? Why not also be **Oseh Shabbos**?"

It's a little joke, but there's a tremendous yesod behind it.

The older Yiddishe women used to say in Yiddish, **"Ich mach Shabbos"**—I'm making Shabbos.

What an expression! Preparing the food, arranging the house, lighting candles, creating a home filled with the atmosphere of Shabbos.

They weren't merely waiting for Shabbos to be over without doing a melachah. They were **making the Shabbos**.

A person has to know that the Torah wants the positive kedushah of the day, not just avoidance of technical violations.

That is part of what the **Rambam** brings out when he explains why Chazal established certain safeguards, including **muktzeh**. The rules guard the **menuchah** and character of the day.

### When We Weaponize Daas Torah

And the danger isn't limited to Shabbos.

Somebody walks around and says, "This is Daas Torah! I'm doing it for the Ribbono Shel Olam!"

And then he uses that conviction to **hurt another Yid**, to humiliate or attack somebody.

Rabosai, is that really what Hashem wants?

Are we sure our interpretation of Torah is not being colored by anger, jealousy, wounded pride, rivalry or some other negius?

We may have learned the words of the mitzvah. But have we understood **the will behind the mitzvah**?

That is the Akeidah's lesson as I am explaining it.

Avraham Avinu could not permit his own preference to determine what the command meant. And we cannot permit our self-interest to tell us that whatever we're doing is automatically l'shem Shamayim.

### "Al Tishlach" and "Al Ta'as Lo Meumah"

Now I want to come back to the end of the Akeidah.

The malach says two things:

**"אל תשלח ידך אל הנער ואל תעש לו מאומה"** (Bereishis 22:12).

Do not lay your hand on the boy, and do not do **anything at all** to him.

Why the double expression?

Rashi explains that when Avraham heard **"Al tishlach yadcha"**, not to slaughter Yitzchak, he asked:

**"אם כן לחנם באתי לכאן? אעשה בו חבלה ואוציא ממנו מעט דם."**

If so, did I come here for nothing? Let me make a small wound and bring out a little blood.

And Hashem answered:

**"אל תעש לו מאומה"**—do not do even the smallest injury.

This is another extraordinary moment.

Avraham was so ready to fulfill what he understood as the ratzon Hashem that even after hearing he should not slaughter Yitzchak, he asks whether some lesser action is still desired.

But Hashem says **no**, not even a small wound.

There are explanations in the name of **the Netziv** and other mefarshim about the significance of a small drop of blood and *hatafas dam*. The exact published source and its interpretation need verification. We should not take this exchange as a practical model for harming someone.

The lesson I want to bring out is this: even when Avraham wants to do something for Hashem, **the final authority is what Hashem actually wants**.

If Hashem says don't harm the boy, the answer is **don't harm him**.

One cannot say, "But I came all this way and prepared for a korban; surely I should at least do a little something!"

No! The Ribbono Shel Olam said not to.

That is the difference between doing what **I think would be a great religious act** and doing the **real ratzon Hashem**.

And now I understand even more strongly why the Midrash about the apparent contradiction appears at **"Ki atah yadati ki yerei Elokim atah."**

Yiras Shamayim isn't measured solely by the apparent grandeur of a deed. It means being prepared to accept Hashem's will, including when His will is **to stop**.

Now I want to end with the words we say every day in the brachah before Kriyas Shema.

## "Lehavin U'Lehaskil ... Lishmor V'La'asos U'Lekayeim"

Rabosai, I want to conclude with the words we say in the brachah of **Ahavah Rabbah** before Kriyas Shema:

**"ותן בלבנו בינה להבין ולהשכיל, לשמוע ללמד וללמד, לשמר ולעשות ולקיים את כל דברי תלמוד תורתך באהבה."**

Give our hearts understanding to comprehend and discern, to hear, to learn and teach, to guard, to do, and to uphold all the words of Your Torah with love.

What is the connection between all those words?

At first I understood the tefillah very simply.

First, we want to **learn Torah**—*lehavin u'lehaskil*, to understand and grasp.

Then we want to **keep Torah**—*lishmor, la'asos, u'lekayeim*, to guard and do the mitzvos.

And it is true that learning must lead to doing. If you learn something properly, it ought to affect how you act.

But perhaps we can hear a deeper request in the brachah.

We're not simply asking for intellectual understanding **of the words** of the mitzvos, as though we can then mechanically carry them out.

We're asking for the **daas** to understand **what the Ribbono Shel Olam truly wants** when He tells us to keep them.

**"Lehavin u'lehaskil"**—understand what it means **"lishmor, la'asos u'lekayeim"**.

Because you can know every technical detail of a din and still apply it in a way that is colored by your own interests.

And sometimes a person can be convinced he is doing a mitzvah while, in reality, he is harming another person and violating the very purpose for which he was given Torah.

That is why real **yiras Shamayim** must accompany our learning.

We have to understand the halachah, and then we must examine our own **negius**.

Is this the truth—or merely what I want the truth to be?

### Rav Dovid Feinstein: Do Not Use Shemiras HaLashon to Destroy People

I want to tell you something that I heard from my Rebbe, **Rav Dovid Feinstein**, zichrono livrachah.

There are times when people invoke the laws of **lashon hara l'toeles**—speaking negative information for a legitimate constructive purpose.

Now, the **Chofetz Chaim** does discuss carefully defined circumstances in which information may be disclosed for a genuine toeles. These are real halachos. Sometimes one **must** act to prevent harm, and keeping silent could itself be wrong.

But there are also strict conditions. A person cannot simply invent a **toeles** and thereby grant himself permission to spread damaging information.

And my Rebbe warned about a terrible misuse of those words.

People say anything they want about somebody else, and then, when you challenge them, they answer:

**"It's l'toeles!"**

They have a toeles for everything!

Rabosai, *l'toeles* does not mean "I am angry," "I want revenge," or "I want to ruin the other fellow's name." It is not a magic word that permits speech which would otherwise be forbidden.

My Rebbe spoke very sharply about how the concept can be misused, and I want to repeat the warning because I believe it is necessary.

In the way I heard his words, he said that had the Chofetz Chaim foreseen just how people would misuse the term **l'toeles**, he would have been deeply distressed—even to the point of saying he might not have written it that way.

I'm a small person. I wouldn't dare make a statement like that in my own name. I am relating what I heard my Rebbe say, and the exact original phrasing remains an **oral recollection**, not a statement from the Chofetz Chaim himself or a legal repeal of his actual rulings.

The halachos of toeles remain in force in their proper circumstances. The warning is about **dishonestly claiming their protection**.

Because it is possible to use the language of **Shemiras HaLashon** while destroying another Yid.

And that's what I want to tell you: **Don't use mitzvos to hurt Yidden!**

If a person really needs to warn someone of danger or prevent harm, he should follow the actual dinim of constructive disclosure, and in difficult cases seek appropriate guidance. But don't label personal attacks "l'shem Shamayim" and imagine the label makes them holy.

### The Akeidah's Lasting Lesson

Now you understand what I think is the *yesod* of the Akeidah.

Avraham Avinu had every possible negius to prefer the interpretation that would spare his son. Yet he did not let his wishes dictate the ratzon Hashem.

And when Hashem said **not** to touch Yitzchak, Avraham stopped. Not even a small injury.

He was committed not to what **he** wanted to do in Hashem's name, but to **what Hashem truly wanted**.

That is yiras Shamayim.

A Yid must live with **emes**, with truth. We must know the Torah, understand its words, and be honest enough to ask whether we are acting according to the Torah—or using its words to justify our own interests.

Rabosai, be careful. Be careful. Be careful.

Ask yourself every day:

**Am I doing what the Ribbono Shel Olam wants—or am I doing what I want, and calling it the ratzon Hashem?**

That is the lesson of Avraham Avinu and the Akeidah.

[End of Rabbi Walkin's recorded shiur. Distributor closing audio omitted.]