May a Man Dye His Hair? Lo Yilbash, Appearance, Shidduchim, Parnassah, and Geneivas Daas

Topics

• Dyeing Hair Color: Lo Yilbash, Appearance, and Geneivas Daas
• Three Practical Questions
• The Hat of Rav Michl Feinstein
• The Source of the Issur: "Lo Yilbash"
• The Prohibition Can Apply to a Single Hair
• The Maharam Shik: Is Reducing White Hair the Same as Erasing It?
• The Opposite Question: Black Hair to White
• What if He Has Already Dyed His Hair?
• Covering White Hair Is Not Necessarily Dyeing It
• The Bach: Is the Purpose Beauty or Necessity?
• Does It Help if a Non-Jew Applies the Dye?
• A Story About "Dog Grooming"
• What "Grooming" Really Means
• Returning to the Three Original Cases
• Geneivas Daas: Looking Young Versus Misleading an Employer
• When the Barber Acts Without Being Asked
• Correcting a Mum Is Different From Ordinary Beautification
• Unusual Colors: Does the Shade Make a Difference?
• The More Complicated Question: Shidduchim
• Different Kinds of Geneivas Daas in Shidduchim
• Ma'ayan Omer: Eyebrows That Meet
• A Ba'al Teshuvah Who Dyed His Hair Blond
• The Thirty-Eight-Year-Old Bachur
• Taking Pills Instead of Applying Dye
• Bringing the Two Sugyos Together
• A Bracha to Conclude

Transcript

# Dyeing Hair Color: Lo Yilbash, Appearance, and Geneivas Daas

## Three Practical Questions

Rabosai, tonight I was asked to discuss an interesting halachic subject. At first, some of you may think, "Is this really relevant to me?" But then you'll remember somebody to whom it is very relevant—or perhaps you yourselves have thought about it!

The question is: **May a man dye his hair to change its color?**

Usually, a person begins to turn gray or white as he gets older, and he would prefer not to look old. Sometimes it bothers him. Sometimes it bothers his wife, who says, "I'm not that old! Why should my husband look so old?" So that is our first practical case: may he dye his hair because he or his wife is unhappy with the white or gray?

The second situation is **shidduchim**. A person may be in shidduchim for years. As he grows older, his hair changes, and he feels that if he could color it, he would look younger and make a better first impression. Is that permitted?

And the third situation is a **job interview**. You know very well that in certain fields, once a person gets to a certain age, employers may look at him as "over the hill." This is something people face, especially in rapidly changing industries. He wants to present himself as younger in order to obtain or retain a position. May he dye his hair for parnassah?

These are three genuine shailos. But I want you to understand at the outset that we are discussing **two different sugyos**.

The first is the halachah of **dyeing the hair itself**. Is the act of coloring a man's hair prohibited as an expression of *lo yilbash*—the prohibition against a man adopting feminine adornment?

The second is **geneivas daas**. Even if we find a heter for the act of dyeing, are you permitted to make another person believe you are younger than you really are? Can you create a misleading impression in shidduchim or when applying for a job?

We must keep those sugyos separate. A person can find a valid answer to the first question and still have a problem with the second.

## The Hat of Rav Michl Feinstein

You know, an interesting story just came into my mind. **Rav Shalom Schwadron**, zichrono livrachah, used to say that if a speaker suddenly remembers a ma'aseh while giving a shmuess, perhaps the Ribbono Shel Olam wants that story told to the people present. This one was not in my notes, but let me tell it to you.

**Rav Michl Feinstein**, a nephew of Rav Moshe Feinstein and son-in-law of the Brisker Rav, was one of those great rabbanim who kept the same hat year after year. His talmidim decided to buy him a new hat.

They brought it to him, and he put it on. Everyone standing there exclaimed, "The Rosh Yeshivah looks twenty years younger! It changes your whole appearance!"

What did Rav Michl do? He took the hat off and, as the story is told, never wore it again.

Why? He did not want to create a false impression about his age. **Geneivas daas**.

Now, I am not telling you that one may not buy new clothing or that wearing a fresh hat is necessarily geneivas daas. That is not the point. The ma'aseh helps us understand how sensitively a great person might regard the impression he creates.

So when someone comes for a job or a shidduch and makes himself look much younger, we have to ask: Is this ordinary grooming, or is he deceiving somebody? We'll return to that question after learning the actual issur of dyeing hair. [The historical hat anecdote is preserved as an oral account and requires independent verification.]

## The Source of the Issur: "Lo Yilbash"

The Torah says in **Devarim 22:5**:

**"לא יהיה כלי גבר על אשה ולא ילבש גבר שמלת אשה כי תועבת ה' אלקיך כל עשה אלה."**

A woman may not wear the equipment or clothing characteristic of a man, and a man may not wear the garments or adornments characteristic of a woman. The halachic categories depend on the items, context and custom, as the poskim discuss.

There is a whole question about weapons and military equipment in connection with *kli gever*. I can see everybody's eyes opening up: "Guns? Carrying guns? Women and weapons?" Rabosai, **not tonight!** Please, I'm asking you—let's leave that shailah for another time.

The part relevant to us is **"ולא ילבש גבר שמלת אשה"**. A man must not adopt certain forms of feminine dress or adornment.

And here's something people don't realize: **The prohibition against a man coloring white hair to black is discussed by the Gemara and the poskim under this very heading.**

Why? Because traditionally removing white hairs or dyeing them to make oneself appear younger was treated as a form of adornment associated with women. So even though the man isn't wearing a woman's dress, his grooming can fall within the same halachic category.

You might ask: Dyeing hair is not clothing! If a man puts on something that is plainly a woman's garment, I understand why that is called *simlas ishah*. But hair dye? How is that like wearing a dress?

It's a very good question, and **Rav Moshe Feinstein**, zichrono livrachah, discusses this distinction in his teshuvos. When we understand **why** the act falls under *lo yilbash*, we can understand which purposes or methods might make a difference.

The **Gemara in Makkos 20b** speaks about plucking white hairs from black hairs. On Shabbos, removing hair presents its own melachah issues. The Gemara discusses the usual quantity for liability and then points out that even **one white hair** can be significant if a person deliberately plucks it from among his black hair.

Why does one hair matter? Because he accomplished exactly what he intended: removing the visible sign of aging. He is making himself appear younger or more youthful.

The Gemara connects that act to *lo yilbash*. It is not only a question of the number of hairs removed; it is about the kind of grooming that the act represents.

There is also a discussion among the Rishonim and Acharonim concerning the precise level of the prohibition and when, if ever, malkus would be relevant. We are not going into that entire sugya tonight. The practical starting point is that there is a prohibition to consider **even when only one white hair is involved**.

And we have it stated plainly in **Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 182:6**. Let's look at what is actually written there before dealing with exceptional cases.

## The Prohibition Can Apply to a Single Hair

The Gemara in **Makkos 20b**, which we mentioned, raises an important point. In the laws of cutting hair on Shabbos, the ordinary measure of liability is different from the case of someone who specifically removes white hairs from among dark hairs. Why? Because for that person, even a single hair can accomplish the result he wants: he has removed the conspicuous white hair.

A man can get up one morning, look into the mirror, and discover one white hair. "Oy! I'm getting old!" He reaches for a pair of tweezers. It is only one hair, he reasons; what could be the problem?

Yet the Shulchan Aruch, **Yoreh De'ah 182:6**, says explicitly: **"אסור לאיש ללקט אפילו שער אחד לבן מתוך השחורות משום לא ילבש גבר ... וכן אסור לאיש לצבוע שערות לבנות שיהיו שחורות אפילו שערה אחת."** A man may not pluck even one white hair from among black hairs, and he may not color even one white hair black. Both are treated as feminine-style adornment under *lo yilbash*.

There is an important machlokes here concerning the exact severity of the issur. Some understand it as *de'oraisa* and discuss the possibility of malkus; others classify aspects of this form of grooming as *derabbanan*. The Rambam and the Raavad differ about liability for a single hair; the **Beis Yosef** examines their dispute in Yoreh De'ah 182. We cannot settle that complicated sugya tonight, but remember that later heterim sometimes depend on the degree and definition of the prohibition.

There are two distinct actions: **plucking white hairs** and **dyeing them dark**. Cutting an overlong white hair along with ordinary haircutting is not necessarily the same act as pulling it out entirely to erase its appearance. That distinction matters.

It is not limited to hair on the head. The same question can arise with the **beard**, where a man pulls out a few selected white hairs to look younger. And then we come to eyebrows. A fellow's eyebrows may meet in the middle; another may have unusually heavy or conspicuous eyebrow hair. May he remove that hair? Now we have another dimension: is he practicing ordinary male grooming, imitating women's grooming, or correcting an unusual appearance? **Rav Ovadia Yosef** and other Acharonim address such cases. We'll come back to the concrete rulings.

What about ordinary body hair? Even there, the act and its purpose can bring us into the laws of *lo yilbash*. We cannot automatically say all grooming is forbidden, nor can we automatically permit every cosmetic act. We must distinguish the precise type of hair, the manner of removal, the local practice, and especially the reason.

Rabosai, keep these two categories in your mind. A person who pulls one white hair from dark hair is not doing exactly the same thing as a man taking an ordinary haircut. And a person dyeing his hair to look twenty years younger may have a different halachic question from one removing an abnormal blemish. These differences will determine how we read the Acharonim.

## The Maharam Shik: Is Reducing White Hair the Same as Erasing It?

Now suppose a man has an unusual amount of hair on his arms or some other part of his body, and he wants to cut it. The subject of male grooming is not limited to the beard or the head. We have to ask whether he is doing something ordinarily associated with feminine adornment or something done for another purpose. That takes us back to the basic question: **What exactly constitutes the forbidden act?**

There is an interesting teshuvah of the **Maharam Shik**, the great talmid of the **Chasam Sofer**, in **Yoreh De'ah, siman 172**. He discusses a distinction that I want you to think about carefully. A person may not pick out a white hair from among black hairs in order to make it disappear. But what if he has many white hairs and merely cuts or reduces their prominence? He is not entirely eradicating the white hairs. He is still left with white hair, only not quite as much or not quite as noticeable.

The Maharam Shik suggests a distinction between **removing the defect completely** and **lessening the way it looks**, because the former resembles the cosmetic act forbidden by Chazal. [The exact extent of the Maharam Shik's permission and its wording must be checked in the original teshuvah, not inferred from this paraphrase.]

You remember how we distinguished trimming a long white hair from plucking it outright? Here the question is more subtle. Perhaps even if the fellow looks somewhat younger after reducing the amount of visible white, that is not the same thing as completely removing the white appearance the way a woman traditionally might do.

It is an interesting *chiddush lahalachah*. Does that mean I am saying every man may rely on this without asking anything further? No. I am showing you the sevara and the machlokes among the Acharonim.

And we have to appreciate something else. There is a dispute about the **level of the prohibition**: is the particular form of grooming an issur *de'oraisa*, or in some instances *derabbanan*? A number of the heterim suggested in the teshuvos become more understandable if the author regards the prohibition as rabbinic. If you understand it as a full Torah prohibition, you may find those leniencies more difficult to accept.

That is why I want you to see the larger picture rather than merely come away with a quick answer. When someone tells you, "It's permitted," ask: **On what basis? Which act? Which purpose? Which understanding of lo yilbash?** It matters.

## The Opposite Question: Black Hair to White

Now let me turn the entire she'eilah around. All this time we have been speaking about a man with white hair who wishes to make it black. But did you ever hear about a man who wants to make his **black hair white**?

Perhaps a young rosh yeshivah wants to look older and more distinguished. He wants the *hadras panim* of an elder. You are smiling, but it is a perfectly good shailah!

Think of the Gemara's account of **Rav Elazar ben Azaryah**, who said, **"הרי אני כבן שבעים שנה"**—I am like a man of seventy years (Berachos 28a; Mishnah Berachos 1:5). The tradition discusses how he acquired the appearance of age, although he was younger. That reminds us that looking older can sometimes be considered an advantage rather than a defect.

Is coloring dark hair white prohibited under *lo yilbash*? The **Beis Yosef** and **Taz, Yoreh De'ah 182**, discuss this very distinction. The Beis Yosef explains that changing white hair to black traditionally produces an adornment characteristic of women; making black hair white is not the same beautifying act from that standpoint. The Taz writes that the reverse transformation is permitted *lechatchilah* on that reasoning.

There are dissenting discussions, and one should not treat every unusual situation as automatically covered. But this distinction is a vital key: **the halachah is not simply that a man may never change the color of his hair**. The prohibited action is defined by its relationship to *tikunei nashim*.

So, rabosai, perhaps a young rosh yeshivah who wants to look older has a different halachic question altogether. We'll leave the jokes about whether he really wants to look a hundred years old for another time. The important part is the distinction between making the white hairs black and the reverse.

## What if He Has Already Dyed His Hair?

We have a man who wants to change dark hair to white so that he will look older; the Beis Yosef and Taz provide a basis to distinguish that from the ordinary forbidden case. But suppose he did the opposite. He took white hair and dyed it black. Then he comes into this beautiful beis medrash and hears that there may be an issur. Suddenly he is worried!

He takes out the telephone and wants to call the **salon**—I almost said *saloon* again!—and asks: "Do I have to undo what I did? Must I bleach it? Wash it out? Change my hair back to white?"

That is a real halachic question. If a man is actually wearing a forbidden garment, of course he has to take it off. Each moment he continues to wear it is another problem. But what about hair that has already been dyed? Is the transgression the **act of dyeing**, which is already finished, or is the continuing color itself a prohibited state?

Many Acharonim distinguish the completed act of coloring from wearing a garment. They conclude that, in the usual case, one is **not necessarily required to undo the dye**. The exact application depends on the circumstances and on the poskim; this is not permission to dye one's hair in the first place.

And don't confuse this with tattoos. I did not say a word about tattoos tonight. That's next week's shiur! "But I won't be here next week," somebody says. Well, perhaps that is why we are not going into it now.

## Covering White Hair Is Not Necessarily Dyeing It

Someone asks: What if I don't color the hair at all? I simply **cover** it. Could I wear a toupee or some other hair covering so that the white hairs do not show?

A toupee may raise questions of its own under *lo yilbash*, depending on the circumstances and the manner in which it is worn. But focusing on the hair color alone, some Acharonim distinguish **covering something** from changing its actual appearance by dyeing or selective removal. A man may put on a hat; that is not the same action as pulling white hair from black.

The sevara is that he is not performing the particular cosmetic act identified by the Gemara. Again, if someone asks about a specific toupee, we must examine the details. Don't take a discussion of *covering the color* as a blanket psak on every possible wig.

## The Bach: Is the Purpose Beauty or Necessity?

Now we come to a very important possible heter—one that will help us return to our opening cases of **shalom bayis, shidduchim, and employment**.

The **Bach**, in his discussion of *lo yilbash*, develops a distinction concerning a man's **purpose**. Suppose he is not trying to adorn himself like a woman at all. He has some other need. Is his action still considered the prohibited form of feminine adornment?

That is the critical point. We are not speaking about a person literally trying to pretend he is a woman. A man may be doing something cosmetically associated with women without pretending to be one. But if the reason is **not beauty**—if he is acting to protect himself, to relieve a genuine problem, or for another practical purpose—the Bach's reasoning may provide room for a distinction.

Rav Moshe Feinstein later uses this framework in **Igros Moshe, Yoreh De'ah II:61**, especially in the case of coloring hair to obtain employment. We still have to ask what *geneivas daas* might result. A purpose-based heter to *lo yilbash* does not erase a separate prohibition against deception.

For the moment, keep the possibilities in mind. When a wife is distressed by her husband's appearance, when a man is trying to find a shidduch, and when someone is worried about work, the motivation may differ from ordinary cosmetic self-adornment. That could change the first sugya.

But it does not mean that every motive automatically makes every act permissible. We have to see precisely what the poskim say, and we have to combine all of the relevant circumstances rather than taking one attractive heter out of context.

## Does It Help if a Non-Jew Applies the Dye?

The next question is an interesting one. Even if it would be forbidden for a man to dye his own hair, what if he goes to a **salon**, and a non-Jew applies the dye? Is *lo yilbash* a prohibition specifically against the act the man himself performs, or is it also a problem if the change is made to him by somebody else?

The **Maharshal** and other Acharonim are discussed in connection with this question. There is a substantial machlokes concerning grooming done *al yedei akum*. [The precise responsum of the Maharshal or other cited Acharon needs independent verification; do not infer a general heter from this oral discussion.]

Now you see why I am building the sugya step by step. You have one question about the **purpose**, based on the Bach. And a second question about the **person performing the act**. Sometimes a posek may look at several grounds together before allowing a particular case. It is certainly not a simple rule that anything forbidden at home becomes mutar in a salon!

Perhaps, for a person who truly has grounds for leniency, having the coloring done by someone else may be preferable to doing it himself. But let us be careful with our terms. I said **salon**. A *saloon* is quite another establishment.

Why am I worried about this English word? Because I have a little story about my own English. And as Rav Shalom Schwadron used to say, when the story comes to mind, sometimes you have to tell it.

## A Story About "Dog Grooming"

When I was newly married, many years ago, I was learning in an out-of-town kollel. It was a very small town. I won't be too unkind about it, but I thought at the time that it was a real *hick town*.

Every day, on my way to yeshivah, I passed a business with a sign saying **"Dog Grooming."**

Now, my English was not as fluent as it is today. Baruch Hashem, I speak English very good—very *well*—all right, leave the grammar alone. But I saw the word **grooming**, and all I could think about was **a groom**, a chassan, a *shidduch*.

I honestly believed that "dog grooming" was a business that arranged **shidduchim for dogs**. I thought people brought their dogs there to find suitable breeds to marry off. Every time I passed the sign, I thought: "What kind of a backwards town is this? They have a store for dog shidduchim!"

And you know, there are people who breed different types of dogs, so the whole thing seemed plausible to me.

One day, I was sitting in yeshivah, where I was a **sho'el u'meishiv**, and a bachur approached me with a question in the sugya of **takfo kohen**. We were discussing a case in which a kohen seized an animal whose status as a *bechor* was in doubt. Does the kohen's possession change who has the right to keep it?

The bachur asked a very down-to-earth question: How could a kohen know whether this animal in somebody else's barn was a true bechor? Was he there observing every birth? How could he claim personal knowledge of the animal's birth order?

Today, I appreciate questions like that more than I did when I was younger. At the time, I was thinking about the Rishonim and the Ketzos and the formal lomdus, and I thought the question was a little peculiar.

And suddenly I remembered the dog-grooming store. I thought I had the perfect answer.

## What "Grooming" Really Means

So I told the bachur: "Do you know why the kohen might know which animal was a bechor? In this town there is actually a place called *dog grooming*. They make shidduchim between dogs! They keep track of the dogs and the pairings, and they know all about which puppies were born. Perhaps something similar happened with these animals!"

I thought I had given a brilliant explanation.

The bachur stared at me. The other bachurim looked at me. Nobody understood what on earth I was talking about.

Later, one of the bachurim came over and quietly asked, "Does the Rosh Yeshivah know what a *dog-grooming* store actually does?"

"Of course," I said. "It arranges marriages between dogs!"

"No," he told me. "They **wash the dogs, comb their hair, and take care of their appearance**. *Grooming* doesn't mean shidduchim."

I learned something that day! You can imagine how I felt. So when I started saying *saloon* instead of *salon* tonight, I remembered the story and said to myself, "Better correct the word quickly. Don't end up with another dog-grooming story!"

At any rate, a **salon**, not a saloon. The question is whether one should have a non-Jew do the coloring instead of applying the dye himself. That is one of the possible considerations alongside the Bach's distinction concerning a person's reason for dyeing.

## Returning to the Three Original Cases

Now bring the issues together. A man is worried because his wife dislikes his graying hair. Another man is in shidduchim and believes the white hairs make people reject him before they have any chance to get to know him. And a third has a job interview and faces age-based assumptions.

They are not necessarily trying to make themselves beautiful the way feminine adornment was traditionally understood. They may be trying to solve a particular practical problem.

So in a qualifying case, the Bach's reasoning about **purpose**, together with the discussion of having the work done *al yedei akum*, can provide **room to be lenient**. *Yesh makom lehakel.* But that is not saying that every man has blanket permission to color his hair. It is a discussion of possible heterim to be weighed by a posek.

And I will tell you frankly: I don't believe a person's life should revolve around such things. If the entire shalom bayis depends on the precise shade of the husband's hair, there are more important issues for the couple to work on! If someone imagines that his parnassah depends on one white hair, perhaps he needs a broader understanding of what makes a person successful. And in shidduchim, ideally people should be looking for the human being rather than the dye on his head.

But that is my *hashkafah*. As a person asked to address a **halachic shailah**, I still have to discuss the possible grounds for a heter. We must not replace halachah with a nice speech about how someone ought to feel.

Rav Moshe Feinstein's teshuvah, **Igros Moshe, Yoreh De'ah II:61**, gives us an especially important framework. In the case of a person coloring his hair **not for beauty but to obtain employment**, he writes that there is a basis to permit it when no deception is involved. In the actual Hebrew: **"ובאם כוונת צביעתו הוא לא ליפוי אלא כדי שיקבלוהו למשרה באופן שאין איסור אונאה כגון שיודע שיעשה המלאכה כצעיר מסתבר שיש להתיר."** If his intention is to get a position rather than beautify himself, and there is no prohibited deception—for example, he can do the work as effectively as a younger person—Rav Moshe considers it reasonable to permit.

He also discusses changing the degree of coloration, rather than simply making the white hairs black. The source and precise limits of a preference for **brown rather than black** need checking against the actual teshuvah before treating that detail as a definite psak.

And here is the crucial point. Even when you think you have solved the first question of *lo yilbash*, there is a **second question**. What impression are you making on the other person? Can you make an employer or a prospective shidduch believe you are someone you are not?

That is **geneivas daas**, and it requires a separate discussion.

## Geneivas Daas: Looking Young Versus Misleading an Employer

Now, rabosai, here we have a question that is relevant not only to hair coloring but to life in general. **May I present myself as something I am not?**

The man walks into a job interview. Perhaps he is forty-five years old, but the employer is looking for a twenty-five-year-old and he has made himself appear twenty-five. Is that simply grooming? Or is it an act of **geneivas daas**, deliberately leading somebody into a false understanding?

Rav Moshe Feinstein speaks about this in **Igros Moshe, Yoreh De'ah II:61**. His possible permission to color the hair for a job is conditioned on the absence of deception. If the person is fully able to perform the work expected of a younger employee, that is one consideration. But to cause the employer to hire you because he believes a material falsehood about your age or ability is a different matter.

Think of a younger man who became gray unusually early. He really is twenty-five, but his hair makes him look forty-five. He wants to dye it to look **his actual age**. From the perspective of *geneivas daas*, that is not the same as a forty-five-year-old deliberately creating the impression he is twenty-five. We still have to discuss the *lo yilbash* question, but the deception question has changed.

This reminds me of another responsum of Rav Moshe concerning **cheating on examinations**. A fellow wants good marks and cheats on an official exam. Later, someone hires him because those marks represent a level of knowledge or ability that he doesn't actually possess. That's a form of geneivas daas. He presents himself as qualified in a way he is not. [The exact Igros Moshe reference for examination fraud is separate from the hair-coloring teshuvah and requires verification.]

The issue is the misleading presentation, not merely the fact that someone looks well dressed.

Now, there are Acharonim who compare changing one's hair to **shaving a beard**. Everybody knows that a clean-shaven man may look younger than he looks with a beard. And ordinary grooming is part of how people present themselves.

So perhaps applying a little color is not fundamentally different from shaving or taking care of one's appearance. Others distinguish the cases: a significant and deliberate change of hair color can be a very direct effort to persuade somebody that you are younger. The facts matter.

And look at the story of Rav Michl Feinstein and the new hat. I told it to illustrate the sensitivity of a great person who did not want people to take his new appearance as an indication of a much younger age. But we shouldn't confuse an extraordinary middah with a categorical issur on ordinary grooming.

## When the Barber Acts Without Being Asked

A fellow goes to his barber—let's call him **Tony**. I know some of you are giving me a look. All right, you go to your Jewish barber! When I grew up, the barber was Tony.

Now Tony knows that a customer wants to look good. When he cuts the man's hair, he may naturally trim or remove some of the white hairs that stand out. The customer did not instruct him to do it. He did not come with the intention that the barber should specifically pick out every white hair.

Is that different from telling the barber: "Take out the white hairs so that I will look younger"?

There are Acharonim who make distinctions involving a barber's independent actions, the customer's intent, and who actually performs the act. We cannot collapse those discussions into a rule that **anything a barber does is permitted**. There is a difference between *not knowing* and deliberately arranging for something to be done while pretending not to know.

Rabosai, keep those points separate. Who is doing the act? Why is he doing it? And is anyone being deceived? Those are different halachic questions that must all be answered.

## Correcting a Mum Is Different From Ordinary Beautification

There is another important chiddush that I want to introduce to the olam. Sometimes the person isn't trying to make himself unusually beautiful, or to look far younger than he is. Rather, he is trying to **correct something that is abnormal about his appearance**, something which causes him significant embarrassment.

For example, a young person might have white hair while all his friends have dark hair. Someone else might have a conspicuous white patch in his beard. Is removing the unusual appearance considered the same as coloring white hair to look youthful? Or is it closer to correcting a *mum*, a blemish?

**Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach**, in a discussion cited in the **Nishmas Avraham**, was reported to allow certain acts to correct an unusual appearance or a serious obstacle, notwithstanding the fact that the person does ultimately look better. [The precise Nishmas Avraham citation and boundaries of his ruling require checking. See also Minchas Shlomo II:86:3, cited on this subject.]

This is a major distinction. Of course he wants to look nicer. That's the whole point of correcting something wrong! But there may be a difference between making oneself **more attractive than normal** and restoring an ordinary appearance.

Not all poskim accept this distinction in the same way. **Rav Yosef Shalom Elyashiv** is cited as taking a stricter approach even when someone unusually young has gray hair, because the person is still acting for cosmetic improvement. [Exact responsum or reported psak not verified.]

This brings us back to **eyebrows**. Suppose a person has eyebrows that grow together in the middle. We discussed that earlier. **Rav Ovadia Yosef**, as quoted in *Ma'ayan Omer*, permits removing the hairs between the eyebrows. The way I want to explain it, the person is not trying to adopt an elaborate feminine beauty treatment; he is correcting an unusual and conspicuous appearance.

There is even a discussion of unusual eyebrows as a physical *mum* in the halachic literature concerning blemishes. But the precise passage and its relevance to modern grooming require review. We don't make up halachos by transferring a category from one sugya to another without a source.

Likewise, Rav Ovadia was asked about eyebrows that were exceptionally bushy and uneven. The response cited in the shiur is that a man may trim them to make them look orderly. We will read those examples more carefully in a moment.

## Unusual Colors: Does the Shade Make a Difference?

Now what if a person doesn't want to color his hair from white to black at all? He wants **blue hair**, or purple hair! You might say, "That's certainly not the ordinary feminine adornment the Gemara is discussing, so perhaps it is permitted."

Some Acharonim indeed distinguish between coloring hair in a shade associated with women making themselves look youthful and using an unusual color that does not produce that traditional kind of beautification. But the opposite argument is also obvious: **customs change**. Colors that once were not used by women may become common forms of women's hair fashion, and not every strange shade escapes the prohibition.

The Maharam Shik and **Ketzos HaShulchan** are among the authorities cited in discussions of unusual coloring. Whether a particular shade and purpose constitute *tikunei nashim* must be assessed in its actual setting, not by saying, "Blue is different; finished!"

You see why I keep coming back to the exact definition of the act. A man wants to look young. Another wants to remove an unusual blemish. A third is using a color nobody would ordinarily choose for beautification. Those are three different cases.

## The More Complicated Question: Shidduchim

Now, rabosai, we must come back to **geneivas daas in shidduchim**. This is a delicate issue.

Everybody prepares themselves for a date. A person dresses well, combs his hair, perhaps puts on a new suit. A woman may use makeup. No one comes to the first meeting and volunteers a list of every personal weakness: "I have a temper, I sometimes have trouble waking up for Shacharis, and here are all my faults!"

Of course there are boundaries between normal presentation and unacceptable concealment. But how do we determine them?

Let me give an example I've encountered. A fellow was a **ba'al teshuvah** with tattoos covering much of his body. Now he was learning in yeshivah, wearing a jacket and hat. A prospective kallah might never know about the tattoos until after they were married. Would that be fair? When, and how, should a detail like that be disclosed?

Some gedolei Yisrael advised that a person should first allow the prospective couple to get to know one another, and then disclose a material issue before the relationship advances too far. That is an oral account of shidduch guidance, not a blanket permission to conceal material facts.

That is the background to the hair question. Does darkening the hair in shidduchim amount to deception? Or is it an ordinary part of presenting oneself well? We cannot answer by confusing the *lo yilbash* prohibition with **geneivas daas**. They are separate questions.

## Different Kinds of Geneivas Daas in Shidduchim

If a person colors his hair to make himself look younger, some Acharonim regard it as presenting a false impression. Others note that people commonly improve their appearance before a shidduch, and that ordinary grooming is not necessarily a declaration of one's exact age.

In an employment case, the employer may be looking for an applicant of a particular age or capacity. If the hair dye deliberately conceals a fact material to the hiring decision, Rav Moshe's caveat about **ona'ah** is especially relevant. But in shidduchim, the way someone looks is itself part of the natural process of meeting and evaluating a person. It is not necessarily a false statement about one's age.

That doesn't mean a person may **lie about his age**. Nor does it mean he may conceal every significant matter until after the wedding. Those are questions of honesty and disclosure that need their own careful halachic analysis.

But a person whose hair is black on a date may simply be a man with black hair—whether naturally or after coloring. Do we compare that to a woman using makeup? To ordinary personal grooming? Or to materially deceiving the other side about something important? Different poskim may weigh these details differently.

Now I want to conclude with a series of specific *pesakim* from **Rav Ovadia Yosef**, quoted in the sefer **Ma'ayan Omer**. The volume records rulings transmitted through Rav **Yehuda Nakai**, one of Rav Ovadia's students. [The exact volume and page of each oral ruling should be verified against the printed edition; their formulations below follow the quoted cases in the source transcript.]

## Ma'ayan Omer: Eyebrows That Meet

The first case concerns a man whose eyebrows are joined in the middle, so that instead of two clearly separated eyebrows, he appears to have one continuous line. May he remove the hairs between them?

The answer brought there is **mutar**. The way we understood it before, this can be seen as correcting an unusual feature rather than performing a purely feminine act of beautification.

The next question concerns a man with **large, bushy eyebrows**. He wants to cut the extra hairs and make them even and orderly. Is he permitted to trim them? Again, the answer quoted in the shiur is that this is permitted.

See how practical these cases are? We're not giving only general principles; we are taking individual questions, one by one.

## A Ba'al Teshuvah Who Dyed His Hair Blond

Now here is an interesting one. A young man naturally had **black hair**. In an earlier period of his life he decided to change his hair to **blond**. Baruch Hashem, he became a ba'al teshuvah, entered a yeshivah and changed the way he lived. Now he was embarrassed by the blond color, which he himself had created. May he dye it back to its natural black?

What would you say, rabosai?

Don't jump immediately to *geneivas daas*. There is no question of misleading someone about his natural hair color: **black really was his original color**. But I am asking about the first sugya, *lo yilbash*. Is it permitted to dye the hair back to black?

In the oral psak cited here, Rav Ovadia Yosef permitted him to return to his original color. The talmid who recorded the ruling raised a question about the reasoning; why should that act not fall within the general prohibition? But the reported conclusion remained **mutar** for this specific case.

Notice the distinction. This man is not coloring aging white hairs to appear youthful. He is correcting an artificial change he had previously made. Again, the full discussion must be read in its own context before a general psak is inferred.

## The Thirty-Eight-Year-Old Bachur

Now another case. A bachur, **thirty-eight years old**, is still looking for a shidduch. His beard is turning white. He believes the white hair is making shidduchim more difficult.

May he color his beard to make it dark?

What do you think? Some of you are already saying yes, because of the reasons we've discussed. But listen to Rav Ovadia's reported answer. According to the wording quoted in the shiur, **"קשה להתיר זאת, שנראה שאסור"**—it is difficult to permit this; it appears prohibited.

That is a stricter answer concerning the act of dyeing than some of the heterim we discussed earlier. And remember, **we are not even talking yet about geneivas daas**. The basic question here is the act of turning white beard hair black.

But the answer adds another possibility: **"ומכל מקום יכול לטפל בכדורים"**—nevertheless, he may use pills. That opens a completely different discussion. What is the distinction between actually applying dye and taking something that changes the hair color indirectly?

## Taking Pills Instead of Applying Dye

You hear what Rav Ovadia's reported answer is doing? He was reluctant to permit the **thirty-eight-year-old bachur** to dye his graying beard directly, even for shidduchim. But he suggested the possibility of taking **pills** that would affect the hair's natural color.

Why could that be different?

Let's return to the beginning of the shiur. The Torah says **"ולא ילבש גבר שמלת אשה"**. Our whole problem with directly dyeing the hair was that the act might be classified as **a form of feminine adornment**. Applying dye looks like a cosmetic act.

But swallowing a medicine or pill—if there were such a medically appropriate and effective treatment—does not necessarily resemble putting on a woman's garment or performing her conventional beauty treatment. Perhaps changing the body's processes is a different kind of act from coloring the surface of the hair.

But there's a big question here. Is the prohibition focused on **the act performed**, or on **the resulting appearance**? If the only important point is that the man's gray hair has turned dark, why should it matter whether he applied a dye or took a pill? On the other hand, if the prohibition concerns a particular kind of grooming act, the method can be decisive.

**Rav Moshe Feinstein** discusses this sort of problem in the teshuvos, but his separate responsum on a drug causing the hair to become black is cited as **Igros Moshe, Yoreh De'ah I:82**, distinct from the employment-coloring discussion in **Yoreh De'ah II:61**. The exact practical rulings of both responsa must be read separately. [The source material under discussion contains differing presentations, and these should not be silently combined into one permission.]

Somebody wants to compare this to questions concerning other kinds of medicine that affect bodily processes. Those are indeed important sugyos, but I don't want to open them tonight. The only point we're discussing is the distinction between a **cosmetic act** and an **internal treatment** that might affect the result.

And let me be clear: none of this is a recommendation to experiment with pills for hair color. Whether such pills are effective or medically safe is not established by the halachic discussion. We are speaking about the **hypothetical halachic category**, not prescribing a product.

The sefer **Ma'ayan Omer** brings another question: a man whose hair is beginning to turn white wants to take pills that would turn the white hairs black. Is that permitted?

The reported response becomes much more cautious: **"לא כדאי"**—it is not advisable. The transcript quotes a distinction between an exceptional young bachur for whom the appearance is causing a major problem, and an older man who simply wants to reverse the signs of aging.

Notice how carefully the *pesakim* are being distinguished. The reported leniency about an unusual young person's situation does **not** mean that every older man may take medication to make his hair black. And the fact that a question is conceivable does not mean that the posek recommends doing it.

## Bringing the Two Sugyos Together

So let me review what we learned, rabosai.

We began with the issur of **lo yilbash**, rooted in **Devarim 22:5**, explained by the Gemara in **Makkos 20b**, and codified in **Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 182:6**. We saw how even the removal or coloring of a single white hair can come within the prohibition.

Then we discussed the Acharonim's distinctions: a man who wishes to make himself look older rather than younger; someone who merely trims or covers the hair; the purpose of coloring, whether for ordinary beauty or for a specific need; the possibility of having another person do it; and the very different question of correcting an unusually conspicuous blemish.

We also considered the special questions of **a young person whose hair is gray, a ba'al teshuvah returning to his natural hair color, the bachur in shidduchim, and the man whose job opportunities may be affected by his appearance**. There is no single answer that fits every case.

And then we have our second sugya: **geneivas daas**. Even if the act of coloring is permitted in a certain situation, a person may not deliberately create a materially false impression about himself. This is especially important in work and shidduchim. The question of what a person must disclose is separate from whether he may perform a particular cosmetic act.

The various teshuvos do not all say exactly the same thing. We must learn them carefully and keep the cases straight. These are shailos for which the practical conclusion depends on the person, the purpose, the method, and the likely effect on others.

## A Bracha to Conclude

Rabosai, I want to finish with a brachah.

May the Ribbono Shel Olam grant that your wives love you **for who you are**, without your having to worry about the color of your hair.

May He give you **parnassah** with dignity, without your having to make yourselves look like someone else.

And for those who need **shidduchim**, may you find people who appreciate you, care for you, and want to marry you **as you truly are**.

May we all be zocheh to **banim u'vnei banim oskim baTorah u'v'mitzvos**—children and grandchildren devoted to Torah and mitzvos.