Parashas Naso - Shavuos - Sacrificing for Torah

Topics

• Shavuos and Kesser Torah
• What Is Kesser Torah?
• The Rambam’s Description
• The Question from Rebbe
• Questions on Pas B’Melach Tochal
• The Crown of Torah and a Life of Restriction
• The Tannaim Who Did Not Live This Way
• The Royal Exterior and the Private Life of Restraint
• Question Two: Wealth Among Great People
• Question Three: The Rambam’s Repetition
• The Inyan of Perishus
• Kach Hi Darkah Shel Torah and Its Source
• Two Halachos in the Rambam
• The Question of a Source for Prishus
• Lo Sisaveh and the Nature of Desire
• The Nature of Lo Sachmod
• Chemdah That Leads to Action
• Is Mere Desire Assur?
• His’avu Ta’avah in the Midbar
• The Chakirah in the Rambam
• The Nazir and the Question of Perishus
• The Nazir: Chotei and Tzaddik
• The Question of Prishus
• The Nazir and Keser Torah
• The Ibn Ezra on a True King
• True Kingship and Freedom from Ta’avos
• Shlomo HaMelech as Melech al Maklo
• Keser Torah and Being Governed by Torah
• The Example of a Cigarette
• The Crown as Freedom from Ta’ivah
• Prishus and the Kesser Torah
• What Is Ta’ivah?
• Ba’al Keri: The Lightest Tumah and a Severe Chumrah
• The Question of Tumas Shechvas Zera
• The Chinuch on Ta’avah and Tumah
• The Sforno: Zuhamas HaNachash
• The Reality of Zuhamas HaNachash
• Taivah as a Tangible Poison
• The Eitzah of the Nachash
• Taivah as a Choli Hanefesh
• Taivah as a Sickness
• Taivah and the Eitz Hadaas
• The Michtav MeEliyahu: Mashal and Nimshal
• The Child’s Toy and the Adult’s Fantasy
• The Ger Tzedek and the Sand Castle
• Kavod, Taavah, and the Reality Check
• Conceptual Taivah as Distraction
• Torah and Taivah Cannot Go Together
• The Rambam’s Presentation
• De’ah Nechonah and the Broadening of Da’as
• The Rambam’s Addition: Veyarchiv Da’ato Bechochmah
• Torah as Perspective Against the Yetzer Hara
• The Example of a President and a Moment of Ta’avah
• Taivah and the Loss of Perspective
• A Mashal from Rav Hai Gaon
• The Lion, the Fox, and the Cheshbon
• Analyzing the Mussar of the Story
• Human Ta’avah and Animal Ta’avah
• Ta’ivah, Need, and Want
• Freedom from Ta’ivah
• Rav Zissel and the Lesson of Matzah
• The Bigger Picture Behind Holding Back
• Keser Torah and Living Above the Bloteh
• V’ahavta L’rei’acha Kamocha: Living Beyond Yourself
• The Larger Picture of Torah
• Na’aseh V’nishma and Kesser Torah
• Pas B’melach Tochal and the Question of Enjoyment
• Ashrecha Ba’olam Hazeh
• Perishus and the Nazir
• Pas B’melach Tochal as an Outlook
• Chayei Tzaar Tichyeh
• Rebbe and Lo Nehenesi
• Hashkafah, Not an Instruction Book

Transcript

## Shavuos and Kesser Torah

This shiur is brought to you by the Lev Aron Foundation. For more, visit levaronlibrary.com.

Shavuos is approaching. Shavuos is the Yom Tov on which we celebrate and commemorate Torah and Kabbalas HaTorah. Shavuos is the Yom Tov on which we speak about the exaltation of Torah.

If you look at the Akdamas that we say before we read the Torah, it is about the neizer, the crown, the glory, the majesty of Torah, and the crown that Klal Yisroel received, which we call Torah. When we said *na’aseh v’nishma*, we received two *kesarim*, one for *na’aseh* and one for *nishma*.

So we see that Shavuos is not only about the *yesod* of Torah and Kabbalas HaTorah; it is also about the *keser* of Torah. The majesty of Torah is also celebrated and commemorated on Shavuos.

## What Is Kesser Torah?

What is Kesser Torah? The Rambam tells us that there are three crowns: Kesser Torah, Kesser Kehunah, and Kesser Malchus. So there is something called Kesser Torah, the crown of Torah.

What is the crown of Torah? How do we identify it? What does it look like? When you see a person who has achieved the *madreigah* of Kesser Torah, what does that look like? What is Kesser Torah?

## The Rambam’s Description

The Rambam, in Hilchos Talmud Torah, perek gimmel, where he discusses the *shalosh kesarim*, writes about Kesser Torah. As we began to quote, there are three crowns, and one of them is Kesser Torah.

The Rambam continues in halachah vav: *Mi shenesa’o libo*—if a person’s heart moves him—to fulfill this mitzvah properly and to be crowned with the crown of Torah, he should not divert his mind to other matters. His mind should not be on other things. He should not expect to acquire Torah together with wealth and *kavod*, with honor. No. It requires a simple, restricted lifestyle. That is how a person achieves Kesser Torah. This is the Rambam.

## The Question from Rebbe

Why is it so important for Kesser Torah that a person should restrict his life? Why? What is wrong if I am looking for a place to live in this world?

We find that Rebbe lacked nothing. Chazal tell us that he lacked nothing; he had the vegetables of the summer and the fruits of the winter. Rebbe lacked nothing.

So what is so bad? What is so wrong with it? How can we reject the idea of *shtei shulchanos* if it is brought in Chazal as a virtue?

How can it be that the Rambam says, “*Pas b’melach tochel*—bread with salt you shall eat; *mayim b’mesurah tishteh*—water in measure you shall drink”? Rebbe did not have *pas b’melach tochel*. Rebbe did not have *mayim b’mesurah tishteh*. Yet he was certainly *zocheh* to Kesser Torah. It is hard to believe that Rebbe was not *zocheh* to Kesser Torah. Rebbe was the Nasi, the author of the Mishnayos. I would assume that Rebbe had Kesser Torah.

How do we understand, then, that the Rambam clearly tells us to reject that approach?

## Questions on Pas B’Melach Tochal

To run away from a life of idunim in order to get *pas b’melach tochal*—I don’t know. I saw many, many Tannaim, many great people, who did not have *pas b’melach tochal*. So how am I going to answer the kasha? It is an unbelievable question.

Now let me point out another nekudah. The Rambam teaches *pas b’melach tochal* in halachah vav. All of a sudden, the Rambam goes into other attributes that are needed for Torah: you cannot be a *baal gaavah*; you have to be an *anav*; you have to make parnassah.

Then, all of a sudden, in halachah yud-beis, the Rambam writes that if you are lazy over learning, if you sit back and want a learning session with comfort, you are not going to be matzliach. No eating, no drinking. Maybe I am wrong, but is that not what he already said in halachah vav? Is halachah vav not already teaching me *kach hi darkah shel Torah*: *pas b’melach tochal, al ha’aretz tishan, v’baTorah atah amel*? And then suddenly there is a whole discussion about other things, and afterward the Rambam goes back to it as if he is teaching something new. Maybe he already taught us this.

## The Crown of Torah and a Life of Restriction

We talk about Shavuos, Shavuos, Shavuos. Everybody likes to give drashos about Shavuos. How about knowing the facts? Let us know the facts. Shavuos, Torah, kabbalas haTorah, *keser Torah*, crowns, *naaseh v’nishma*—what is the crown of Torah? The Rambam tells us: *pas b’melach tochal, mayim b’mesurah tishteh*.

So we have to ask three questions, and that is why I am repeating it: to give you a clear picture of what we are trying to answer.

One: Why is *keser Torah* dependent on a life of restriction? What is wrong if you have it easy?

There is a very famous vort that the world says. Do not ask the question: why is *eidus* enough with two, while *zimun* needs three? What is wrong if you have two, just like by *eidus*? That is a kasha that people ask. And you know what they answer? Why do you care if another Yid eats? Why do you care if another Yid eats?

I would probably say this is a joke; I do not mean it as a serious *shtickel Torah*. But I would like to use the same phrase. Why do you care if another Yid eats? No—don’t eat. Starve yourself. Why do you have to starve yourself for *kabbalas haTorah*, for *keser Torah*? What do you need it for? Why is it so intricate, so important?

You are putting all the babushkas out of business. Babushkas want you to eat, and they try to feed you. And here you have to say, the Rambam tells me, I do not need your delicious jolmays and koshaves, whatever you guys eat over there, right? Osavos and ospalovs—give me *pas b’melach tochal*, and I am finished. That is all. Make it nice and dry.

## The Tannaim Who Did Not Live This Way

Second question: the Rambam tells me that this is the way you are zocheh to *keser Torah*, implying that it is the only way you are zocheh to *keser Torah*. So what do you do with all the tzaddikim, and before them the Tannaim, who were not *pas b’melach tochal*?

Rebbe was not *pas b’melach tochal*—maybe he was; I do not know. The pashtus, the mashma’us is that he was not. Unless we say differently, and we will soon see; maybe we will say differently. Maybe the pshat is that he had it, but he did not use it. Because Rebbe also said before he was niftar that he did not have hana’ah, even a finger’s worth, in this world. So it could be he had it, but he did not use it. Maybe that is the pshat. In other words, Rebbe had a secret life. On the outside, he had a life.

# The Royal Exterior and the Private Life of Restraint

A life of what? Rich? Yes, rich. But if you looked into his private life, you would notice **pas bamelach tochal**: he lived poor, restricted, with nothing.

A lot of Rebbes used to do this. They say that Ruzhin is a Chassidus called **Malchus**. Their theme is royalty. That is why that branch of Chassidus was called **Malchus Beis Ruzhin**, because they were royal.

What was royal about it? They dressed like kings: beautiful clothing, gold, everything was beautiful. They say that the original Ruzhiner Rebbe was beautifully dressed, but there was a secret **pas bamelach tochal** in his dress. He had no soles under his shoes. His feet were worn out, but nobody could see that.

Big Rebbes used to wear fancy shoes, and they would put hard peas inside so that it should hurt when they walked. They should not have the comfort. True, it looked nice, but inside were peas.

They tell a very nice story. There was once a chassid who came to a Rebbe. The Rebbe used to advise, for these reasons, to put hard peas inside the shoes. A lot of the chassidim walked around like that, and it hurt them; it was painful. One chassid said, “I have no problem. I cooked the peas before I put them in.” The Rebbe said to put peas in, so he cooked them first.

The point is that a person can walk around with fancy shoes, but have peas inside. On the outside there can be beauty; that portrays **Malchus**, royalty. But at the same time, within, there can be **pas bamelach tochal**.

So maybe that was Rebbe. Rebbe was a king; Rebbe was a Nasi. On the outside he portrayed royalty. But on the inside, in private, hidden, there was **pas bamelach tochal**, the restrictive lifestyle. He was a Nasi; he had to dress royally. People had to see that persona, and people had to respect him. But in his own life, maybe it was **pas bamelach tochal**.

The proof is that Rebbe himself said, “I did not have **hana’ah** from this world even a little bit, not even the measure of my small finger.”

# Question Two: Wealth Among Great People

B’ezras Hashem, we are going to say perhaps a different **pshat** in how Rebbe’s lifestyle, and the lifestyles of other tzaddikim who were rich, are not a contradiction to **pas bamelach tochal**, which is needed for **Kesser shel Torah**.

But **al kol panim**, this is question number two: What do we do with the lifestyles of Amoraim, Tannaim, and great people? Moshe Rabbeinu was rich. Chazal tell us clearly that Moshe Rabbeinu was very rich, and still Moshe Rabbeinu was zocheh to Kesser Torah. You are not going to come and tell me otherwise. So that is question number two.

# Question Three: The Rambam’s Repetition

Question number three is: How could the Rambam tell us that there is a requirement for Kesser Torah of **pas bamelach**, and then, as if repeating it, say that there is also something called not learning Torah from **idun**, from luxury and indulgence?

How do we understand that these are two different things? **Lichorah**, it seems like the same thing. So why would the Rambam repeat himself? Obviously, they are two things, and we have to explain them.

What are the two things? What does the Rambam mean in **Halachah Vav**, and what does the Rambam mean later, in **Halachah Yud-Beis**? At first glance, it looks like the same thing.

# The Inyan of Perishus

So, rabosai, let me discuss with you the **inyan of perishus**. We are saying here that a person is supposed to live a lifestyle of perishus, and this is Kesser Torah. This is what causes and brings about Kesser Torah.

Is there any place in the Torah that teaches us that we have to live such a lifestyle — **pas bamelach tochal, u’mayim bamesurah tishteh**? In the Torah it says,

# Kach Hi Darkah Shel Torah and Its Source

This is the Chachamim: “Kach hi darkah shel Torah.” Do they have a pasuk for this?

Ela mai, you rightfully said, maybe it comes from “Adam ki yamus ba’ohel”: “Ein haTorah miskayemes ela b’mi shemeimis atzmo aleha.” Maybe that is the source—that a person has to kill himself, separate from ta’anugei olam hazeh, in order to learn Torah.

But again, if we understand that there are two Rambams here—one Rambam is discussing Kesser Torah, “pas b’melach tochel,” and this Rambam is something else, a separate principle of “ein haTorah miskayemes ela b’mi shemeimis atzmo aleha”—then we still do not know the source for “kach hi darkah shel Torah.”

And I will tell you even further: the words “darkah shel Torah” imply that this is not a limud from a pasuk, but Chazal telling us that this is the way it is. “Kach hi darkah”—this is the way it is. Experience teaches us the facts: “Kach hi darkah shel Torah: pas b’melach tochel, mayim b’mesurah tishteh.”

## Two Halachos in the Rambam

Halachah 12 may be a separate halachah, and that could be learned from a pasuk. My question is: is this actually the source that a person should stay away from a life of pleasure?

I will tell you something interesting. I do not believe so, because the Rambam never said that a person should not seek pleasure. What the Rambam said was that the way you learn should not be mitoch ta’anugim; it should not be a form of laziness in learning. This Rambam of “ein divrei Torah miskayemim ela b’mi shemeimis atzmo aleha” is not telling me that there is something wrong with enjoyment. It is telling me that there is something wrong with the way you are learning if you are learning in an indulgent, relaxed way.

That is a whole different halachah, Rabbosai, and it already answers the third question that we asked. Why does the Rambam break it up? The answer is that these are two different Rambams. One is teaching me how to learn: the learning itself cannot be in a form of “marpeh atzmo,” in a lazy, laid-back style of learning, because you are not going to get anything from it.

Mah she’ein kein, the Rambam in Halachah 6 is teaching us a lifestyle. Halachah 12 is about the learning itself: the learning cannot be while you are in that state. You have to put your whole self into it, with mesirus nefesh. You have to learn in such a way that you are not preoccupied with nonsense.

Halachah 6 is teaching something else: you need a life of prishus, a life of separation from olam hazeh, in order to be zocheh to Kesser Torah. That is why the Rambam splits it into two separate halachos.

## The Question of a Source for Prishus

The question remains: where do we know “kach hi darkah shel Torah” from? “Ein haTorah miskayemes” can be learned from a pasuk: Torah cannot be obtained, Torah is not going to become a part of you, if you do not learn it properly. But where does “kach hi darkah shel Torah,” the path to Kesser Torah, come from?

Is there any place in the Torah that tells us that a life of prishus is conducive to Torah and mitzvos? Is there such a place? Is there any place in the Torah that says, “Do not have ta’avah; do not have olam hazeh”?

## Lo Sisaveh and the Nature of Desire

I do not know. I can tell you that there is a pasuk in the Torah called “lo sisaveh.” It is one of the Aseres HaDibros: “lo sisaveh.” “Lo sisaveh” means do not have desire; do not seek what is not yours. Chemdah and ta’avah are very close.

Is lo sisaveh a bein adam la’chaveiro or a bein adam laMakom? Is the problem with the chemdah you and how you feel, or is the problem with the chemdah the fact that you want somebody else’s object? Where is the problem? Is the problem you?

# The Nature of Lo Sachmod

Or perhaps the problem is that you are taking, that you want something that belongs to the other person. Is it an *avizrayhu* of *gezel*? Let us call it that: an *avizrayhu* of *gezel*. It is not yours; do not want it.

Or is the problem: do not have *ta’avah*, do not lust? Whatever is needed for you, you will get.

## Chemdah That Leads to Action

I was thinking about it. The Acharonim discuss that the *aveirah* of *Lo Sachmod* is *b’lev*, in the heart, but it must be *shemeivi lidei ma’aseh*; the *chemdah* must lead to an action. If I merely want, that is not the problem. But if I want and I pursue it — for example, I speak to the person: “Maybe give it to me, maybe sell it to me” — I do something in order to obtain it, then I am *oveir Lo Sachmod*. The Acharonim discuss this *yesod*.

We could say that this condition is necessary in order for it to be a *ma’aseh*. Otherwise it remains *b’lev*, in the heart. What makes it into a *ma’aseh aveirah*? The answer is that it is *b’lev* that comes *lidei ma’aseh*. That is why there is a stipulation that it must come *lidei ma’aseh*.

Or perhaps we could say no. The reason it must come *lidei ma’aseh* is because the *chisaron* is not merely the wanting. The *chisaron* is trying to get what does not belong to you, something that belongs to somebody else. If it does not come *lidei ma’aseh*, the *ta’avah* alone is not an *aveirah*. I want — so what? What is wrong if I want? A person can want many things in life. What is wrong with wanting?

## Is Mere Desire Assur?

What do we see from here? The *ta’avah* per se may not be *assur*. It is the *ta’avah* of trying to obtain somebody else’s thing. But the mere wanting — let us say I say, “Ribono shel Olam, I do not want the other person’s. I want mine. But I want. I want a car.” Clearly, that is not the *aveirah*. What is the *aveirah*? That I want? What is the big deal? I want, but I am not hurting anybody.

Why is it that if a person expresses a desire, it is treated as terrible, as though he cannot be *zocheh* to the *keser*? Why not? What is wrong with *ta’avah*?

You hear what we are saying, how we are learning the *sugya*. It is solid. So you say: Why are you asking me this? Because it belongs to the other person. Maybe the whole problem is that you want what belongs to the other person. But let us say I do not want what belongs to the other person. What is wrong with *chemdah*?

You see that *chemdah* is only a problem when it is directed toward the other person’s property. Did the Torah say, “Do not have *chemdah*,” period? Do not desire luxuries? The Torah never said that.

## His’avu Ta’avah in the Midbar

We know there is a parashah of *His’avu Ta’avah*. That may be in the discussion. In the Midbar, they desired *basar*; they had *ta’avah*. But perhaps there the problem was that they were going against what Hashem was giving them. Maybe *His’avu Ta’avah* was a *ta’avah* for the wrong things. If you are given this, you are told to be happy with it, and suddenly you cannot control yourself and you want what was not given to you — that is something wrong.

But what is wrong with asking Hashem: “Ribono shel Olam, give it to me properly”? Again, I find places in the Torah that speak against *ta’avah*, but in those contexts there was something wrong with the *ta’avah*. How do we know regarding a *ta’avah* that is merely extra — a foolish extra — that there is anything wrong with it? “Ribono shel Olam, give me an extra car. Ribono shel Olam, put an extra million into the bank.” What is so bad about it?

I understand that in the Midbar, *His’avu Ta’avah* was bad. Why? Because ultimately, that was a *meridah*.

## The Chakirah in the Rambam

But where it is not a **meridah** at all—what about the concept of, “Ribbono Shel Olam, give me so that I can do good things with it”? What happens if a person seeks **osher v’kavod** for the proper reasons?

From the Rambam it is mashma that it is all nice, but it is not going to be **Keser Torah**. Keser Torah requires, “**Pas b’melach tochal**.” I do not know; perhaps it is a nice thing. Unless the Rambam is not talking about osher v’kavod for himself. I am trying to understand the Rambam: does the Rambam tell you that you should not even ask for osher v’kavod for the right reasons?

I do not know. Maybe all the Rambam meant was osher v’kavod for the wrong reasons. But for the right reasons, perhaps it is not so bad. Or perhaps the opposite: the problem is not osher v’kavod; the problem is that you need “pas b’melach tochal.” You need a restricted life of **aniyus**, of poverty, of humility. If so, then osher v’kavod would not be l’chatchilah, even if it is for the right reasons.

You like my chakirah? It is a very nice chakirah. Does the Rambam mean osher v’kavod because he wants osher v’kavod? Or does the Rambam mean that even if the osher v’kavod is not for himself, it is still not a **ma’alah**, it is still not what you should be asking for, because you should actually have “pas b’melach.” You should have a humble life in order to be zocheh to Keser Torah.

The Rambam says not to look for riches. Does he mean for the wrong reasons, or for the right reasons? The chakirah could be that if it is osher v’kavod, it means you are taking your eye off the ball, so to speak. If I ask for the real reasons, then perhaps it is not a big deal; I am not doing anything wrong. But if the pshat is that we are looking for “pas b’melach tochal,” because you must have that lifestyle, then even if it is osher v’kavod for the right reasons, who says you should be asking for it? That is not going to bring you to Keser Torah.

What does the Rambam mean when he says not to seek osher v’kavod?

## The Nazir and the Question of Perishus

Let me show you an interesting pasuk in this coming week’s parashah, **Parashas Naso**. A nazir is a **parush**. That is what he accepted upon himself: to live a life of **perishus**, a life of staying away from all **ta’anugim**. He does not live the normal life. He lives the life of a parush, a separate person, separated from the world.

Chazal tell us that a nazir is not such a good thing. Maybe he has to bring korbanos because Hashem gave the world to humanity to enjoy. Hashem gave the world for people to enjoy, and he is going and being a parush.

So what do we see here? Maybe this is even a **stirah** to the right thing. We are saying that it is the right thing to be a parush. The nazir teaches me, perhaps, that it is not the right thing to be a parush, because Hashem gives, and you should enjoy.

Can we use the same concept and say: Hashem gave money to the world, let me enjoy it. Hashem instituted a world with cars, let me enjoy it. Hashem instituted vacations, let me enjoy it. Where do we draw the line? I do not see that as a good ra’ayah.

The parashah of nazir, of course, is a shaylah in Chazal, and we pasken like that. The nazir is a complicated sugya. On one hand, he is considered a **kadosh**. On the other hand, he is considered a **chotei** because he was “**nazar atzmo min ha’olam hazeh**.” Which one is it? Is it good, or is it no good?

How could the same act be good and no good at the same time? You ever had this problem? Your mother could see one thing that you do and tell you that it is good and it is no good at the same time. But normally, if it is good, it is good; and if it is no good, it is no good. How could it be good and no good at the same time?

How could the nazir have to bring a korban because he is a chotei, because “nazar atzmo,” he separated himself from olam hazeh, and at the same time be considered a kadosh?

## The Nazir: Chotei and Tzaddik

He is holy.

There is a joke people say over. It is known from the pasuk, “Ein tzaddik ba’aretz asher ya’aseh tov velo yechta”—there is no tzaddik in the world who does good and does not sin. Every tzaddik has some chet. So someone once said, “But such a chotei, like this tzaddik, I have never seen.”

What is he trying to say? You can come and say about a tzaddik that he is a chotei. But such a chotei as this tzaddik? That is what we are saying about the Nazir. You are laughing, but that is what Chazal tell us about the Nazir. He is a tzaddik, and yet he is called a chotei. But such a chotei, like this tzaddik, I have never seen.

So which is he? Is he a chotei or is he a tzaddik? Make up your mind. What do Chazal mean that he is a chotei and a tzaddik at the same time?

## The Question of Prishus

Let me show you the second question I am asking. Where do we draw the line?

HaKadosh Baruch Hu gives, so a person is supposed to enjoy. You could say that about anything: Hashem put everything in the world so that we should enjoy it. Maybe I should look to enjoy every part of this world.

But then Chazal teach us, “Pas b’melach tochel”—you should restrict yourself. Yet the Nazir is called a chotei for doing that. Is it good, or is it not? Something is wrong here. There is a contradiction in Chazal and in the halachah. It is not just a kashya; it is a contradiction. One minute you tell me it is prishus, and one minute you tell me it is an aveirah to be poresh. Which one is it?

## The Nazir and Keser Torah

Rabbosai, let me tell you a shtikel from Reb Yerucham. Reb Yerucham, in this week’s parashah, Naso, on the parashah of Nazir, discusses the pasuk, “Ki nezer Elokav al rosho.” The Nazir carries a crown.

Pay attention to the word crown. Remember, we spoke about keser. We want to identify what Keser Torah is. What does a crown mean?

It is interesting that the Nazir carries a crown on himself. What is the Nazir? The Nazir is a porush. What does the Rambam teach us here? “Mi shenasa’o libo” to acquire Keser Torah must live with “pas b’melach,” with prishus.

Isn’t it interesting? Keser, keser; prishus, prishus. This is my he’arah before I even tell you what Reb Yerucham explains about the nezer of the Nazir. I want to show you how the Nazir comes into our sugya of Keser Torah.

Nezer is a keser; it is a crown. Keser Torah, the Rambam says, comes through what? Through “pas b’melach tochel,” through the restricted, humble life of a person who is not looking for riches. Interesting. The same is true by the Nazir. The Nazir is a porush, and it is called a nezer on him.

## The Ibn Ezra on a True King

Good, I find that it is a crown in both places. What does that crown mean by Nazir?

The Ibn Ezra says: “Veda”—you should know—“ki kol bnei adam avdei ta’avos.” People are slaves to their ta’avos, to the desires of the world. The world is full of ta’avah. People run with such attachment, with such devotion, after those ta’avos.

“Ha’melech be’emes”—a true king—“deyesh lo nezer va’ateres malchus b’rosho.” There are different types of kings. There is a king who does nothing but run after his ta’avos. A president, too, could spend all his days running after his ta’avos.

So we are not talking about just any president. We are talking about a true person who is above the normal. A melech, a king, a real king, a melech be’emes. Who is a real king?

# True Kingship and Freedom from Ta’avos

Yesh lo nezer shel tiferes malchus b’rosho—he truly has the crown of royalty on his head. A person can wear a crown, but that does not mean he has a crown. A melech is not merely someone, Rabbosai, who dresses like a king. A melech is someone who is a king.

## Shlomo HaMelech as Melech al Maklo

Chazal tell us about Shlomo HaMelech that in the beginning he was king over many, over everything. Later he was king only in Yerushalayim. Then, levasof, lo malach ela al maklo—he was king only over his stick, over his walking stick, as the Gemara in Sanhedrin says.

The question is obvious: what kind of melech is that? He was malach al maklo. What does it mean to be a king over a walking stick? The Ba’alei Mussar say: a melech is a melech. It is who he is. Malchus is the royalty of a person. A person can be a melech al maklo. He does not need an entire kingdom. He is a melech, and Shlomo was malach al maklo.

This is what is being said here. We are not speaking about a king who dresses like a king, who plays the role of a king, but about someone who is a king. Who is a king? The one who has a nezer shel tiferes malchus b’rosho—who truly has a crown upon him. Kol mi shechofshi min hata’avos: when he is free from ta’avos, he is a king.

## Keser Torah and Being Governed by Torah

Now, it is interesting: Keser Torah. We will get to it soon, Keser Torah. The Rambam speaks about Keser Torah. Rav Yerucham tells us that true kingship, royalty, a crown—when a person really has a crown upon himself—is when he is free from ta’avah.

What does that mean?

Rav Yerucham says it means like this: a person who has Torah is enslaved by the Torah, to the extent that he has no ability to do what he wants. He is not free in that sense, because he is governed by it. He is enslaved to his Torah. He could say to himself, “I do not want to do this,” but he is addicted. The addiction is so strong that it makes him do it.

## The Example of a Cigarette

He gives a very interesting example: a person who smokes. Rav Yerucham brings a very good example here. Imagine a person who smokes. What is the first thing he does right after Shabbos? Immediately after Havdalah, before he does anything else, the first thing he does is go out to take a cigarette.

That is addiction. He is enslaved. He is controlled, governed by that cigarette. Nothing can take precedence over that cigarette.

More than that, whatever you tell him does not help. That is obvious. They say that many people are lying in hospital beds with illnesses caused by smoking, and the first thing they do when they wake up from surgery is ask for a cigarette.

Your mind tells you, “No cigarette,” but your ta’avah is the boss. That is called avdus. That is called avdus.

An eved has no independent self, no self-wanting. He is governed by the boss. Can the eved come and say, “I do not want”? Can the eved act on, “I do not want”? He cannot.

# The Crown as Freedom from Ta’ivah

A person cannot say, “Today I am tired,” and therefore decide differently. No. An eved means that there is a boss. The boss speaks, and the boss dictates. When ta’ivah becomes your boss, you become an eved to the ta’ivah.

The melech in a person is free from ta’ivah. He is a melech; he dictates. He is the one who sets policy. What is a melech? A melech sets policy. A person can either be a melech in this world, or he can be an eved in this world. This is Reb Yerucham’s understanding of this inyan.

You can either be the boss or the employee. The boss sets the policies. You can be the boss and set policy: “I want to go; I want to sit.” Or you can be the employee, the eved. Then you are being set by the policies of the world, by the ta’ivos. They dictate to you what you have to do.

A crown is a symbol of freedom. It is a symbol that a person is his own boss, so to speak. Therefore, the person who is free from ta’ivah is his own boss.

Why is this called nezer? Why a crown? What is the concept of the crown? Reb Yerucham says a pshat in the piece before that. Nezer means l’ma’alah min hateva. When you want to speak about something that is above, something that is not the norm, it is called l’ma’alah min hateva. It is nezer because it is not normal. The norm is to follow the ta’ivah, and he broke the norm. So he carries on himself something that is above and beyond nature, a characteristic above and beyond what regular people in the world have and attain. He can be shalit over himself, and he is not an eved to the ta’ivah.

That is why it says, “Adam ki yafli.” Nezirus begins with the parashah of “yafli.” Chazal say it is a pele. Why is it a pele? Because it is not the norm. Normal people are subject to ta’ivos. They become enslaved by the retzonos, by the needs of the world. A person who is above and beyond that is called a nazir, who carries a nezer, a crown; he is l’ma’alah min hateva, above and beyond nature. This person freed himself from the enslavement of ta’ivah, so he has a nezer of l’ma’alah min hateva.

This is putting together two pieces of Reb Yerucham.

# Prishus and the Kesser Torah

I want to go a little bit further, to give a little more understanding and explanation of the crown, the concept of the crown for someone who is poresh.

We have established that there is something called Kesser Torah, and Kesser Torah comes from prishus. In the same way that the nazir is called a king who carries a nezer because he is a poresh, we see that prishus brings royalty, a crown, a nezer.

Let us go a little further to identify and explain this crown.

# What Is Ta’ivah?

What is ta’ivah? If you had to explain to someone, “Ta’ivos”—we grew up using that word. Do we know what the word ta’ivah means?

I want to tell you a few pieces from Reb Yerucham and a few pieces from Rav Eliyahu Dessler, where we see that they differ in opinion on what ta’ivah is. I am going to show you a little more chomer, as they say.

Reb Yerucham calls ta’ivah a tumah. It is an impurity. I will read to you Reb Yerucham in Vayikra, in Parashas Metzora, where he discusses tumas shichvas zera. This is on page kuf yud daled in Vayikra.

Reb Yerucham says that shichvas zera is the lightest of all the tumos. It is the lightest of all the tumos. As a matter of fact, today, ta’ivos carry a great deal of tumah.

## Ba’al Keri: The Lightest Tumah and a Severe Chumrah

Tumas shechvas zera is the lightest of all the tumos. Reb Yerucham says that, at the same time, it is the most strict of all the tumos, because a ba’al keri was assur b’divrei Torah. A ba’al keri was not allowed to learn Torah. No other tamei has that din.

Chazal were mesaken that a ba’al keri is assur. What? I am saying that we do not pasken that way. But in those days, a ba’al keri was assur b’divrei Torah. No other tamei has that.

It is a beautiful piece from Reb Yerucham. Anybody who is a lamdan, or a person who wants to know halachah l’maaseh, should know that it is a beautiful shaylah: How could it be that, on the one hand, this is the weakest of all the tumos, and at the same time a ba’al keri is assur b’divrei Torah, which no other tamei is? A tamei is not assur b’divrei Torah; only a ba’al keri. A moradige shaylah.

## The Question of Tumas Shechvas Zera

I read it to you because it is so beautiful:

“Mah omnam tumas shechvas zera?” What is so severe about tumas shechvas zera? “Ve’im ki hakalah mi-yoser ha-tumos”—even though it is the lightest of the tumos, because it does not have a taharah process: no korban, nothing. “Ulam b’tzad echad la-chumra yeseirah”—nevertheless, in one respect it has an added chumrah, “ki ba’al keri gam assur b’divrei Torah”—because a ba’al keri is also assur b’divrei Torah.

That is Reb Yerucham. You want to know what Reb Yerucham is? That is Reb Yerucham. Lamdus. Such a moradige shaylah.

## The Chinuch on Ta’avah and Tumah

He quotes the Chinuch. What is the tumah of shechvas zera? What is it all about?

“Mishorshei ha-mitzvah: lefi she’inyan zeh lo yikreh rak mitzad machsheves ha-ta’avah ha-gufnis.” This comes from ta’avah. It is the only tumah that a person brings about through ta’avah.

The Chinuch continues: “Hora’asenu Toraseinu ha-sheleimah ki ha-guf nikra tamei”—our complete Torah teaches us that the body is called tamei. “Ikar heyoso ba’olam eino rak lehavin ba-muskalos u’lehis’aneig b’Borei”—the essence of a person’s being in this world is not for this; it is to be involved with the concepts of Torah and wisdom, to understand the muskalos and to be connected to the Borei.

Therefore, “k’sheyikreh b’yiheyoso davar shetireh bo hatayaso el ha-ta’avah hachomeris”—when such a thing happens, it is a sign that the person was involved with matters of physical ta’avah. “Ra’ui la’amod yom echad b’tumaso k’dei sheyinnakeh machshavto”—it is fitting for him to remain one day in his tumah so that his thoughts should be cleansed.

## The Sforno: Zuhamas HaNachash

Reb Yerucham says an unbelievable thing. You think ta’avah is just a concept, something not tangible? Listen to the lashon.

The Sforno says on the pasuk, “asher teitzei mimenu shechvas zera litmah vah.” What is the lashon “litmah vah”—to become tamei through it?

Says the Sforno: tumas keri is “litmah vah b’ti’uv zuhmas ha-nachash,” through the contamination, the poison, of the nachash, “v’lo l’kiyum hamin,” and not for the preservation of the species, not for procreation. For if it were for procreation, there would be no tumah in the zera.

It sounds very poetic. What does he mean by “the poison of the nachash”? What is he saying?

Reb Yerucham asks: It is very nice language, but what are you talking about—a poison of the snake? What are you saying?

## The Reality of Zuhamas HaNachash

Says Reb Yerucham: I do not know if you will understand what I am talking about, but I will say it anyway. Do not think that zuhmas ha-nachash is something ruchni, something spiritual, something of the past, something dimyoni, figurative, imaginary, abstract—something “out there.”

No. “Hu inyan metziusi mamash”—it is an actual reality. “Ha-nitan l’simo b’tzelochis, b’tzintzenes”—it can be placed into a glass, into a bottle. You could put it in a cup or a bottle and sell it in a store.

That is Reb Yerucham. We do not realize the greatness of Reb Yerucham.

## Taivah as a Tangible Poison

Taivah is not merely an abstract idea. You could think, what is it—something hard to define? No. It could be sold in stores. It could be bottled, packaged, and handed to you on a plate. What is it? It is a measure of poison. If you had a factory, you could manufacture this poison, put it into boxes, and supply it all over the world.

Says Reb Yerucham, that is the pshat in **sheichvas zera**. Sheichvas zera is the tangible expression of **tumas hataivah**. Therefore it is **metamei**, and therefore a **baal keri** is **assur** in **divrei Torah**. He does not go into the aspect of divrei Torah, but now you can see what he is saying: tumas hataivah is a direct **stirah** to Torah, and therefore a baal keri is assur in divrei Torah.

You want to know the tangible result of **hirhurim of taivos**? It is sheichvas zera. And that sheichvas zera makes a baal keri assur in divrei Torah.

## The Eitzah of the Nachash

This is called the **eitzah shel nachash**. What was the eitzah of the nachash? Does anybody know? Reb Yerucham does not explain it, but this is what he means, **l’chaira**, according to my understanding.

What was the one thing that the nachash put into this world? “**Taavah hu la’einayim**.” Want what is not yours. Go beyond what you were supposed to have, and take it because it is enjoyable. Taivah. It is the eitzah of the nachash. Taivah is tumah.

## Taivah as a Choli Hanefesh

I believe Reb Yerucham is **l’shitaso**, because Reb Yerucham learns that taivah is a **choli hanefesh**. It is a sickness. It is a sickness of the heart.

There are people who have a **choli haguf**. They are physically sick. For example, a person has strep throat, or a different type of bacteria, and if he does not take care of it, he could die from it. Taivah is a choli hanefesh. It is a sickness that comes from the heart.

Reb Yerucham says this in Parashas Re’eh. The Ramban in Bamidbar 11:4 explains what taivah is: it is like a person who has a taivah to eat coals and dirt. You know a person who has a taivah to eat coals and dirt? What would you say about him? He is a meshugganah. He is a sick man. He belongs in a hospital.

“**Ve’zu hi choli ra**”—this is a disease. A healthy person is not going to want to eat garbage. He wants normal, healthy food. If someone wants the opposite, **ein zeh ki im machalah b’nefesh**; it is nothing other than a sickness in the nefesh.

So too with taivah: you know it is poison for you, and you do it anyway.

## Taivah as a Sickness

The answer is that it is a sickness. Reb Yerucham is l’shitaso here: the nachash ingrained into the beriah a sickness called taivah. Every person, when he is born, has this “bacteria” in his nefesh. It is a choli, as Reb Yerucham says in Parshas Yisrael, based on what the Ramban explains.

It is like a person who wants garbage, poison. We find this today with people who have a problem with drugs, or with a certain type of food and cannot control themselves. A person cannot control himself and takes poison into his body. Reb Yerucham says that all taivah is like that. It is a choli.

This is what he means in Vayikra: it is the eitzah shel nachash. It was instituted, brought to us—what do they call that? Courtesy of the nachash. The nachash gave us this sickness.

## Taivah and the Eitz Hadaas

I believe there is another way to understand taivah. I believe the Michtav MeEliyahu learns this way, and I want to point out where it comes from.

Tell me: was the yetzer hara of the Eitz Hadaas a taivah chumris, a material desire, or did it have to do with daas? I thought about it over Shabbos. What was the Eitz? Do you think it was like in the pictures, a delicious apple? A golden delicious painted red, like they paint it in the stores, and she could not control herself because she loved apples? You think that is what it was?

It was the Eitz Hadaas. She ate from the Eitz Hadaas. What was the problem of the Eitz Hadaas? Hashem said not to eat from it. So what was the taivah? The apple? A nice golden delicious? I doubt it highly.

If you notice, the nachash said to her, “Ki b’yom achalchem mimenu…,” when you eat from it, “yodei…,” you will know wisdom. So what did he entice her with? With the wisdom, with the daas. It was not merely physical, like a person running after drugs, where there is nothing psychological behind it, only a physical enjoyment, a certain feeling.

I believe that the taivah the nachash brought was deeper than just a physical taivah. I believe that is what the Michtav MeEliyahu can add to this discussion.

## The Michtav MeEliyahu: Mashal and Nimshal

The Michtav MeEliyahu, rabbosai, is one of the most classic things I have ever read. This is in Chelek Aleph, page 99, “HaMashal VeHaNimshal.” He explains the world as a mashal and nimshal. The whole world can be explained with a parable.

I have to read it to you. It might take a few minutes, but it is kedai, rabbosai. It is kedai because it will change your whole life.

What is a mashal? A mashal is a story; without the nimshal, there is nothing there. It does not exist. There is no such thing. It is just a made-up parable, and the whole toeles of it is only the true statement that comes from it. The point is just to get the nimshal across. That is all it is.

So what happens if a person leaves the shiur and he knows the mashal without the nimshal? He has nothing. Like the meshalim of the Dubna Maggid. Tell me, if you had the meshalim of the Dubna Maggid and you did not have the nimshal, do you have anything? Nothing. It is science fiction. It is just made-up stories. It does not mean anything.

Says the Michtav MeEliyahu: we live our lives that way. “Chulshah zu she’achizas hamashal ve’azivas hanimshal”—this is life. We are busy with the mashal, with the made-up story, and we do not take out the nimshal.

For example, he says, a little child plays with toys. The Michtav MeEliyahu is brilliant; he has such a brilliant understanding. What does the child play with? Most children make up toys in their mind. For example, he takes a broken pot, and it becomes a boat, and he is the captain of the boat.

# The Child’s Toy and the Adult’s Fantasy

In his eyes, mamash, it is reality. My kids do this. They sit in the back of the car and they are driving. You think they are just pretending to drive, but they do everything. They are honking: “Oh, there’s a guy…” When you watch it, you laugh. Why? Because it is not true. It is fantasy.

If a person would go over to a child and steal his toy, do you think he just stole a toy? Reb Yisrael Salanter says it is like being *matbi’a sefinaso* and *machriv beiso*—like sinking his ship and destroying his house. In his little world, it is reality. His toy, his doll, is real. If you do something to his doll, you are killing his baby. But you look at it and say, “Don’t kill your baby? It is a toy. It is two dollars. It is nothing.”

Reb Yisrael Salanter says you do not realize that it is like stealing from a grown-up. What is Reb Yisrael Salanter trying to bring out? With the grown-up also, when you steal his money, you think, “Look what you are doing to him.” But somebody with a different perspective says, “What are you talking about? It is nothing. It is make-believe. You are living in a make-believe world.”

The *Michtav MeEliyahu* says that we never grow out of the fantasy. It turns from one fantasy into another fantasy, from one toy to bigger toys. A toy car turns into a bigger toy car. A Volvo is not a toy car? It is also a toy car. A Mercedes is not a toy car? It is also a toy. It is the type of toy for grown-ups.

I want you to listen to what is going on here. You think you are making a million dollars; it is toy money. This is toy money, and that is toy money. It is all toy money. It is all *tzatzua’im*. You are all playing games here—more money, less money. It is all playing games.

# The Ger Tzedek and the Sand Castle

There is a *maaseh* with the Ger Tzedek. Some of you know it, but I say it over and over. The Ger Tzedek was the son of a big Christian *poritz*, perhaps even a *galach*, and he became a Jew. He was ratted out, they caught him, and they were going to kill him.

When he was in jail, the Gaon sent him a message that he was able to save him with *Sheimos HaKedoshim*; he would be able to get him out. Avraham ben Avraham, the Ger Tzedek, said no.

What was the *mashal* that he sent back to the Gaon? When you have a little child playing in the sand, he makes a castle, and some big person comes and breaks the castle. The little child is so angry: “Look what you did to me! You broke my castle!” But tell me, in twenty years, when he grows up, will he care about the castle? It is a joke. It was nothing.

So he said, the whole world is that way. You think I am upset because they caught me and they are going to burn me? It is nothing whatsoever. When I come to Shamayim, do you think it is going to bother me?

This is the *maaseh* with the Ger Tzedek. The castle for the child—we never grow out of that toy. We just have different toys. We take life seriously, but the truth is that it is a toy. At the end of the day, I came out of the house, I got a car—it is a toy.

# Kavod, Taavah, and the Reality Check

The *Michtav MeEliyahu* says that when you grow up, you leave the little toys, but the *dimyon* is the same. A person runs after *kavod*; he wants *kavod*. What is *kavod*? It is nothing. It does not bring you anything. But in your mind: “I need it.” It is like the little child who needs the toy. What do you need it for? You do not need it.

The grown-up laughs at the child. So the one who grew out of all this laughs at *kavod*: what do you have from it?

The *Michtav MeEliyahu* says—I am going to try to skip a little bit so I can go through the whole thing here—where does this come from? The *taavah* comes because a person does not want to have a reality check of what is real in this world. The moment he has a reality check of what it is all about, what is he running after? Toys.

So the Yetzer Hara gives you a *dimyon*: no, no, no, it is very important to have money; it is very important to have a car; it is very important. This way, a person does not focus on what is really important. It is a *moradige* piece over here.

## Conceptual Taivah as Distraction

He calls it the way the yetzer hara gets you to take your eye off the ball, so to speak, to remove your focus from what is real and from where you should be putting all your emphasis. He gives you distractions. He tells you, “This is important, and that is important.” At the end of the day, you wasted your day, because you did not do what you had to do.

Then he writes, of course, that if a person does not run after it, the truth comes out. So we have a whole new concept of taivah: taivah as a blockage, as a distraction from what is true and real in this world.

I believe that is what the Eitz HaDaas was. The Eitz HaDaas was a distraction. Do you think she needed the apple? Do you think it was physical — “I need an apple” — like someone needs a cigarette? That is not what it was. She was convinced that there were important things in the Eitz HaDaas. There were rules, tremendous things. What was that? It was the taivah that takes the eye off the ball, so to speak, a distraction.

That is the Eitz HaDaas. It has to do with daas. It is conceptual. There is such a thing as a conceptual taivah. Think about it. It is not a physical taivah; it is a conceptual taivah. In your mind, you begin to think, “This is important. This is what you need.” “On the day you take from this, you will be like Elokim.” It is a distraction, a diversion from the truth. That is called Eitz HaDaas, and that too is a taivah.

## Torah and Taivah Cannot Go Together

Lefi zeh, rabosai, I understand: Torah and taivah cannot go together. Torah and taivah cannot go together.

Chazal tell us that Torah is a tavlin for the yetzer hara. It is the antidote for the yetzer hara. How is it the antidote for the yetzer hara? How does it work?

Rabosai, if you learn like Reb Yerucham, the pshat is simple. Taivah is tumah; it is a sickness. If you add kedushah, that kedushah is an antidote to tumah. Very simple. Kedushah is the antidote to the yetzer hara, to taivah and tumah. That is according to Reb Yerucham, who brings the proof from keri, from tumah.

But according to the Michtav Me’Eliyahu, it is deeper. Torah gives you the right perspective. Torah gives you the true perspective. Torah gives you the true goals, and therefore it drowns out the need for taivah.

Again, according to Reb Yerucham, we could say very simply: taivah is tumah, and kedushah counteracts tumah. But according to the Michtav Me’Eliyahu, it is even deeper. Torah gives you the true understanding of tachlis. It helps you focus on why we are here and what we are supposed to do in this world. That drowns out the falsehood that is constantly thrown at us: “Go, this is what it is all about.” No, that is not what it is all about.

## The Rambam’s Presentation

I will prove it to you. The Rambam, when he tells us this halachah that Torah is the tavlin for taivah, breaks it down this way. Gezel and arayos — it is at the end of Hilchos Issurei Bi’ah, Perek Chaf-Beis, the last two or three halachos. A person has to overpower his yetzer hara.

What is kedushah yeseirah? Torah has kedushah. The opposite of tumah — arayos — is tumah. So what is the antidote? Kedushah. Kedushah yeseirah.

Rabosai, Reb Yerucham discusses arayos and the taivah for arayos. What? No, rabosai, the taivah for arayos, no?

## De’ah Nechonah and the Broadening of Da’as

If there is tumah, the antidote is to accustom oneself to **kedushah yeseirah**. Let us see the next words of the Rambam: “**u’vemachshavah tehorah, u’vede’ah nechonah, kedei lehinatzel bahem**” — with pure thought and with correct understanding, in order to be saved through them.

What does the Rambam mean by “**de’ah nechonah**”? If a person has a pull toward **arayos**, that is tumah, so he has to train himself in kedushah. Then the Rambam adds “**u’vemachshavah tehorah**.” But what is “de’ah nechonah”? What is he referring to? How would you translate it? “Straight thinking.” But what does that mean?

## The Rambam’s Addition: Veyarchiv Da’ato Bechochmah

Let us see the next line. “**Veyizaher min ha-yichud**,” he should be careful from **yichud**, as the Chachamim said. Then he says, “**Gedolah mikol zos amru: yifneh atzmo u’machshavto ledivrei Torah**” — greater than all of this, they said, he should turn himself and his thoughts to divrei Torah.

Why? Because Torah is an antidote, right? But the Rambam adds three more words: “**veyarchiv da’ato bechochmah**” — he should broaden his da’as with chochmah. What does that mean? Just say kedushah. A person learns Torah; there is kedushah. Period. “Yifneh atzmo u’machshavto ledivrei Torah” — kedushah. But no. “Veyarchiv da’ato.” He should broaden his da’as, “bechochmah,” with wisdom.

I think the Rambam is telling us that it is not simply that Torah is taharah, and if a person has kedushah it pushes away tumah. It is deeper than that. “Veyarchiv da’ato bechochmah.” There is a certain shallowness, a certain narrow-mindedness, in a person who runs after ta’avah. He does not see the picture. He does not know what it is all about. He is living for the moment, without seeing the broader picture.

Torah gives a person the ability to be “yarchiv da’ato bechochmah.” It broadens his knowledge and his understanding; it broadens his wisdom. There is a certain lack of common sense in running after a foolishness that is gone in a moment. What could be the point of it? You ate the steak last night. A day later, nobody remembers that you ate the steak. How can a person spend his whole life on something that is not there anymore, something that simply disappears?

## Torah as Perspective Against the Yetzer Hara

So what does the yetzer hara do? It dumbs a person down. It tells him: do not focus on the bigger picture. Talk like an idiot. Think like an idiot. “Yarchiv da’ato” means that Torah gives a person a broader concept, a havanah of what life is all about. That is harchavas hada’as with chochmah.

The yetzer hara was “**ki tov le’einayim**” — it looks good. But what about the bigger picture? Do you hear what we are saying? Do you understand it? It is beautiful. Do you see the Rambam? The Rambam could have said very simply: a person learns Torah, and Torah is kedushah. Kedushah is beautiful. But what does he mean by “de’ah nechonah”? What does the Rambam mean by “bemachshavah tehorah” and “vede’ah nechonah”? Torah gives a person de’ah nechonah.

What is that? The way we are learning it is gevaldig. It gives perspective. De’ah nechonah. What are you running after? What do you have from it?

## The Example of a President and a Moment of Ta’avah

Think about a president of the United States. He was, so to speak, king of the world. His legacy could have been such that he created so much; he had so much glory and power. He gave it up for a moment of ta’avah. What are you doing? There is a certain foolishness involved.

What is the explanation? He did not look at the picture. At that moment, he looked at the ta’avah. When you look at him, what do you say? He is a fool. But why could he not understand that at that moment? At that moment, he is not necessarily stupid. The fact is, that person is very bright. He is not stupid.

We are not talking about this president; we are talking about the previous president. This president, we could say, is stupid — and that would be an overstatement.

## Taivah and the Loss of Perspective

I understand. I will try to bring out that if he says he was stupid, then fine; that is one of the good things about it. If you told him that a fox is a smart, shrewd character, then how could he do something so stupid? Stupid! He suffered because of it. If they had a chance to ask him, “Was it worth it? If you had to do it again, would you?” he would say, “What are you, crazy?”

This is not about kedushah. The point here is not kedushah; I am talking about something else. It is taivah, which blocks all perception of reality. All perception of reality.

“You can be knowledgeable about taivah also.”

What do you mean? You have to approach taivah properly. Taivah exists in food and in everything else. So what are you asking?

“The knowledge is not going to help you at all.”

That is not true. A person who is osek baTorah and does it with control, with “pas b’melach tochal,” that is called kibush ha-taivah. But you are skipping. Let us go in order.

In the meantime, the yesod is that taivah is not treated by putting on a first-aid bandage. That is not how it works. It has to work from the core, giving a person a whole new perspective of what it is all about.

## A Mashal from Rav Hai Gaon

Let me tell you a little more. Listen carefully to this. The Sefer Chasidim quotes a teshuvah of Rav Hai Gaon. Now, you might think a teshuvah of Rav Hai Gaon means a chiddush in halachah. No; here it is a story, a mashal. Rav Hai Gaon brings a mashal, teshuvah yud-gimmel.

*Maaseh b’shu’al* — there was a story with a fox. *Sheba alav ha’ari le’ochlah* — a lion came to eat it.

The fox said to him, “*Mah yesh b’yadi lehasbiach?* I am a little fox. You cannot even get full from me. What are you going to do? Eat me up, and you will still be hungry afterward. *Aval ani mar’eh osach adam shamein* — I will show you a fat person. He will fill you up. You could make five meals, five steaks, out of this man.”

There was a pit there, covered over, and the person was behind the pit. That was the fox. The fox is the clever one, the wise guy, the shrewd one. He is thinking to himself: when the lion goes to eat the man, he will fall into the pit, and then the fox will be free. So he tells him, “You see that man there?” But the pit was covered.

When the lion saw the man, he said to the fox, “You know what? I was taught that one has to be careful with people. Why? Because a person can pray to Hashem. If he prays to Hashem, I will be in trouble.”

The fox answered him, “Do not be afraid. Who will get punished? Your children, your grandchildren. In some later generation, someone will have to pay for killing a person. But right now, at least you will get your dinner. At least now you will be full. It is your children; you will worry about it later. Do not worry about it now. Until then, it is a long time.”

The lion listens. “I am hungry now. Now I am hungry. We will worry about it when the time comes.” People are like that: “I will do what I want now, and we will worry about the consequences later.” Sounds familiar?

The lion jumps toward the man and falls into the pit. The fox stands at the side of the pit, looking at the foolish lion. The lion says to him, “I do not understand. You told me that it is only...”

# The Lion, the Fox, and the Cheshbon

The lion says to the fox, “You lied to me. Why didn’t you tell me that I would suffer? You told me that my great-grandchildren would be in trouble from this, not me. Look how I am suffering. I am stuck in the pit now, and I am going to die here from hunger.”

The fox tells him, “You fool. Your grandfather tried this trick many years ago. Now you are suffering for what your grandfather did.” This is brought by Rabbi Chaggai; I am not making this up. The fox says, “Your grandfather did the same foolishness, and now you are receiving the consequence of what he did.”

So the **ari** says, “Wait a minute. That is not fair. Why should my grandfather eat, and then I should suffer for it?”

The **shu’al** tells him, “It is a little late to think about that. You obviously made the same **cheshbon**. You thought: I will eat, and why should my children’s problems concern me? So your grandfather made the same **cheshbon**.” And the shu’al says, “Have a nice day. We will see you later. Goodbye.”

## Analyzing the Mussar of the Story

There are many different lessons that should be taken out of this story. The Alter from Kelm analyzes it beautifully.

The ari was afraid. In other words, he was not completely blind to the dangers involved. It does not say that he was stupid and blind. He was afraid. The thought entered his mind: “Wait a minute. If I eat a person, I will get into trouble.” But because he was a fool, he was able to be convinced.

Now, who is the **melech** of all the **chayos**? The ari. He is the king. Chazal tell us that a melech is connected to **mishpat**, and mishpat requires common sense. And the truth is, says Rav Yerucham, he did have common sense, because afterward he asked, “The fathers eat and the children are punished?” That means he had a concept of right and wrong. He was not simply an idiot off the street.

In other words, we are speaking about someone who was able to think in advance, and he was able to think afterward, but at that moment he could not think. Why not? Because maybe he would get more meat. This little feeling of “I am hungry” made him unable to think about what he had thought before and what he understood afterward. Beforehand, he was able to think that it was dangerous. Afterward, he was able to realize that it was wrong, that the whole thing had been a mistake. But at that moment he could not think.

**Ve’anah barach mimenu ha’muskal hahu?** Where did it go? Where did all this wisdom go? The answer is: **ta’avah**.

## Human Ta’avah and Animal Ta’avah

The Alter from Kelm says: Who has more ta’avah, an animal or a human being? You say a human being; you say an animal. The Kuzari says: **ha’adam ta’avaso yoser chazakah**. A person’s ta’avah is much stronger. His desires are much greater.

That is what Dovid HaMelech said: **“Hotzi’ah mimasger nafshi.”** Take me out of this **masger**, this jail. Free me. He meant the **yetzer hara**. The yetzer hara is so strong that it imprisons a person.

You hear the pshat? A person can give up everything and fail to see reality for the sake of one moment of enjoyment. Where is all the wisdom? It is gone. The ta’avah of a person is much greater.

This is one part of the mashal. There are several parts that he learns from here. Why is the ta’avah of a person worse? Because an animal does not eat something that is not good for it. If something is not good for an animal, it will not eat it. A person will eat something even when it is not good for him.

That is the simple way of saying it. In nature, it is that way. But I think it is deeper, and it has to do with this idea in **Michtav Eliyahu**: an animal is governed by instinct for what it wants.

## Ta’ivah, Need, and Want

He wants it. What he does not want, if there is no good for him in it, he does not go for. An animal, even a behemah, has an instinct for what is good for it and to stay away from what is not good for it. That is a different type of ta’ivah: what it needs.

A person has an instinct even for what he does not need. That is what I hold is peshat in this. An animal has a ta’ivah for what it wants, and the ta’ivah is strong—do not get me wrong. It will pounce on it and eat what it needs. A lion or a bear will rip a person to pieces in order to eat, but it is a ta’ivah for what it needs.

The yetzer hara by a Yid is a ta’ivah for what he does not need—farkert, for what he is not supposed to have—and also for what he needs. It is for what he needs and for what he does not need.

## Freedom from Ta’ivah

Lefi zeh, I understand what it means to have freedom from ta’ivah. The Rabbi said that freedom from ta’ivah is not freedom from physical want. Freedom from ta’ivah is a conceptual thing. It is a whole way of understanding, a whole insight into what this world is about.

Freedom from ta’ivah is not like today, when they want you not to smoke and they give you something that takes away the physical ta’ivah—a patch, right? Could they come and talk to you and convince you? No, because that is not necessarily going to work. It might work for some people, but it does not necessarily work.

Adam’s ta’ivah comes from the mind. It is not only that I have a ta’ivah for something. Some people do have a ta’ivah for mamon and for kavod; they do have that physical ta’ivah. But it also comes from a ta’ivah in the mind, which means that the concept of what the world is all about is distorted. What is important? Freedom from that ta’ivah is in the mind.

## Rav Zissel and the Lesson of Matzah

I will tell you where I got this from. This is also a shtickel from Rav Zissel, in the second chelek, perek chaf, of the Mussar. Rav Zissel asks: Why did it have to be that Galus Mitzrayim ended with the geulah in this way? What is that all about?

It is a nice story that the dough had to be taken quickly and did not have time to rise; the dough became matzah. It is an event that took place. But obviously there is a reason for it. “Nireh,” says Rav Zissel, there is a reason for it. It is not just that it happened to be that way.

Getting back to our Mishnah and the Rambam that we are discussing, the Torah is teaching us that we are not looking for chayei tza’ar. Do we want you to suffer? We do not want you to suffer. So then what does it mean?

The answer is that the Mishnah is teaching us a way of thinking. Sound familiar? That is how I learned the Rambam. I was so happy when I saw it. I said, the Alter is learning peshat in the Rambam the same way. He is not telling you to suffer. The point is not to suffer, and the point is not merely to tell you how to behave. It is not about behavior. This is the outlook of a ben Torah. This is how he is supposed to view things.

What does that mean? The worst thing is ta’ivah. Because of this, great people understood that one who removes ta’ivah has more enjoyment than one who runs after his ta’ivah. This is a concept, by the way.

# The Bigger Picture Behind Holding Back

This is a concept people use; it is used in psychology. You will enjoy not having the piece of cake, because you held yourself back, more than you would enjoy having the cake. They use this idea. Anybody who ever went on a diet knows this. They teach you that you will have more from not eating it than from eating it.

What is the pshat in that? What does it mean?

I always thought the pshat was that if you are able to overpower yourself, there is a certain enjoyment in that. But it is deeper than that, because then it would not be as much as the candy itself. Let me tell you something: it is hogwash to think that you enjoy not eating a doughnut more than eating a doughnut. If that is what you think, you need therapy; you need a psychiatrist.

So what does it mean?

You see that the Alter of Kelm says it. It is interesting: this is a concept used today in psychology, and you see that the Alter of Kelm used it.

What it means is this: when you go after the cake, what did you do? You gave up the bigger picture for the small moment, for that moment of enjoyment. A person like that can never be happy. There is no way to be happy, because the smaller picture is not a happy one. If it is about the ta’avah, the ta’avah is never enough in the small moment. You are not happy.

If a person lives with the bigger picture, he will be very happy. That is what it is. If you look at Rav Shamshon Raphael Hirsch, when he explains this, he says that freedom is moach. He says it clearly: *ha’cheirus ha’amitis hi cheirus ha’moach*. It is the freedom of the mind. We will get to that in a few minutes, maybe.

But the point is that when you see the bigger picture, you will be happy. When you are busy with the details, you are not going to be happy. When you are busy with, “I have to have this, and I have to have that,” how much of that can you have? That is what it is all about. If you are able to overlook the moment’s need for the greater purpose of life, you will have *oneg*. You will have enjoyment.

# Keser Torah and Living Above the Bloteh

Now, rabosai, with this we can say the pshat in the Rambam. The Rambam is speaking about *kach hi darkah shel Torah*. It is not the same thing as *adam ki yamis ba’ohel*. *Kach hi darkah shel Torah* means this is the concept, the hashkafah, that a person needs in order to be zocheh to the *keser Torah*.

What is *keser*? *Keser* is, in truth, a crown, a *nezer Elokav al rosho*. He is living a different life. Chazal tell us: *man malchi? Rabbanan*. Who are kings? The Rabbanan. What is it? It is that he does not live in the *bloteh*. Let us use the word *bloteh*. Do you know what *bloteh* means? The dirt of this world. He lives in the shamayim. He lives somewhere royal. He is living in a different atmosphere.

Chazal tell us: *man malchi? Rabbanan*. A *nezer Elokav al rosho*. This, rabosai, is the meaning.

Where in the Torah does it say that you should not have ta’avah? The answer is that the Torah does not have to say it. The life of Torah means not ta’avah. That is what it means. It means that you are looking at something completely different. Your focus is on something else. Ta’avah means that your focus is on things that are not real. Torah teaches a person to have his focus on things that are real.

# V’ahavta L’rei’acha Kamocha: Living Beyond Yourself

I will just give it over with a mashal. The Torah tells us that when the ger came to Hillel, he told him that *v’ahavta l’rei’acha kamocha* is the *yesod haTorah*. The rest is only *peirush*; it is only an explanation.

How is the Torah an explanation of *v’ahavta l’rei’acha kamocha*? What do Chazal mean by that?

The baalei mussar explain that *v’ahavta l’rei’acha kamocha* means that you do not live for yourself. There is something more than just you in this world. Torah teaches that yesod. A person who lives only for himself is a stirah to all the mitzvos in the Torah.

You have to live for something greater than yourself. You live for the good of Hashem. You live for the good of your relatives. You live for the good of your neighbors.

# The Larger Picture of Torah

It is a bigger picture than just me. That is why we say: leave room for another person. It is not only about you.

So too, ta’avah is a contradiction to Torah. Ta’avah means: it is me, this moment. Torah is: it is not me, and it is not this moment. It is about a bigger picture. This is the hashkafah of the Torah. And this, the Rambam tells me, is Kesser Torah.

## Na’aseh V’nishma and Kesser Torah

This, rabbosai, is the Yom Tov of Shavuos that we celebrate. Na’aseh v’nishma—what is na’aseh v’nishma? We will do and we will hear. Obedience. Na’aseh: we will do it. There is no nishma first; we will do it. That is avdus. It is not about me. That itself is Kesser Torah.

A goy lives for himself. A Yid lives a life of Torah. It is not about himself. That is Kesser shel Torah, and that is na’aseh v’nishma. Na’aseh. Nishma means: I will hear it, and then I will decide if it is for me to do. No. Na’aseh. I do. I keep the Torah. It is not about nishma; it is not about me. That is called Kesser Torah.

## Pas B’melach Tochal and the Question of Enjoyment

That is why it says, pas b’melach tochal. When it is not about you, then pas b’melach tochal is understood. It is not about me, and it is not about my enjoying myself.

My father always used to say something, and years later I understood it. For years I did not understand it. My father used to say, “Who says you have to enjoy yourself? Where does it say that you have to enjoy yourself?” I never understood it. What do you mean? Of course. That is pashut. But when I analyzed it, it was not so pashut.

What was he trying to say? It depends on your perspective. If your perspective is me, and I am here to enjoy myself, then of course that is life: life means I have to enjoy myself. But if life is explained differently, if it is explained as being for a bigger good, then it is not obvious that I have to enjoy myself. What is obvious is that I have to learn Torah.

When you understand why you are here, then you understand whether you should have this lifestyle or that lifestyle. That is what it means: kach hi darkah shel Torah. It is not that you are here for self-enjoyment; the opposite, you are here for Torah. Of course, then, this is darkah shel Torah.

## Ashrecha Ba’olam Hazeh

That is why Chazal learned Torah from a pasuk. It is not about the pasuk alone. It is the derech shel Torah. It is the hashkafah. It is what the Torah stands for. It stands for not making an ikar out of this world, but rather: pas b’melach tochal, u’baTorah atah amel; she’im atah oseh kein, ashrecha ba’olam hazeh.

Do you hear? What do Chazal want with “ashrecha ba’olam hazeh”? They are trying to refocus what ashrecha is. That is the meaning of “ashrecha ba’olam hazeh.” If I come and tell you, “I did not have this, and I did not have that,” and you say “ashrecha,” then you are missing the point. The Torah is teaching me what real ashrecha is. If I have ashrecha without all this, then I really have ashrecha.

Because if ashrecha is something else in this world, then it is not ashrecha. There is no end to wanting, and it does not come, and it is nothing. Ein adam meis v’chatzi ta’avaso b’yado. I have nothing from it. Farkert: kach hi darkah shel Torah. This is the hashkafah—the word darkah.

That is what I saw from Rav Simcha Zissel: the word darkah means that this is the proper hashkafah of the Torah. The Torah is there to teach me what the world is meant for. Pas b’melach—this is what it is saying—and then you will be happy.

## Perishus and the Nazir

Now let us talk about nezirus: kesser, kesser, kesser. What is the difference between the nazir who is called a chotei and the nazir of whom it says, nezer Elokav al rosho?

Ein hachi nami: if a person pursues perishus without changing the hashkafah of it, he is a chotei. Of course he is a chotei. When is he a chotei? If the pshat is that he is not holding by it; his mind is that he really needs it, and he is merely holding himself back from it. That is called a chotei.

It cannot be only b’ma’aseh. It has to be machshavah. The very fact that you have to stay away from it is already a very big...

# Pas B’melach Tochal as an Outlook

That is true also, but I am not going there. I am trying to say that the **ma’aseh** of **pas b’melach tochal** without the **moach** of **pas b’melach tochal**—the outlook, the way of looking at life that **pas b’melach tochal** represents—is not right. The Ribono Shel Olam gave a world, and that itself is not a **stirah** to **pas b’melach tochal**, because **pas b’melach tochal** is the way you go through it.

Let us say I do not have it. No—even if I do have it, I can still have **pas b’melach tochal**. It is not **nogea** to me. **Pas b’melach tochal** is how you view it, not how you act in it.

## Chayei Tzaar Tichyeh

What about **chayei tzaar tichyeh**? **Chayei tzaar** is not that good. That already tells me the outlook. **Chayei tzaar** does not simply mean **tzaar**. It means **tzaar afukei ta’anugim**; it excludes **ta’anugim**. That is what it means.

## Rebbe and Lo Nehenesi

Rebbe said, **lo nehenesi b’etzba ketanah**. What does **lo nehenesi** mean? It means: I had it, but I did not know from it. That is, that is not what brought me happiness. It was not an **ikar** for me. It was not **nogea** to me. It was a means. It was this—okay, now what? That was not Rebbe. Rebbe was saying: to me, this was not my life. My life was the Mishnayos.

Of course, it is a very high **madreigah**. It is too much. **Pas b’melach tochal** is very hard.

No, I am talking about the opposite—not **pas b’melach tochal**. **Pas b’melach tochal** is very simple, and still completely good. I do not have this; I live on the floor in the middle. I will get there. So this is saying everything? The opposite.

I hear what you are saying. I hear it, but you see from Rebbe that it is that way.

## Hashkafah, Not an Instruction Book

The way it sounds is that it is an instruction book.

Right. I am saying it is not an instruction book; it is **hashkafah**. And the **ra’ayah** is from Rebbe, because Rebbe had everything, but **lo nehenesi**. What does **lo nehenesi** mean? It means it was nothing to me. That is what we see from Rebbe. The **teretz** is that Rebbe is saying: I had it all, but it did not mean anything to me. It was not **nogea** to me.

So while he eats, or whatever he does, what does that mean? He gets the **ta’avah**?

It was not for the **ta’avah**.

I understand that, but he gets the **ta’avah**. What did he do with the **ta’avah**?

**Lo nehenesi** means he gets no **ta’avah**. He has no **ta’avah** for it.

I understand: no **ta’avah**. Ignore it?

Ignore it. Ignore it.

I have ten million dollars in my pocket. I do not want to ignore it.

It is not ignoring it. It simply does not mean anything. **Vaiter**—I will do something with it. What do you want me to do about it? But it was not, ‘Oh my God, I have ten million dollars.’

That is right. But **mimeila**, a person could come to such a thing: I enjoyed it before; I want more.

Let me tell you something. I enjoyed it. Turn off the tape for a minute. I want you to know something.